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1. Introduction1
More than half of Europeans and almost 40% of people living in Spain have recently 
signed some sort of petition (Quaranta, 2015)  In other words, they have attempted to change 
a certain aspect of reality, using their signature  This kind of participation is one of the most 
common and widespread after voting  In the USA, for example, national polls show that 
signing a petition is 4 to 5 times more frequent than participating in a demonstration (Durso 
et al , 2018)  Despite most of these initiatives corresponding to non-regulated actuations, 
otherwise referred to as bottom-up participations, many public institutions have tried to 
enable regulated mechanisms which allow an organised process of collecting signatures, as 
a way of influencing public decision-making.
The subject of this report is to study the participatory tools which enable citizens to 
initiate a process of collecting signatures in order to influence local institutions. These ini-
tiatives have several aims: to promote a debate in the Chamber of local representatives, for 
example, or to to call a referendum regarding a political proposal, or perhaps the removal 
of a public officer. Here we have presented two reasons which help explain why they can be 
regarded as a desirable method of participation  Firstly, it could be said that there is not a 
large amount of effort required from the participants  This facilitates not only a high number 
of participants, but also a reduction in the social bias found in other forms of participation, 
which involve very specific sections of the population. Secondly, it may generate a process 
with a strong capacity for political impact 
With this study we aim to contribute to the knowledge and reflect upon these partic-
ipatory tools which have not been fully studied at local level, despite their growing presence 
in very diverse areas of the world  It will assess a combination of institutional tools that, if 
well designed, can open new channels to social involvement 
In order to analyse their use and potential difficulties, we are going to examine how 
these tools of initiative operate in a multitude of geographical and administrative contexts  
We are going to pay particular attention to issues such as thematic scope, regulation, validity 
requirements and their relationship with the decision-making process  To achieve this, we 
are using two principal means. The first and most important is the analysis of 21 cases which 
illustrate different models, and their strengths and weaknesses  Using our selection criteria, 
we have attempted to cover a diverse overview of situations and regulations from all points 
of view (diversity of objects, of geographical and cultural areas, of more successful and less 
successful cases)  It is worth noting that the availability of accessible information has un-
doubtedly favoured the predomination of experiences in English and Spanish speaking areas  
Experiences at local level have been prioritised, but two particularly illustrative supralocal 
cases have also been included 
For each of these cases a reference sheet has been designed, each with a similar 
format, based on all the primary and secondary information that we have been able to find 
(the sources are detailed in each reference sheet in section 5) 
Additionally, we have conducted 20 online interviews with experts (see table A1 in the 
Annex) regarding the subject (12 men and 8 women, 12 Europeans and 8 from other conti-
nents, 15 people from university institutions and 5 from other research centres or founda-
tions)  They have provided very relevant information, both about the existence of these tools 
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and their most interesting experiences with them  They also provide information about the 
documentation and their specific opinions regarding some of the experiences. We want to 
thank them greatly for their valuable contribution to this study 
The report is structured into four parts  After the introduction, the second section 
defines the object of study and details previous debates about its scope and limitations. In 
other words, primarily we establish the definition and scope of several types of initiatives and 
then we examine their different potential effects (both positive and negative), according to 
previous research in the topic  In section 3 we look at the origins of citizens’ initiatives and 
their current presence in different geographical contexts  Section 4 analyses our empirical 
evidence, through a comparative and transversal reading of the 21 studied cases, together 
with a literary review of citizens’ initiatives  In this section, we analyse the main character-
istics of each of the initiatives: how they are regulated, who can initiate them, which issues 
can be addressed (and which cannot), what are the established procedures to allow them to 
operate, the number of signatures required and, finally, their influence in decision-making. 
The analysis performed in each of these sections can be consulted in the reference sheets 
which better illustrate the ideas presented  The large section at the end includes the 21 
corresponding reference sheets covering the initiatives that have been analysed during the 
report  The study ends with our conclusions and the bibliography where further information 
about the issue can be found 
5
2. What is the initiative: typology and potential uses
In this section we define our object of study, the different types of citizens’ initiatives. 
Following this, we introduce a debate to discuss the expectations and concerns that these 
tools generate in the context of increasing citizen disaffection with representative institu-
tions 
2.1. Types of initiative
To explain what we mean when addressing the different initiatives of citizen partic-
ipation is not an easy task, given the multitude of existing versions and terms, both in the 
regulatory and academic fields. If we focus more broadly on the mechanisms of direct de-
mocracy, these constitute a set of procedures that allow citizens to make direct political 
decisions through voting, far beyond regular elections  This voting can be determined by law, 
being made compulsory, it can be promoted by public authorities (known as a top-down 
process) or it can depend on the collection of signatures (bottom-up) (Ruth et al , 2017)  In 
this work we focus on the latter method, where the citizen is the actor who initiates the 
process, and we include both the mechanisms that lead to voting and those that allow the 
presentation of collective proposals upon which parliament or deliberative councils decide 
Therefore, our object of study includes all the mechanisms which allow citizens to 
initiate a process of collecting signatures in order to influence, either in a binding way or as 
proposals, the decision-making or public representation processes, paying special attention 
to local level  This collection of signatures may have various objectives:
1  To push forward a regulatory proposal (bylaw, constitutional change or law) 
that fulfils the procedural requirements and leads to a referendum being held over 
the issue (legislative initiative) 
2  To push forward a public policy proposal to be considered by the correspond-
ing representative bodies, who have the power to decide whether to apply it, put it to 
a vote, or reject it (agenda initiative) 
3  To push forward a referendum proposal regarding a matter of public inter-
est, where the corresponding authority can decide to carry it out or not (referendum 
initiative) 
4. To respond to a policy or specific legislative proposal from the public author-
ities, promoting a referendum for its approval or rejection (abrogative referendum) 
5  To push forward a referendum in order to decide if an authority (executive, 
legislative) or a government body (the council or parliament as a whole) will continue 
in charge or will be removed before the end of their term (recall initiative) 
In some countries, a different type of citizens’ initiative can be found: The consti-
tutional or statutory initiative  This focuses on the promotion of a referendum or debate 
within the representative bodies, regarding changes to the constitution (at local level, in the 
development of proposals for constitutional reform, or the organisational statute of local 
government)  With this option, the initiative tends to incorporate a need for higher numbers 
of signatures compared to legislative and agenda initiatives, with which they overlap 
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The outcomes of the initiative can be advisory (in general, this defines the agenda 
initiative, which are proposals) or binding (comparative legislation shows variability amongst 
the remaining initiatives)  The initiatives are a set of diverse tools, with very dissimilar ob-
jectives and degrees of connection in decision-making  When we want to refer jointly to 
the tools which begin as a collection of signatures, we use the term citizens’ initiatives or 
simply initiatives 
As table 1 shows, we can differentiate these tools according to the mechanisms put in 
place once the required support has been achieved and validated  Agenda and referendum 
initiatives leave the corresponding representative body in charge of the final decision, while 
the remaining initiatives almost always necessarily lead to a popular referendum (whether 
binding or non-binding)  The table also differentiates initiatives according to their goals, with 
the agenda initiative promoting debate between legislative representatives and the others 
which look to hold a referendum  In cases like the Swiss legislative initiative, negotiations 
with the parliament can commence, with the possibility of the proposal being withdrawn 
without a vote if an agreement is reached with the legislative. A final decision to withdraw 
is left to the promoter committee and not to the authorities 
On the other hand, those tools which necessarily result in a referendum being called 
(legislative, abrogative and recall initiatives) can be distinguished according to their objec-
tives  Legislative initiative is proactive, it addresses an issue which is not present in the gov-
ernment agenda (a non-decision; Kersting, 2009), whereas abrogative and recall initiatives are 
reactive; they promote the rejection of existing political decisions or public service positions 
Table 1. Types of initiatives according to their goal and mandatory nature in the  
mobilisation of the referendum







Debate between  
representatives Agenda initiative
Source: Own elaboration
These citizen-initiated tools differ from those where the referendum is called by a 
constitutional mandate or through the efforts of the authorities, either under a united or 
divided government, where one power can initiate a process against the decision of another 
(for example, executive authorities against legislatives or vice versa) (Welp and Ruth, 2017)  
Podolnjak (2015) distinguishes between decision-controlling and decision-promoting referen-
dums  Decision-controlling referendums take place when they are promoted by a political 
actor who is not the author of the proposal  This would be an abrogative initiative, being 
reactive in nature, where citizens request a vote regarding a governmental decision  In con-
trast, with decision-promoting referendums, the promoter is the one who also develops the 




The types of initiative described represent an operational simplification. Nevertheless, 
the reality is far more complex, and the categories cannot always be fully defined. To begin 
with, there is no consensus regarding the terminology used to refer to these citizens’ initi-
atives, nor is there any universal referendum terminology (Suksi, 1993)  Agenda initiative is 
also called indirect initiative, popular legislative initiative, citizens’ proposal, citizens’ motion, 
right of proposal, popular demand, indirect popular initiative, citizens’ petition, law initiative 
or inhabitants’ initiative  It is also called normative initiative when the aim is to present re-
gional or local ordinance projects which are to be submitted for debate by the relevant body 
Referendum initiative does not have any established terminology (Schiller, 2011a)  It is 
also referred to as motion for a referendum, or proposal of advisory popular voting (in this 
case, the possible referendum would be non-binding)  By the same token, abrogative initia-
tive is also called the initiative of popular referendum, citizen-initiated referendum, rejection 
initiative or popular veto  A notable characteristic of abrogative initiative is that it distin-
guishes between being directed towards existing legislation, as occurs in Italian legislation, 
or towards approved but not yet current legislation, as in Swiss regulation (Breuer, 2008a) 
One characteristic of recall initiative is that it is promoted by citizens, unlike recall ref-
erendum which is promoted by the authorities in order to ratify a decision already taken  The 
latter resembles other processes for removing public servants from their positions, where 
the promotion and decision came from the authorities, such as in the case of impeachment  
However, these do not involve citizens, whereas the recall referendum does  In this study we 
only consider the recall initiative promoted through the collection of signatures 
For its part, references to legislative initiative as initiative and referendum, popular or 
citizens’ referendum initiative, popular citizens’ initiative, right of initiative, initiative process, 
city initiative, direct initiative or citizens’ political initiative have also been found  In some 
countries, like Switzerland, Italy, Germany or France, when initiatives at the local level are 
referred to, the term is accompanied by the adjective “communal” 
In some cases, once a legislative or referendum initiative is presented, authorities have 
the option to propose an alternative  In Switzerland, a negotiation process can be opened 
which isn’t part of the regulation, but an alternative which has already been put into prac-
tice  It allows for the approval of the proposal through other means, without the need to 
consult citizens (if, when faced with an assembly proposal the promoter committee decides 
to withdraw the initiative) or even lead to citizens being allowed to vote on a choice of four 
eventualities: the original initiative, a negotiated initiative between the parliament and the 
promoter committee, the parliament’s counter-proposal, or maintaining the status quo (i e : 
rejection of all the former) 
A central element in all these initiatives is their role within the democratic system  
This can range from a logic of control or counterbalance of the processes of political rep-
resentation, or, in the other extreme, generating a more propositional dynamic within poli-
tics  The initiative may also take on the role of mobilising support on behalf of the political 
authorities, when triggered by parties with representation (through the collection of signa-
tures), along with the support of other associations  The legislative initiative, by permitting 
citizens to develop a legislative role through the introduction of issues in the political agenda 
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(Breuer, 2008a), allows citizens and the associative network to intervene directly in the deci-
sion-making process. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that this intervention is mediated 
by numerous technical, legal, political and social restrictions  As case studies will show (see 
section 5), it is not easy to gather thousands of signatures and then to formulate a proposal 
The agenda initiative relates to the right to place an issue within the political agenda 
(Kaufmann and Waters, 2004)  It is often considered an incomplete initiative (Schiller, 2011a), 
given that the administration has the power to make the final decision on the proposed issue. 
This tool, by opening up the public agenda to innovative points of view coming from civil 
society, can potentially counteract dynamics of exclusion by paving the way for proposals 
that would otherwise never be heard  (Christensen et al , 2017)  Given that the agenda initi-
ative represents a tool halfway between the right to petition and other binding tools, there 
exists a possibility that they may be complemented in a specific process. For example, if 
the agenda initiative includes a referendum being held over a certain issue –Peruvian and 
Ecuadorian legislations establish this when the initiative is not dealt with– then it becomes 
a referendum initiative  Furthermore, if a successful collection of signatures takes place 
outside the official channels, its impact can be similar to an agenda initiative (as in the ex-
amples of Cordoba (see sheet 9) and Krakow (see sheet 20) where associative and political 
actors initiated signature collection campaigns to voice proposals for maintaining the names 
of certain streets, or against the winter Olympics) 
Other types of initiatives operate as reactive instruments or tools of vertical control  
The abrogative initiative, when permitted to deal with legislation which is not yet current, 
(like in Switzerland), constitutes a potential barrier for measures that have a majority op-
position of voters or powerful social actors that decide to mobilise in order to block their 
approval  When it enables the right to decide on retrospective measures (like in Italy), it acts 
as a corrective in decision-making by public representatives; it allows the measures which 
don’t coincide with the views of the citizens to be repealed  For its part, the recall initiative 
represents a retrospective accountability mechanism that allows citizens to sanction irre-
sponsible behaviour beyond the electoral processes  In saying that, it also enables powerful 
socio-political actors to boycott government action when they are unable to control the 
electoral process 
2.2. What are its uses?
The promotion and development of citizen participation initiatives has been subjected 
to an intense debate  In this, the opportunities and risks associated with it have stood out 
both from a theoretical perspective, as well as from empirical analysis focusing on effects, 
strengths and weaknesses  For example, the case study carried out in Australia (Canberra and 
the Australian Capital Territory) demonstrates the political and economic debate surround-
ing the introduction of the local initiative  Ultimately, this depends upon the actors and the 
arguments through which it is presented, the model proposed, as well as the pre-existing 
participatory tools available in the area (see sheet 13) 
In this section we address some of these debates  We focus on different areas of anal-
ysis, such as, the possible solution that these tools pose in the face of problems of legitimacy 
and trust suffered by representative institutions; problems relating to the resources needed 
to participate and the consequent danger of the co-option of these tools by interest groups 
and the logic of democratic deepening, both in proactive terms, such as those relating to 
control, or its impact on the quality of democracy and decision-making processes 
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2.2.1. Political trust
Recent decades have witnessed a global trend of declining confidence in the institu-
tions of representative democracy (especially political parties and Parliaments), which has 
often been described as a political crisis  Traditionally, criticisms arising from the general cit-
izenry had focused on policies or governments, whilst recent social movements such as the 
15M in Spain express a more encompassing rejection of the political and economic system, 
through slogans such as “No Nos Representan” (They do not represent us) (Gonzalo, 2017). 
Along the same lines, the slogan “Que se vayan todos” (Throw them all out) that emerged in 
the Argentinean crisis of 2001, also showed a general rejection, whilst the “We are the 99%” 
of the Occupy Wall Street Movement synthesized, in a very graphic way, the perceived breach 
between the citizenry and political and economic elites  This also occurred in Mexico with 
the “#YoSoy132” (#IAm132) slogan, as well as in Chile’s student movement 
 Since the 1970’s, mechanisms for civic participation have been conceived as a poten-
tial antidote in the face of growing political disaffection, particularly in Western countries 
(Pateman, 1970)  Recent studies regarding support for participatory processes in countries 
such as the USA, Spain, Finland or the UK, find that public opinion is generally in favour of 
direct democratic tools such as referenda  This preference is concentrated amongst partic-
ular social groups, such as the young and those who position themselves on the left of the 
ideological spectrum (Font et al , 2012) 2This increases pressures for making institutional 
changes, that can open up the democratic process via mechanisms that permit an avoidance 
of political parties, such as the initiative (Dalton and Welton, 2005)  It is no coincidence that 
in countries such as Spain, where levels of political trust are hitting all-time lows, partici-
patory rhetoric has climbed in position (Ganuza and Font, 2018) 
Could the introduction of new direct democratic tools such as the initiative contrib-
ute to increase levels of trust in the institutions which they are hosted by, and even lead to 
a greater level of interest in politics? When participatory institutions are introduced, they 
lead to contextual changes not only in terms of public policy, but also in terms of political 
culture. More specifically, the citizens’ initiative can be conceived as a solution to diverse 
problems, such as falling levels of participation, the abuse of power or unresponsive gov-
ernments (House of Lords, 2010)  However, what initially seems a solution to a problem can 
also generate adverse effects  If initiatives intended to promote participation are not well 
designed, or are perceived to be of low practical use, they could generate frustration and 
increase dissatisfaction 
2.2.2. Electoral and non-electoral mobilisation
Electoral mobilisation is essential to the strengthening of the legitimacy of demo-
cratic political institutions  This is a central pillar of representation (the more people vote, 
the more legitimate the result, although other equally important conditions must also exist, 
such as, free and fair competition between electoral options)  The question in this respect 
is whether participatory processes, such as, the citizens’ initiative serve to strengthen or to 
weaken representative institutions  Research points in both directions, but no studies are 
focused specifically on the initiative at a local level.
 In California (USA), participation in popular initiatives is slightly lower than that in 
representative elections, and use is falling since the initiative was instigated  As such, the 
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potential to increase electoral mobilisation has not materialised (Collins and Oesterle, 1995)  
This case points to the risk that citizens might be made weary by the proliferation of elec-
toral events, thereby decreasing levels of participation  Switzerland is the paradigmatic 
case of this possible tendency: the country which offers the most opportunities for direct 
participation, is also a country with relatively low levels of electoral turnout  Although other 
explanatory factors exist for this relationship, it also seems clear that the existence of mul-
tiple channels for participation could facilitate a more strategic and selective use of these  
Recent studies also suggest that the active electorate is much larger than that which voting 
averages suggest, since people participate in relation to specific issues. With the existence 
of dozens of voting opportunities per year (referendums at federal, regional and local level) 
there is considerable space for voters to drop in and out of their use 
 Some studies find greater electoral participation in those places where referendums 
and initiatives are more frequent (Smith and Tolbert, 2004)  In the USA, those states that 
make a more regular use of the citizens’ initiatives return higher levels of electoral participa-
tion (Donovan et al , 2009)  In these cases, the citizens’ initiative generates a positive dynamic 
of electoral participation that spills over into elections for public office. It has been argued 
that the existence of well-designed direct democratic mechanisms can increase motivation 
for participation in general  A greater interest in public matters, as well as, a more positive 
perception of political institutions, both feature amongst the motives underpinning this pos-
itive synergy  As such, participatory processes can have an educational effect upon citizenry, 
as citizens learn to be more participatory and trust that their involvement is meaningful 
(Smith and Tolbert, 2004)  Direct democratic mechanisms like referenda can have indirect 
effects upon political behaviour and attitudes, such as increased political efficacy, commit-
ment and interest (Donovan et al , 2009) 
 A study focusing on agenda initiatives in Finland (Christensen et al , 2017) makes four 
interesting conclusions  1) These tools instigate the participation of more excluded groups, 
as is clearly the case in terms of youth, while the positive effect of socialising them as active 
citizens at a young age, increases the possibility that they will maintain their involvement in 
the future  2) Agenda initiatives fail to mobilise people with low levels of political interest 
or efficacy. 3) Political parties are important when mobilising people to support initiatives, 
whilst forming part of other groups can seem to be irrelevant and 4) Internet usage predicts 
support for these mechanisms, which demonstrates that agenda initiatives are a relatively 
accessible form of participation  Whilst our results are optimistic, we should caveat that the 
initiative is new and has generated large expectations, as well as, having been highly publi-
cised  Whether interest will endure will depend, amongst other things, upon its effectiveness 
in channeling citizen demands 
 One of the classical arguments in favour of promoting participation argues that it 
can be a “democratic school”  This is because participation in these processes generates 
educational effects upon direct participants. Moreover, if the process is sufficiently visible 
and influential, these effects can extend to broader social groups who develop a will to be 
involved and listened to, in the decision-making process (Font et al , 2001)  The success of 
participatory processes such as the citizens’ initiative must, therefore, be understood as a 
process that includes learning on behalf of citizens  As long as they are well designed and 
deployed, different participatory tools will contribute to generating a participatory culture 
and practice amongst the population  The counter-side of consultations is that they can lead 
to division and polarisation (as we will discuss below) 
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 Another argument, that frequently appears in the direct democracy literature, points to 
an approximation between political institutions and society  Since the electoral relationship 
between citizens and public administration is not limited to the periodic election of repre-
sentatives, the perceived distance between represented and representatives is reduced and 
citizens look more favourably upon public debates  In the case of the USA, an increase and 
broadening of discussion on public matters is observed, whilst at the same time campaigns 
on controversial matters attract media attention (Collins and Oesterle, 1995)  By increasing 
the visibility of and interest in certain public issues, electoral participation is also increased 
As such, in the face of increased doubts and concerns regarding democratic institu-
tions, these direct democratic instruments can contribute to offloading some of the pres-
sure upon representative organisations and contribute to the integration of groups that feel 
excluded (Cuesta López and Presno Linera, 2017)  For example, in the case of the establish-
ment of a minimum salary in Los Angeles (see sheet 10) or in that of San Antonio in Texas 
(see sheet 17), we see that the initiative served to place a topic that affected workers on low 
salaries, who make up a substantial part of the population, at the centre of public debate 
The willingness to incorporate more parts of the population into participatory process-
es is reflected in the attempts made by public administrations to open channels aimed at 
individuals, who are not represented in parties or associations  Since the end of the 1980’s 
the limitations of participatory processes, based on associational participation, have become 
evident  This is due to the often questionable degree of the representativeness of the groups 
involved, in relation to the broader associational fabric, the individuals involved in relation to 
their organisations, as well as of the participating organisations vis-a-vis the broad spectrum 
of interests in society (Font et al , 2010)  However, whilst citizen participation initiatives open 
up such channels for the involvement of individuals, research shows that the activation of 
direct democratic mechanisms depends to a greater extent on associations and (quite often) 
political parties, with individuals activating processes on very specific occasions.
2.2.3. Resources and costs
A classical dilemma regarding the initiation of participatory processes is that the 
majority of citizens lack the necessary resources in terms of time, means, knowledge and 
abilities to start them (Kaźmierczak, 2011). However, more developed societies demonstrate a 
higher potential for participation because large sections of society are increasingly informed 
and ready to participate (Inglehart, 1991) 
As the cultural and educational level of societies increases, new technologies contrib-
ute to reducing the costs of participation, meaning it takes up less time, dedication, physical 
presence and even contact with other actors  It is plausible to propose that the population 
would, therefore, be better prepared to take part in the decision-making process  However, 
despite some exceptions, such as, the Finnish initiative model (see sheet 19), it is not very 
common for the collection of signatures to be allowed via online platforms  Thus, at the mo-
ment, in most cases the possibilities afforded by new technologies are limited to campaigns 
and dissemination, but not in their formal initiation 
In any case, this does not mean that the challenges presented by the costs involved in 
ensuring effective and responsible participation will disappear. In terms of the final referen-
dum vote in citizens’ initiatives, the lack of information amongst citizens is aggravated in two 
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ways (Cronin, 1989)  On one hand, when public debate during the campaign is developed by 
interest groups rather than political parties, their motivations and interests are less known 
than the ideologies of parties and, therefore, increasing their capacity to decisively influ-
ence public debate  On the other hand, when political proposals that are subject of debate 
and have complex, technical or long-term implications, whether we consider the majority of 
local cases analysed in this report, or if we refer to some of the most famous national con-
sultations of the past few years (for example, the peace referendum in Colombia, involving 
a 297-page long agreement for which there lacked the time, or the intention, to analyse and 
debate)  In many cases, citizens can also chose to follow the informational shortcut repre-
sented by the positioning of political parties on the issue in question, without having to be 
acquainted with the proposal in detail, generating much debate regarding the benefits and 
problems involved in this process (Gómez Fortes and Font, 2014; Linares Lejarraga, 2017)  
More systematic studies regarding the formation of preferences demonstrate that, political 
parties generally play a role in influencing the formation of preferences, including in those 
cases when citizens themselves initiate referendums (Le Duc, 2002) 
In short, information and mobilisation involve a commitment of time and resources 
that aims at certain benefits (in the case of the initiative influencing the process of deci-
sion-making)  Since time is a limited and, as such, highly valued, resource, participation must 
involve demonstrative or instrumental benefits (Font et al., 2001). This is especially so in 
terms of the costs incurred in the initial stages of an initiative  Realising a political proposal, 
collecting the necessary signatures and, if and when this results in a vote, carrying out a 
campaign is, without a doubt, much more costly than taking part in a more discrete way, by 
signing a petition and / or voting in a referendum. For this reason, the cost-benefit analysis 
that can motivate a group of citizens to propose an initiative, will be associated with its de-
sign (and costs) as well as the potential for influence and success offered by the prospect. 
For example, in the case of Geneva (see sheet 15) and in the Swiss scene in general, research 
about the resource barrier and its influence upon citizens’ initiatives suggests that reaching 
the signature quorum involves considerably high economic costs (Ruppen, 2004) 
2.2.4. Interest groups
Our review of literature and cases reveals many grey areas  One of the negative aspects 
that stands out the most, refers to the actions of interest groups  Since initiatives require 
a high degree of mobilising capacity, as well as, human and economic resources, there is a 
clear danger that they can be used by interest groups with more capacity to influence the 
result (Lissidini, 2008)  For example, Garrett (2004) analyses the important and sometimes 
problematic role that economic actors and political parties play in the Californian recall ini-
tiative  In the case of Richmond (see sheet 16), in the initiative regarding the rent cap, busi-
ness lobbies carried out a powerful campaign that enjoyed greater resources than those of 
its opponents  Despite this, however, they were unable to sway public opinion or the result 
of the final vote at the referendum. In similar fashion, political parties in many countries 
have played a key role in the use of initiatives to promote their policies and mobilise voters 
(Serdült and Welp, 2012; Seo, 2017) 
One the concerns, in this respect, is that powerful economic interests are able to 
“buy” legislation by promoting proposals and campaigning for their approval, or for the re-
jection of other proposals  A wide range of studies suggest that investment in campaigns 
is a very effective way to reject an initiative, but has a very limited influence when it is in 
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support of a proposal (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004)  As such, economically powerful groups 
are more influential when promoting a rejection of citizens’ initiatives, than they are in pro-
moting their own  This is especially so, given the tendency for the fear of change to impose 
itself in referendums, in favour of maintaining the status quo 
Another risk of opening up decision-making to citizens’ initiatives refers to the co-opt-
ing of the political process  For example, if a government is ignorant of majority preferences 
on an issue, it could make concessions to organised interests to avoid the risks of an initia-
tive (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004)  This criticism should be contrasted with in-depth studies, 
because lobbies also operate in the absence of these mechanisms, using other channels  
Even considering this risk, referendums create a level of uncertainty that has potential to 
disrupt the power of dominant interests, as long as democratic rules are respected and 
spaces for public debate are improved (two key features) 
Political parties are more prepared to develop and promote recall initiatives, because 
their activation requires organisational capacity and resources and they have more incen-
tives to do so (Welp, 2018)  As such, processes that have been put in place with the aim of 
opening up channels for participation for citizens to control and take advantage of, can end 
up being co-opted by organised interests or political parties that, at the very least, have 
strong abilities to influence their development. This is a fact that should be kept in mind, 
but that is difficult to tackle.
2.2.5. Direct and representative democratic processes
Do direct democratic processes complement or challenge representative institutions? 
Do they improve channels for participation? Citizens’ initiatives can be conceived as tools 
for collaboration between citizens and public administration or, as processes that interfere 
with and disrupt government plans (Morales and Arroyo, 2017)  Californian critics of the 
recall referendum deem it undemocratic on the grounds that it undermines representative 
democracy and the accountability mechanisms associated with periodic elections  In this 
sense, on the basis of one contested measure, the recall can lead to ending a representative 
government before the end of mandate (Garrett, 2004) 
According to Breuer (2008a), the different kinds of citizens’ initiative relate to repre-
sentative democracy in different ways  In the case of reactive tools (when they provide op-
portunities for citizens to veto the proposals or decisions of public authorities), they could 
be described as complementary to representative democracy  On the other hand, when they 
are proactive (when citizens can develop proposals to place on the political agenda and 
therefore influence the legal status quo) they can be described as a substitute for represen-
tative democracy, since the citizenry takes on the role of legislator  Taking into account that 
they operate on specific occasions and there are no cases where a high level of legislation 
is developed through these mechanisms (including in Switzerland and California) it seems 
more accurate to say that they act as a corrective, rather than a substitute 
In general terms, where citizens’ initiatives have been used they have not replaced, 
but rather have complemented, representative democracy3 (Kaufmann and Waters, 2004)  
For example, in Finland, where around one third of the population has signed at least one 
citizens’ initiative proposal, 83% agree that this tool has had a positive impact on democracy 
(Christensen et al , 2017)  In this vein, citizen participation has also been considered a way 
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to “democratise democracy” (Sidor, 2012)  As such, the initiative allows for the opening of 
complementary channels for participation in decision-making, above and beyond the elec-
tion of candidates or parties, encouraging the bottom-up development of ideas and support 
(Beramendi et al , 2008) 
In place of a governmental monopoly over the right to make decisions, a well-designed 
modern direct democracy would mean that representatives, as well as citizens themselves 
(acting as “occasional politicians”) can gain decision-making power (Buchi, 2011)  For its 
part, the agenda initiative can serve as a mechanism for translating citizen demands and 
increasing the legislative agenda, bringing public administration closer to citizens (Welp and 
Suárez, 2017) 
2.2.6. Political debate and deliberation
If we focus on process rather than objectives, attempts to deepen democracy point 
towards the deliberative dimension: the development of a high quality debate, where dif-
ferent points of view are heard and respected  One desirable objective of direct democratic 
process is to increase decision-making transparency, by implying greater access to informa-
tion and public debate about political issues, as well as the values and interests associated 
with them  In this way, the deliberative qualities of public debates and campaigns developed 
during initiatives and referendums can be enhanced (Schiller, 2011a)  A campaign relating to 
a referendum can be conceived of an exchange of arguments that is conducive to greater 
rationality in making collective decisions, going above and beyond parliamentary debate (Ker-
sting, 2009)  In this vein the Citizens’ Initiative Review in Oregon incorporates a deliberative 
process within the citizens’ initiative, in order to deepen and systematise different positions, 
with a view to the generation of a more informed vote (see sheet 21) 
However, this rational exchange of arguments is usually conditioned by the importance 
of the intervening actors, as well as their ability to influence debate. Moreover, one of the 
fundamental criticisms is that referendums divide and, in practice, tend to polarize politi-
cal positioning  In fact, the adversarial and majoritarian logic means that it is impossible to 
achieve a deliberated and consensual solution amongst the different parties involved  Anal-
ysis of the anti-mosque mobilisations in Helsinki (see sheet 19) or against beggars in Ciudad 
Quezón (see sheet 14) illustrate how initiatives can also polarise and create confrontation 
along social and ideological lines  In the case of Switzerland, however, the referendums 
(which are by definition majoritarian) have worked well to strengthen channels for negoti-
ation. If we accept that conflicts will always exist in any given society, the referendum can 
be an ideal mechanism to resolve these, based on a series of agreed rules and procedures  
Its ability to deepen or resolve conflicts is, therefore, associated with the context in which 
it is activated 
In contrast to the legislative and referendum initiatives, where the initiators must ex-
plain and justify their proposal to the electorate, in the case of agenda initiatives a demand 
is taken to the political authorities, who then take a final decision. Therefore, in this case 
initiators activate a public debate, which is initiated a-posteriori (Büchi, 2011)  Although it is 
of lesser reach, the agenda initiative promotes a public discussion and deliberation on is-
sues that representatives may not have prioritised, thereby contributing to the integration of 
interests within representative bodies (García Majado, 2017)  However, in practice this effect 
does not seem to materialise  Many agenda initiatives remain unresolved, or do not appear 
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on the parliamentary agenda, and therefore these discussions do not occur  In the Spanish 
case, where the initiative requires debate and approval by the municipal chamber, this often 
occurs (Suárez Antón, 2017)  In many cases, whether or not the agenda initiative promotes 
debate depends upon the support it enjoys amongst established political actors 
2.2.7. Control and accountability
Another argument related to democratic deepening refers to supervision of represen-
tative institutions  It is hoped that direct democratic mechanisms offer tools for political 
control and, therefore, strengthen accountability and responsiveness of elites to citizen 
demands (Setälä and Schiller, 2009) 
If public officials act on behalf of voters, the latter should have the right to annul 
political decisions through the legislative and abrogative initiative (Matsusaka, 2004)  This 
control can be exercised over legislation and legislators  On one hand, abrogative initiatives 
function as an instrument for political control, in order to guarantee that the actions of 
governments might be challenged by a majority of the population, whilst minorities have 
the opportunity to win support in a referendum  This primarily takes place when controver-
sial legislation incites ideological controversies, media visibility and protests in favour of or 
against proposals  In these cases, the citizens’ initiatives can serve to clarify the existing 
power balances – that is to say, what support a given proposal or counter-proposal has  For 
example, in the referendum initiative relating to the Great Mosque of Helsinki (see sheet 19), 
the proposal was used by right wing actors to instigate debate, increase the visibility of their 
arguments and to mobilise, before the representative chamber made its decision regarding 
the construction of the mosque 
It has also been argued that the mere possibility of starting an initiative improves 
representation, because it keeps representatives alert  According to some studies, in Swit-
zerland the threat of an abrogative initiative is more influential than a legislative initiative, 
since those who lose a vote in representative bodies often drive these kinds of initiatives 
(Collins and Oesterle, 1995)  In any case, the existence of this mixture of mechanisms and 
their capacity to control governmental action, mean that they become an important incentive 
for representatives to negotiate their proposals before approving them, given the risk that 
these could be paralysed after being approved 
In terms of control over legislators, the abrogative referendum rests on the idea that 
public authorities should be responsive to the citizens that elected them, enabling an early 
termination of their mandate, if they do not meet expectations  It, therefore, creates effective 
vertical accountability mechanisms  As such, one of the motivations to implement this tool in 
various states of the USA, such as Oregon, was to counter the perception that elected offices 
were too connected to powerful economic interests, forcing them to be more receptive to 
other citizen demands (Beramendi et al , 2008) 
Cronin (1989) summarises the arguments for and against the abrogative initiative  
Amongst its virtues, the initiative allows for constant accountability, facilitating citizens to 
remove incompetent, dishonest or irresponsible public officials. It also contributes to con-
trolling an excessive influence of single interests over government and promotes citizen 
interest in political affairs in between elections  Amongst its disadvantages, the abrogative 
initiative conflicts with the idea of the free representative mandate and decreases the at-
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traction of public office for the more capable individuals. The vote in abrogative initiatives 
can be divisive, polarising, confusing, often unjust, costly and are tied to a myriad of abuses 
and unintended consequences  Therefore, as we shall see below, the positive aspects that 
facilitate popular control can also have a negative influence on governability.
2.2.8. Governability
The relationship between public administration and citizens rests, amongst other 
factors, on the perception of political actors as being more or less active  Thus, Agger and 
Lund (2017) analyse the role that different models of democracy envisage for the citizenry 
in public administration (as clients, consumers or co producers)  In the classic liberal con-
ception of democracy, the citizen is viewed as a client, who expresses her preferences as a 
voter at electoral events, or as an individual belonging to political parties or pressure groups  
The risk here is that, the policies that are developed in between elections, fail to satisfy the 
needs of citizens. As a reaction to this passive role for the citizen, the perspective of New 
Public Management conceived of the citizen as a consumer, who could influence public 
policies via her capacity to select service providers that meet her preferences  This model 
also fails to incorporate citizen knowledge in the development of public policy, beyond the 
possibility for election. From a New Public Governance perspective, the role of the citizen 
becomes more active, conceived of as a potential partner in contributing to the improve-
ment of services and public policies  This co-production or co-creation role, based on the 
mobilisation of resources and knowledge to develop policies and services, is hampered by 
the lack of time and resources, results in participatory processes that are dominated by a 
specific part of the population.
Given the limitations of these models, Agger and Lund (2017) propose that the citizens’ 
role should be that of co-innovator, that can activate the citizen and her knowledge, meeting 
her needs, whilst also appealing to her creative capacity Citizens’ initiatives are coherent 
with this kind of conception, especially those that allow the citizen to innovate in a more 
proactive fashion, developing proposals for public policies  The establishment of guarantees 
and facilitation mechanisms such as financial or technical support for the development of 
proposals would give groups with lesser resources opportunities to make proposals 
For example, in the US cases we have studied (see sheets 10, 16, 17 y 18), electoral 
offices offer support for drafting initiative projects. Notwithstanding, as demonstrated by the 
case of Buenos Aires (see sheet 5), when promoters are neighbourhood, worker or consumer 
groups with less resources, they tend to rely on other more specialised groups (such as envi-
ronmentalists, socially minded architects, trade unions) for the drafting and development of 
their proposals, in order to ensure that all legal and technical viability requirements are met 
Direct democratic mechanisms do not always promote political inclusion  As we have 
seen, one recurrent criticism points towards the use of these tools by groups with high 
mobilising capacity, at the risk that these can negatively affect governability  In this respect, 
the abrogative initiative is considered a highly polarising and divisive mechanism  It can lead 
to severe confrontations which interrupt mandates and create incentives for opposition 
groups to replace elected officials. Different studies demonstrate that opposition political 
parties often use referendums, when they are not able to win elections (Kersting, 2009)  For 
example, in Peru, where 5,303 abrogative referendums were initiated in 747 municipalities 
between 1997 and 2013, the party-political use of this initiative has led to a permanent state 
of political campaigning, eroding governability and democratic legitimacy (Welp, 2016) 
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On the other hand, it should also be expected that if it is citizens that promote ref-
erendums, the process could solve conflicts via a majoritarian vote, such as through an 
abrogative initiative applied to controversial legislation 
2.2.9. Quality of decisions
Finally, the public policy making processes also require attention  Political inclusion 
does not solely imply the involvement of actors that are traditionally excluded from the policy 
process, but also the generation of opportunities for realising quality proposals, with infor-
mation, sufficient means and responsibility over the consequences of these actions. Some 
argue that due to the low level of resources amongst citizens, decisions made via direct 
democratic processes can be ineffective, given limitations of technical and expert knowledge 
(Kaźmierczak, 2011). Moreover, direct democracy could lead to irrational decisions about com-
plex matters, given the opportunities for manipulation by certain actors (Rourke et al , 1992) 
One of the objections to “bottom-up” direct democracy refers to the possibility that 
decisions about interrelated matters can be taken in isolation, creating opportunities for 
collective irrationalities (Petit, 2012)  Such a case might be, for example, if citizens voted in 
favour of two initiatives, in favour of increasing spending on urban planning and education 
and another, calling for a reduction in municipal taxes  In this respect, Linares Lejarraga (2017) 
argues that when voting on related issues it should be possible to generate more complex 
alternatives, where all the possible combinations could be hierarchically ordered, or to carry 
out sequential votes in a short period of time to emphasize their connectedness 
On the other hand, some contributions point out that initiatives approximate public 
policies towards the preferences of the average voter (Gerber, 1996; Arnold and Freier, 2015)  
One US study demonstrates that States with legislative initiatives develop public policies 
that are closer to the preferences of the average voter than other States, where this tool 
does not exist (Matsusaka, 2010) 
What kinds of policies result from these initiatives? The evidence points in multiple 
directions  For example, if we focus on their effect on public spending, a US-based study 
focusing on the 1970-2000 period (Matsusaka, 2008) demonstrates that States where a 
legislative initiative exists spend less, decentralise more spending from the state level to 
the municipal level and raise less funds through direct, general taxation and more through 
indirect taxes such as fares and charges for services. Nevertheless, this same study finds 
that according to municipal data, local initiatives were associated with higher public spend-
ing in the 1980’s and 1990’s  Another US piece of research focussing on 350 Californian cit-
ies in 2000 demonstrates that the legislative initiative leads to increased public spending, 
when acceptance requirements are not too high (Gordon, 2004)  Likewise, a study of 2,056 
municipalities in Bavaria (Germany) between 1983 and 2011 shows that the local initiative is 
associated with higher public spending (Asatryan et al , 2016) 
In relation to other topics, some studies focussing on the US and Switzerland link the 
presence of direct democratic processes with effects such as cleaner environment, as well 
as educational and mental health improvements (for a review see Matsusaka, 2008)  There is 
a need for more empirical evidence, especially in areas where less research has taken place, 
if we are to be able to determine whether these effects are generalised, or rather are linked 
to specific contexts or conjectural dynamics.
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In short, we have found that there is no consensus in the debate about direct democ-
racy in general and citizens’ initiatives in particular  Undoubtedly, many of the virtues and 
defects associated with these tools will have greater or lesser relevance, depending on their 
specific design, the role of broader institutions (for example, the electoral bodies in charge 
of supervising these processes) the political responsibility of the authorities (accepting the 
rules of the democratic game) and civic culture (capacity of the citizenship and other actors 
to activate these tools)  In the following sections we will carry out a detailed analysis of the 
central elements of the design of these tools, such as their authorization requirements, the 
objectives for which they have been developed or the extent to which they are binding in 
nature 
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3. Origins and expansion
In this section we briefly summarize the origins of the initiatives, as well as their re-
cent worldwide diffusion  We begin by presenting a global overview of citizens’ initiatives at 
national, regional and local levels 
 The citizens’ initiative is often considered a Swiss innovation. More specifically, many 
Swiss cantons adopted the constitutional initiative during the 1830s, as well as the legislative 
initiative during the 1860s (Collins and Oesterle, 1995)  At the national level, the initiative was 
implemented in Switzerland in 1891 and in Liechtenstein in 1921 (Seo, 2017)  However, the 
conception of direct democracy, in which the initiative is framed, is very old  Even in ancient 
Greece there was a very similar instrument, while citizens’ initiative already appeared in the 
constitution that emerged from the French Revolution of 1793 (Kaufmann and Waters, 2004)  
Moreover, tools such as the petition (precursor of the agenda initiative) spread throughout 
Europe during the VI-VII centuries 
 Tracing the precedents of the agenda initiative, Suárez Antón (2017) places its origins 
in France from Capeto (987-996) and, more assuredly, with Louis IX (1226-1270)  In Spain, 
the practice of addressing the King in demands for justice, grace or help, exists from the 
11th century  A more sophisticated version is found in the articles of the House of Commons 
approved by Henry IV (1399-1413) who introduced the practice of presenting petitions writ-
ten in the form of a Bill, that the King would be limited to accepting or rejecting, without 
modification. These antecedents cohere with Whitehead’s critique of the notion of a sharp 
division between representative and direct democracy, by hiding the presence of elements 
of participation and attempts to expand them throughout the history of states (Whitehead, 
2017) 
 The Swiss cantons regulated these mechanisms before the first constitution of the 
Confederation was approved in 1848 (as an example, see the expansion of the recall initiative 
in Serdült 2015)  In the USA, 19 states were directly inspired by Switzerland (including visits to 
the country) to authorize legislative initiatives between 1898 and 1918, during the Progressive 
Era, beginning with South Dakota (Collins and Oesterle, 1995)  In Japan, the decentralization 
and incorporation of citizen participation mechanisms occurred during the North American 
occupation, after the Second World War  In other countries, these instruments were adopted 
after periods of dictatorial rule, such as, in Italy or Germany (at the regional level) since 1945, 
and later in Latin America (Ruth et al , 2017)  Similarly, in Eastern Europe, initiatives were 
introduced in the 1990s during the Post-Communist period 
 The agenda initiative appeared for the first time in the Austrian Constitution in 1920, 
although the first formal experience took place in Italy in 1954 (Welp and Suárez, 2017). 
Other initial developments took place within the constitutions of some European countries 
such as Latvia or Spain after the First World War  Since 1989, the agenda initiative has been 
established in various geographical areas such as Southeast Asia (Philippines and Thailand) 
West Africa (Ghana and Niger) and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) (Beramen-
di et al , 2008)  More recently, the agenda initiative has been reinforced by the third wave 
of constitutional reforms in Latin America and the failed draft Constitutional Treaty of the 
European Union (Welp and Suárez, 2017) 
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 The abrogative initiative was added to the Swiss constitution in 1874 (Kaufmann and 
Waters, 2004)  For this reason its origin is usually recognised in Switzerland at the end of the 
X1X century, both at the local and state level, followed again by the USA at the end of the 
XIX and beginning of the XX centuries (Beramendi et al , 2008)  During this period, we also 
find that in one year (1918-1919) the right to popular referendums existed locally in Finland. 
It was just used once and was abolished with the end of the Civil War (Büchi, 2011)  However, 
the recall appears much earlier within the laws of the General Court of Massachusetts Bay 
Colony in 1631 (Welp, 2018) 
 A global study, focusing on the national level and on mechanisms that are activated 
by a collection of signatures, which culminate in voting, shows that Switzerland was the only 
country with this kind of regulation up until 1920  In the following period, 1921-1950, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein and Estonia joined the Alpine country  Between 1951 and 1988 Latvia and Es-
tonia eliminated these mechanisms; whilst they were adopted by Uruguay, San Marino and 
Italy (thus there was an increase from four to five countries that regulated this mechanism 
at national level)  After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the restoration of democracy in the 
countries of Latin America, the map begins to change more markedly  The study shows that 
between 1989 and 2009 both the number of countries adopting the regulation, as well as, 
the practical instances of its use, increased  The cases of Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San 
Marino and Uruguay, show the highest frequency of initiations  Other countries in which they 
exist include the Ukraine, Taiwan, Palau, Hungary, Slovakia, Bolivia, Venezuela and Colombia 
(Serdült and Welp, 2012)  This group has continued to expand following the publication of 
the study, as further countries have introduced these mechanisms 
 In general terms, initiatives have mainly evolved since the 1990s  In this period, there 
is no general tendency to liberalise procedures, rather, in some countries steps have been 
taken towards adopting regulations that are more open to citizens (such as in Bulgaria in 
2009, and some German states or Sweden in 2011), while in other countries more restrictive 
regulations have been adopted (such as in Slovakia in 2001 or in the Czech Republic in 2004) 
(Schiller, 2011a)  Continuing with the Swiss example, we see that the development of these 
instruments does not correspond to a specific moment. In this country, the establishment of 
strong initiative tools has been a gradual process, advanced through pressures from powerful 
citizen movements (Kaufmann and Waters, 2004) 
3.1. Where: mapping the initiatives
Beyond looking at how different types of initiative came about, it is more interesting 
to understand what is happening currently  With this in mind, we now analyse at a broad 
scale the places where these citizen participation initiatives are present  The instances re-
corded here do not imply an exhaustive census of these tools, but they serve to give an idea 
of the regions and countries in which they are institutionalised and / or used with more or 
less frequency 
Table 2 shows those cases in which we have found evidence of practices or legislation 
at the local, regional or national level  In some cases, the introduction of a mechanism in the 
constitution has not been accompanied by effective implementation, or the mechanism has 
never been taken up  Similarly, the presence of one type of initiative at the local or regional 
level within a country could mean that it is used extensively, or that only a single municipality 
uses it  The overview presented here does not constitute an exhaustive review, but rather a 
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synthesis of the information that we have found through consulting the bibliography of this 
study and from a review of the Center for Research on Direct Democracy (c2d) database, as 
well as websites documenting participative like The Navigator to Direct Democracy, The ACE 
Electoral Knowledge Network and Participedia.
There are even more reasons to treat the information shown in the table with caution  
On the one hand, there are certainly some existing practices or regulations not reflected in 
the data  On the other hand, in many cases the information available is incomplete or con-
fusing. Therefore, added to the enormous diversity of terminology in use, it becomes difficult 
to differentiate between different types of initiatives 
As a general overview, it can be seen that these initiatives are far more present in Eu-
ropea and the Americas. In Africa, Asia and the Pacific Islands we find less countries where 
these initiatives are in evidence 
Table 2. Presence of legislation and/or experiences of different types of initiative at the lo-
cal, regional and national level
Legislative in. Agenda in. Referendum in. Abrogative in. Recall in.







Burkina Faso • •
Cape Verde • • •
Congo •
Ethiopia •
Ivory Coast • • •
Kenya • •
Liberia • • •
Niger •
Togo • • •
Uganda • • •
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Legislative in. Agenda in. Referendum in. Abrogative in. Recall in.






Argentina • • • • • • • • • •
Bolivia • • • • • • •
Brazil • • •
Canada • • • • • •
Colombia • • • • • • • • • • •
Costa Rica • •
Cuba • •
Ecuador • • • • • • • •
Guatemala • • • • • • • •
Honduras • •
Mexico • •




United States • • • • • • •
Uruguay • •




Georgia • • • • • •
Japan • • • •
Kyrgyzstan • • •
Philippines • •
Taiwan •
Thailand • • • • •
Turkmenistan • • • • •
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Legislative in. Agenda in. Referendum in. Abrogative in. Recall in.




Albania • • • • •
Andorra • • • • • • • • •
Austria • •
Belarus • •
Bulgaria • • •
Croatia • • • • •
Czech Rep. • • •
Denmark •
Estonia • • • • •
Finland • • • • •
France • • • •
Germany •
Netherlands • • • •
Hungry •
Italy • •
Liechtenstein • • • •
Latvia • • • • • • •
Lithuania • • • •
Macedonia • •
Malta • •
Moldavia • • •
Montenegro •
Norway • • • • •
Poland • •
Portugal • • •





Slovenia • • •
Spain • • •
Sweden • • • •



















Palau • • •
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Center for Research on Direct Democracy4 (c2d), The Navigator to Direct 
Democracy5, The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network6 , Participedia7 and sources cited in the bibliography 
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Below we present a general overview of the initiatives found in the different regions, 
before moving on to focus on examples of each type of initiative and their frequency 
3.1.1. General overview
The data shows that the institutions which facilitate the citizens’ initiative are present 
in fewer countries than the obligatory or optional referendums promoted by public author-
ities  In Europe, the proportion was less than a third years ago, while in other places, such 
as, Africa and Asia the difference was much greater (Kaufmann and Waters, 2004; Beramendi 
et al , 2008) 
In Africa we have not found experiences or initiative regulations at the local or re-
gional level  In fact, neither do most African countries offer the possibility of carrying out 
referendums at a local level, mainly due to the low level of decentralisation and municipal 
autonomy in the continent (Kersting, 2009). Moreover, only Namibia, Uganda and Ethiopia 
have referendums at the subnational level  Citizens’ initiatives had never been carried out in 
South East Africa until 2009 (Kersting, 2009) 
A study analysing 30 Asian countries (Qvortrup et al., 2018) finds that legislation on 
holding referendums exists in just 11, and initiatives are only regulated in Taiwan and the 
Philippines  The four national referendums promoted in Taiwan through this tool did not meet 
the 50% electoral assistance requirements 
Switzerland continues to be the main instigator of initiatives at the national level, 
although more and more countries are activating them and regulating them throughout the 
world  At the subnational level the most frequent initiators of legislative and referendum ini-
tiatives are Switzerland, Germany and the USA  In the USA, around 70% of the population live 
in municipalities with some type of local initiative, while 40% live in a state that recognizes 
some type of initiative  Use is more frequent in large cities, than it is in small cities, as well 
as, in cities within states that have initiative, than it is in those that do not (Matsusaka, 2003) 
Due to their federal make up, the USA and Germany, two of the countries that are 
most experienced in terms of subnational initiatives, have no experience of direct democracy 
at the national level (Podolnjak, 2015)  This also applies to Peru, which is the heaviest user 
of the local recall initiative in the world, with more than 6,000 authorities being subjected 
to a recall referendum between 1997 and 2017 (Holland and Inicio, 2018)  The recall initiative 
has also frequently been initiated in other Andean countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Colombia, although few attempts have culminated with a vote in these cases (Welp, 2016) 
Amongst the Pacific Islands, a national consultative referendum initiative exists in New 
Zealand  Amongst its microstates, the legislative, recall and constitutional initiatives exist 
at state level in Palau and Micronesia (Serdült and Welp, 2012)  In Micronesia the possibility 
exists for 10% of registered voters, spanning at least three quarters of states, to propose 
amendments to the constitution, which must be supported by three quarters of voters in 
three of the four states (Qvortrup et al , 2018)  Only in Australia have we found local or re-
gional experiences, of the legislative initiative in this case 
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3.1.2. Legislative initiatives
Few countries make provision at the national level for initiatives which allow citizens 
to take part to intervene in the development of laws  Switzerland or Uruguay are notable 
exceptions, where citizens’ initiatives are able to bring about constitutional changes  In 
the former particularly, this has led to the initiative being used to resolve public policy is-
sues through amendments to the constitution  For example, an initiative approved on 23rd 
September 2018 introduced a constitutional obligation on the part of government to protect 
and promote bicycle paths  In addition to being able to differentiate on the basis of wheth-
er a country allows initiatives to propose laws or constitutional amendments, we can also 
recognise distinctions in the procedure by which such changes are effected  In some cases 
citizens’ initiatives are able to activate legislative changes directly (Switzerland, Uruguay), 
whereas in others the approval of the Parliament is required (Portugal, Colombia) 
At the subnational level, the picture is more diverse and complex  In Latin America, 
the legislative initiatives of the Mexican state of Jalisco (Alacio García, 2017) or the Auton-
omous City of Buenos Aires (see sheet 5)  stand out in particular  In Italy, some cities such 
as Rome, Turin, Florence or Genoa allow for a consultative referendum to be held in cases 
where a threshold of signatures is exceeded  However, this mechanism is not used frequently 
(Erne, 2004) 
In Germany, all the länder (federal states) introduced rights facilitating legislative in-
itiatives during the 1990s (before this such provisions only existed in Baden-Wuerttemberg, 
where they were introduced in 1956)  Since then, almost 40% of all German initiatives have 
been developed in the state of Bavaria (Arnold and Freier, 2015)  Between 1995 (when they 
were introduced) and 2011, 2,500 legislative initiatives were developed - although obviously 
not all of these resulted in a vote (Asatryan et al , 2016)  Until 2005, 538 referendums were 
called in Bavaria as a result of legislative initiatives, with 305 of these resulting in successful 
outcomes (Beramendi et al , 2008) 
A study by Schiller (2011b) shows that throughout Germany, legislative initiatives are 
the predominant instrument of local direct democracy  Before 2009 there were 4,829 local 
legislative initiatives, resulting in 2,055 ballots  These initiatives are predominantly used to 
hold authorities to account, with between 70% and 75% challenging a local administration’s 
decision - often putting forward alternative ideas  The frequency of these initiatives is sig-
nificantly higher in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants.
In Switzerland, one of the most paradigmatic cases and a reference for direct democ-
racy, hundreds of thousands of referendums have been called at the local level since 1848, 
when the country’s first Constitution was approved (Ruppen, 2004). Since the second half 
of the 19th century, three out of four referendums in Switzerland have been brought about 
through legislative initiatives  However, the success rate of these initiatives (10%) is much 
lower than that of government proposals and counterproposals (65%)  In other countries we 
find the same pattern: relatively few contested votes, predominance of sectors with greater 
resources and often low participation ratios (House of Lords, 2010) 
In the US, legislative initiatives are authorised in 24 states, and are more widely used 
in the western states (Beramendi et al , 2008)  Many local governments have also embraced 
these instruments, even where there is no provision in state law (Collins and Oesterle, 1995)  
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In Oregon, for example, since 1902 it has been possible to submit a legislative proposal 
(both to amend the constitution and to adopt a new law) with 1,000 valid signatures  340 
such initiatives have been voted on since this time, of which 118 (35%) have been approved 
(McGuire, 2008)  Such initiatives are also used frequently in California, where 363 initiatives 
have been voted between 1912 and 2015 (López Rubio, 2017) 
Table 3 shows some examples of local legislative initiatives, noting for each of these 
the population eligible to participate, the issues the initiative can address, the procedural 
requirements for it to be enacted, as well as the potential outcomes or consequences 
Table 3. Examples of legislative initiatives at the local level
Region Country Administrative 
Scale
















Submit a rationale 15% of the total 
votes in local elec-
tions, 120 days
If not adopted, referendum 
called within 110-140 days 




cation or reasons, refund-
able fee (max. $200)
10% electorate,  
180 days
Public hearing with pro-
moters. The chamber re-
quests reports (economic 
impact, legal impact...). 
If not adopted, a binding 
referendum is called. If 
approved, it can only be 
revoked by referendum
San Antonio  
(sheet 17)
Excluded: private appro-
priation of money, fees 
and taxes, suffrage, public 
rates, zoning (urban plan-
ning)
10% electorate, 
 online or in person
Public hearing with pro-
moters. Approved or a 
binding referendum is 
called. If approved, it can-




Voters Specific regulatory meas-
ures or modification of 
municipal statutes; pro-
posed referendum date 
(in representative elec-
tions)
9% of the elec-
torate; before 4 
months for the 
scheduled elections; 
fines for non-com-
pliance with data 
collection protocol
Approved or submitted 
to a binding referendum. 
The chamber can include 









Voters Draft agreements or u or-
dinances, policy propos-
als. Excluded: exclusive 
initiative of the mayor, 
budget, fiscal or tributary, 
international relations, 
amnesties, public order 
issues
10% voters,  
6 months
Local administration  
decides whether to call  
a referendum - mandatory 
if signatures reach 20%. 
Representative of the  













Can be used to reject  
or propose local laws.
No more than one  
initiative a year
1,000 in cities, 100  





One proposal a year. 
Debate, approve, reject, 
modify or repeal of laws, 
ordinances or resolutions
1st stage: 1,000 in 
metropolitan area, 
100 in a city, 50 in a 
neighbourhood; 2nd 
stage: 10% of the 
electors in the met-
ropolitan area. (90 
days) city (60 days) 
or neighbourhood 
(30 days)
Following 1st stage, the 
chamber can approve.  
If not approved, after the 
2nd phase a vote is called. 
won by simple majority, 
the government cannot 
adopt contrary policies in 
6 months and it can only 
be modified by a majority 
rule of ¾
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Region Country Administrative 
Scale














nicipal organisation, legal 
matters pertaining to 
elected representatives, 





size (10% for up to 
10,000; 9% for up to 
20,000; 8% for up 
to 30,000; 7% for up 
to 50,000; 6% for up 
to 100,000; 5% for 
up to 500,000; 3% if 
more than 500,000)
Binding referendum  
triggered; favourable votes 
required: 20% of registered 
voters for up to 50,000 
habitants; 15% for up to 




Voters Can be used to modify, 
repeal or introduce  
regulations – at the dis-
trict level too. Excluded: 
budgetary provisions, 
staff, public salaries  
and pensions and taxes
20,000 signatures 
from residents over 
16, 6 months
If the proposal with sig-
natures of 7% electors is 
rejected by the chamber, 
a referendum is triggered. 
The chamber may present 
counter proposals for vot-




10% of registered voters Mandatory referendum  
if 50% of registered voters 
are exceeded, optional  
otherwise. Turnout  
required: equal to that of 
the last municipal elections
Slovakia National  legislation




Excluded issues: budget, 
taxes, issues that contra-
vene constitutional norms













Can be used to propose 
or repeal laws
Varies from one city 















registered, stating official 
question, justification, 
date, financing, etc.  
Excluded: municipal 
budget and taxes, issues 
that are not within the 
municipality’s jurisdiction
30% for less than 
3,000 residents, 
20% for up to 
20,000, 10% for up 
to 200,000 and 6% 
in cities of more 
than 200,000
Decision on whether  
a referendum is called falls 
to the local adinistration. 
Turnout of 50% required  








Legislative proposals or 
concrete measures, re-
peal of standards. Eligible 
issues: communal goods, 
public roads, foundations 
and public utility works, 
planning, leisure, culture, 
social issues and sports. 
40 days after public de-
liberation
4% of electors (min-
imum of 2,400 and 
maximum of 3,200), 
40 days
Referendum triggered,  

















Voters Petition with 1,000 
signatures, initia-
tive with 5% of the 
number of votes in 
the last elections,  
6 months
Spokesperson presents 
proposal in the assembly. 
If rejected it is negotiat-
ed with the promoters or 
submitted to a referendum 
(simple majority), before 
returning to the assembly 
which can approve or re-
ject.
Source: Own elaboration based on cited sources
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3.1.3. The agenda initiative
The sustained historical growth of the implementation of initiatives observed in this 
report also applies to the agenda initiative  Suárez Antón’s (2017) study points out that the 
first country to introduce the mechanism was Austria (1920), followed by Latvia (1922), Italy 
(1947), Portugal (1976), Spain (1978) and Brazil (1988)  Since the 1990’s almost every country 
in Europe and Latin America has included the agenda initiative, bar a few exceptions such as 
Uruguay, Switzerland or Venezuela, where mechanisms that culminate in voting exist  In Af-
rica, Asia and the Pacific Islands the mechanism is less widespread (Beramendi et al., 2008). 
Despite the increasing implementation, most initiatives are rarely used or are not successful 
(Suárez Antón, 2017), with the few exceptions in which they are promoted by social organiza-
tions, or arise in the context of popular mobilizations, as in Argentina in 2002, a case which 
exceeded one million signatures and ended up generating legislation (Soto Barrientos, 2017) 
In Brazil, 5 out of 9 accepted initiatives have generated legislation (the rest are being 
processed), wheras, in countries such as Bolivia and Honduras none have been registered 
(Welp and Suárez, 2017)  In Mexico, the agenda initiative is included in the constitution as 
well as incorporated into subnational legislation in all States except the State of Mexico, 
with differences in the percentage of signatures required and issues that are excluded (Ala-
cio García, 2017). They have been initiated in almost half of the States. In its first five years 
since its implementation, 18 local level initiatives were presented in Buenos Aires, but only 
two managed to overcome all the procedures and verifications and were finally approved by 
the usual legislative means (Paonessa, 2007) 
In Peru there is a combination of an agenda and legislative initiative, where 0 3% of 
voters can present a proposal  Should Congress reject it, 10% of voters can propose a refer-
endum, in which the proposal would be approved if it exceeds 50% of support (Welp, 2008) 
In Cuba, the citizens’ initiative was included in the 1940 constitution, where was widely 
recognised  It also appeared in two subsequent constitutional laws focused on the municipal 
sphere  The Constitution that will come to force next year restricts these tools to the agenda 
initiative (Guzmán Hernández, 2017)
The agenda initiative has been used more frequently in some European countries  In 
Italy, there were 320 attempts to initiate an agenda between 1978 and 2002, of which over 
a third exceeded the requirement of 50,000 signatures  In 1988, a proposal to request that 
the European Parliament should initiate a constitutional process gathered more than 110,000 
signatures and even ended up being approved in a consultative referendum that decided to 
promote the Parliament and had an electoral participation of 86% (Beramendi et al , 2008)  
The agenda initiative has also been used on many occasions in countries such as Hungary 
(with more than 150 attempts at the national level) or Poland 
The national agenda initiative was introduced in Finland in 2012, with a signature 
threshold of 50,000 citizens (corresponding to 0 9% of the population and 1 2% of the elec-
torate)  This case includes the innovation of allowing online signatures  Up to 2015 more than 
370 processes were initiated, 6 of which led to parliamentary deliberation  One initiative on 
homosexual marriage (which exceeded the threshold of signatures in a few hours) ended up 
generating legislation (Seo, 2017)  Since 2015, several initiatives have passed the signature 
quorum, including a counter-initiative to abolish legislation allowing for homosexual marriage  
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However, it is failed attempts that predominate: a large majority (around 93%) collected less 
than 10,000 signatures, almost 50% only achieved less than 100 supporting votes and only 
around 3% exceeded the threshold (Christensen et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the current trend 
is the presentation of fewer proposals that get more support on average, showing a certain 
learning in the use of the tool 
Spain is one of the European countries with the most restrictive legislation in relation 
to the agenda initiative: the threshold of signatures is very high and the procedure for consid-
ering proposals is the most critical stage (unlike other countries where a successful agenda 
initiative is handled directly as a parliamentary initiative) (Quintero Ortega, 2014)  Of the 104 
agenda initiatives submitted since 1982, 48 were rejected due to inadmissibility or failure to 
pass the consideration procedure, while 38 expired due to failure to meet deadlines or due 
to parliamentary inaction  Of the rest, only one was approved without question and 2 were 
subsumed in new texts (Morales Arroyo, 2017; see sheets 6, 7, 8 y 9) 
The European Citizen Initiative launched in 2012 is the only example of a supranational 
citizen participation initiative. For the first time in history, a mechanism was set up for cit-
izens to be involved in the establishment of the political agenda at the transnational level 
(Berg et al , 2008)  As described by Sánchez (2013), although in the case of national agenda 
initiatives parliament acts as intermediary, in the European case this dialogue is with the 
European Commission, rather than the European Parliament  A million signatures are required 
in at least a quarter of the Member States (i e , 7 states)  The signatures can be collected on 
paper, or electronically, (given its transnational character) within a year  Once obtained and 
reviewed, the Commission issues a public communication with its final conclusions.
So far, most of the presented initiatives have been annulled by the Commission on 
the grounds that they fall outside the scope of their competences (the European court has 
annulled some of the decisions to refuse registration, such as “Stop TTIP” or “ One million 
signatures in favour of diversity” in 20178), while accepted proposals face the problem of 
exceeding the established requirements, without assistance from public finances. Since 
its operation, only three initiatives have managed to reach the signature quorum, one of 
which has had a legislative impact (Madariaga Méndez, 2018)  This initiative, Right2Water, 
focused on the promotion of the public nature of the right to water and sanitation, proposing 
various measures  In its response, the European Commission undertook to implement several 
concrete actions, but not the most important element of the initiative: that water and 
sanitation should not be subject to liberalization (Godoy Vázquez, 2017). Given the difficulties 
imposed by the requirements and the high level of resources necessary for its success, there 
is a risk that the European initiative will end up becoming an instrument that serves the 
most organized interest groups (Godoy Vázquez, 2017) 
Table 4 displays some examples of local agenda initiatives, according to who can 
promote them, what topics can be discussed, the procedures required and the objectives 
that can be achieved 
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Table 4. Examples of agenda initiatives at the local level
Region Country Administrative 
Scale


















ties, taxes and local 
budget
1’5% of the elec-
toral roll, 12 




Municipal assembly debate 
and acceptance / rejection 
vote (term: 12 months, if it 
is delayed and there are 15% 
signatures a binding referen-
dum is called). The promot-
ers have the right to a hear-





n Nago (sheet 4) Voters Measures, modifica-
tion or elimination 
of municipal regu-
lations
2% electorate If representatives reject the 
measure, a referendum can-















2% residents with 
a right to vote, in 
person or online
The proposal becomes a 
“matter of interest” for the 
local chamber, 6 months to 
discuss it and inform pro-
moters of the decision (also 
online publication)
Ita
ly Bologna 300 residents Justify that it serves 
a public interest and 
not a private one
2.000, 3 months A plenary session to deliber-







Adults from  
the district
Proposal under local 
authority, propos-
als with the same 
measure excluded in 
same electoral term, 




The local administration 
must make a decision on the 




























service fees, taxes 
or changes to mu-





tion); excl. district 
initiatives; face-to-
face and online
Proposal for debate: inclusion 
of the topic in the municipal 
plenary; proposal for consul-
tation: full approval / rejec-
tion non-binding consulta-








exception: taxes and 
public service fees.
3% of signatures 
(or also 5% of 
associations)
Inclusion in order of the day 









with Human Rights 
or dignity of people
1% face-to-face or 
online support
Plenary debate and approval 









Prop’s for legis. or 
for spec. measures, 
repeal of standards; 
issues: communal 
goods, public roads, 
foundations and 
public works, plan-
ning, leisure, culture, 
social and sports
4% of voters (min-
imum of 2,400 
and maximum of 
3,200), 4 months
The council must make a de-
cision in 1 year, if it does not 
approve it, it must present a 
counter-initiative
Source: Own elaboration based on cited sources
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3.1.4. The abrogative initiative
Our classification is an analytical one that is not always clearly identifiable in real reg-
ulation  This is especially so with the abrogative initiative, which in many cases is a required 
feature of legislative initiatives and the tools, therefore, overlap  For example, in Germany, 
legislative initiatives (“Antrag auf Bürgerbegehren”) can be aimed at “correcting” a decision 
of the local Council, putting a topic on the agenda or proposing new regulation 
The abrogative initiative is frequently used at the national level in Italy (it is the only 
mechanism that citizens can activate to request a national vote)  In this country there have 
been 62 votes from 1974 to 2009, on a variety of topics, but since 1995 no law has been re-
jected by this mechanism  Part of the explanation points to the requirement of more than 
50% electoral participation (Serdült and Welp, 2012) 
Holland has featured a national abrogative initiative since 2015  To set it in motion, 
10,000 signatures of electorally registered citizens are required, to be collected within four 
weeks of the parliamentary approval of the law or the ratification of the international treaty. 
The result is validated if 30% of the electoral census participates, but its consultative nature 
leaves the final decision in the hands of representatives (Cuesta López, 2017). In April 2016, 
a referendum was effectively promoted by a Eurosceptic citizen platform requesting the 
rejection of the EU’s International Treaty of Association with the Ukraine 
In Slovenia there are no statistics on the use of this tool at the local level  Following 
20 years without use of local referenda, a 2004 initiative in the capital, Ljubljana, gathered 
more than 10% of signatures to convene a derogatory referendum against the granting of 
municipal land for the construction of a Muslim centre  However, the mayor blocked the ref-
erendum and the Constitutional Court rendered it unconstitutional (Nežmah, 2011). In Bled, 
an environmentalist initiative managed to promote a referendum in 2022, that put a stop 
to an energy company’s plans to expand a reservoir  Another initiative in Ajdovscina in 1999 
prevented the municipality from changing its name 
A variety of US states feature the abrogative initiative  Since its launch in 1902, 62 
abrogative referendums have been promoted in Oregon (exceeding the signature quorum of 
4% of the total votes cast in the previous local elections)  Of these 21 (33%) have success-
fully rejected the law in question (McGuire, 2008)  In California, between 1912 and 2015, 50 
referendums have been held for the ratification of legal texts and constitutional amendments 
(López Rubio, 2017) 
3.1.5. The recall initiative
During the early twentieth century, the recall initiative was regulated for a few coun-
tries  Moreover, with the exception of Liechtenstein (1921) these were limited to the sub-
national level (for example in some Swiss cantons, US states and Argentine provinces) and 
frequent use of it was limited to some US municipalities  It began to spread after the Second 
World War and especially during the third democratic wave, following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall  During the 1990s its extension reached areas such as Poland, Colombia, Peru, Canada, 
Venezuela and several German länder (Welp, 2018) 
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Most of the recall processes that are initiated do not end in referendum  In Japan, out 
of 1,250 attempts (prior to 1999) 397 votes have been held  In other countries its frequency 
and completion rate is lower: 78 in Ecuador (with 786 attempts prior to 2013), 54 in Colombia 
(with 169 attempts prior to 2013), 17 in Germany (prior to 2008), 10 in Venezuela (from 167 
attempts prior to 2013), 4 in Switzerland (where there were only 12 attempts until 2015) and 
2 in Argentina (with only 10 attempts until 2014)  In Canada, no recall referendum has been 
held, in the 26 attempts, until 2015 
Since its launch in 1993, with the signature of 25% of voters in Peru, use of the recall 
initiative has been intense  It is estimated that about 20,000 recall processes were initiated 
up to 2013, with 5,303 being fulfilled. For example, in 1997, 63 districts featured requests for 
recall initiatives, focused mainly at the municipal level. The most common justification was 
alleged commitment of crimes  Participation rates surrounded the 70% mark  The success 
rate is very low (6% in 2001 or 16% in 2004)  The majority took place in towns with less than 
2,000 voters, where it is easier to get 25% of the signatures (Welp, 2018) 
In Colombia, all of the 54 recall referendums held between 1994 and 2013 were invali-
dated due to the low level of electoral participation, which did not exceed the 40% required  
The issue is that in these processes signatures of 40% of the electorate were obtained but 
the usual strategy adopted by Mayors is to take little notice of the recall and hope for a low 
turnout (Welp, 2018) 
In Venezuela, the recall is the direct democratic mechanism most frequently attempt-
ed (Schneider and Welp, 2011)  In Miranda, a recall initiative was voted on against the Mayor, 
although his position was ratified by the vote.
In the USA, the recall initiative is more frequent at the local level than at the state 
level, although it is relatively under-used when compared to others forms of initiative  In 
fact, about three-quarters of the recalls take place locally  The city of Los Angeles was the 
first in the US to adopt the recall initiative in 1903, followed by Oregon in 1908. Following 
the general trend, the recall initiative has rarely been used at the state level in Oregon, but 
it is active more regularly in small municipalities, where it is easier to collect the necessary 
signatures  According to the information available, recall initiatives have been successful in 
this state in less than half of the cases (McGuire, 2008)  In general, in the US and until 1989, 
about 4,000 recalls out of about 6,000 attempts have taken place 
In Uganda we find a special case of a recall initiative, in that it is implemented at the 
national level  A member of Parliament or District President may be recalled for malpractice, 
desertion, mental or physical disability by a petition signed by at least two-thirds of the reg-
istered electorate in his or her constituency (Angeyo et al , 2008) 
In Poland, local recall initiatives represent around 85% of all the referendums held 
there  Up to 2014, 656 referendums had taken place  However, the vast majority have not 
exceeded the required electoral participation threshold  In many cases, fewer people partic-
ipated than people signed the original petition and very few Mayors have lost their mandates 
(Piasecki, 2011) 
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Table 5 shows some examples of local recall initiatives, showing their promoters, which 
actors can be subjected to the process, the processes required and their consequences 
Table 5. Examples of local recall initiatives





Ecuador National  legislation





Can be initiated at any 
moment
12% of voters in the 
last election, 160 days
New authority chosen 
simultaneously (the 
replacement candidate 
with the most votes)
Steve-level: 
Minnesota
Can be initiated at any 
moment. Reasons: 
illicit activity, breach, 
serious crime
25% of voters in the 




Can be initiated at any 
moment
25% of electorate New elections
Los Angeles All public positions, 
appointed or elected 
(but not 3 months 
prior election, or 6 
months following recall 
election). Rationale 
must be published 
with request. Includes 
the response of the 
affected official
For designated posi-
tions, 20% of the votes 
of the last elections, 
for elected officials 
and members of the 
school committee, 
15%; 120 days
Call for a recall  
referendum plus a 
candidate to replace 
it (who must obtain 
a majority vote to be 
appointed, or elections 





All elected officials, 
from mid-term and 
before the last year of 
mandate
20% of the electorate, 
3 days
Recall referendum and, 
depending on when it 
takes place, new elec-









All members of the 
Punong Barangay and 
Sangguniang Barangay 
of the city, only once 
per mandate, after first 
after the elections or 
takeover
25% Recall elections  
in 30 days, most voted  








Termination of local 
assembly, individual 
members, mayors  
or governors, public 
offices (such as deputy 
mayors or members  
of school committees); 
1 year following  
the government  
mandate max.  
1 time per mandate
One month in small 
cities and two in large 
cities (more than 
500,000 inhabitants),  
% varies according to 
size
Binding recall  
referendum
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Voters End of legislature 50.000 signatures With signatures 20% 
voters, call for referen-





Voters Mayors 30% voters, inde-
pendently of the num-















Mayors, not before 12 
months last election 
or the last recall, nor 
less than 6 months 
before new elections, 
withdrawal of request 
is forbidden
Inform provincial elec-
toral commission and 
mayor, explain reasons, 
signatures of 10% vot-
ers, 60 days, without 
funding for information 
campaign
Call for a referendum, 
binding if it is attended 
by % of voters from 
previous elections 
and more than 30% 
of the voters supports 
the proposal; in case 
of recall, dissolution 
of local government 
and resignation mayor, 
Prime Minister ap-
points administrator 
until new government 
election
Source: Own elaboration based on cited sources
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4. Analysis of the initiatives
In this section we conduct an in-depth comparative analysis of the initiatives defined 
in the first chapter and described in chapter 3. To that end, we examine various elements, 
paying close attention to local experiences 
The central aspects of the institutional design we analyse refer to:
a) Regulation: Which regulations frame the functioning of the initiatives?
b) The subject: Who can trigger an initiative? Must an individual or a committee register 
before gathering signatures?
c) The object: Is any material excluded? Are there determined timeframes within which 
to repeal a law or recall an authority?
d) The formulation: For a proposed law, is it necessary to formulate it as such, or is the 
main idea sufficient? If the aim is to recall a mandate, are evidence and arguments 
required or can it be exercised as a political right?
e) The process: How many signatures are required? What time period is permitted to 
collect them? By whom and how are they validated? Is there any prior oversight re-
garding constitutionality?
f) Consequences of the initiation: Who, and using which criteria, legitimates the call for 
a referendum and/or discusses the proposal in the legislature? Are the decisions tak-
en binding or consultative? Who is responsible for overseeing their implementation?
4.1. Based on what: regulation
The range of participatory mechanisms aimed at broadening the political agenda (pro-
active) and/or controlling public actions (reactive) in the hands of the citizens is as broad as 
its regulation is varied  With regards to regulations, one element with which to distinguish 
them is the territorial ground on which they are conducted  A second element we wish to 
highlight is related to institutional design and, in particular, the triggering process along with 
its objectives and results  These are analysed below 
The source of the regulation
Unlike mechanisms such as participatory budgeting or citizens’ assemblies, whose 
implementation does not require any prior regulatory framework, the mechanisms of direct 
democracy do require specific regulations contained in constitutions and/or laws and ordi-
nances 
In some countries, national constitutions define the limits and scope of citizens’ ini-
tiatives (and of any other form of popular consultation or referenda)  In others wide-ranging 
regulatory remits are granted to the provinces, states, or districts (including the power to 
contradict the content of the central authority’s regulatory framework)  An example of the 
first group is Spain, where even though autonomous communities dictate their own statutes 
and municipalities create their own specific laws, the 1978 constitution imposes considerable 
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limits on the mechanisms of direct democracy, starting with the prohibition of conducting 
binding consultations and the need to obtain permission to conduct consultative referenda  
In fact, between 1985 and 2009, of the 111 municipal referenda proposed, only 26 were au-
thorised  These restrictions also extend to the issues which are permitted to be the object 
of these initiatives (García Majado, 2017) 
In Venezuela the 1999 constitution introduced mechanisms of direct democracy for 
all governmental bodies  This is not a minor issue because if the mechanisms are not pro-
mulgated at a sub-national level, the citizenry could bring a complaint before the judicial 
authorities. This occurred during the first local recalls of local mandates, triggered in 2007 
after the intervention of the judicial authorities ordering that a constitutionally enshrined 
right be exercised (Welp and Serdült, 2011)  The Venezuelan example also highlights the 
indispensable need for the regulatory framework to function adequately –that rules are re-
spected and function effectively– in order for citizens’ initiatives to come to fruition  Unless 
they can be exercised, potentially powerful mechanisms of control hold little value  This is 
what occurred in Venezuela in 2016, when in spite of the fact that the recall initiative against 
president Nicolás Maduro had fulfilled the requirements stipulated by law, an electoral 
organisation co-opted by the government (the National Electoral Council) delayed it until 
eventually a state of emergency suspended subnational elections and, along with them, the 
recall referendum (Welp and Serdült, 2011) 
In the second group, in which the subnational bodies have greater powers, we find 
federal countries such as Germany, Argentina, the United States, Switzerland, and Mexico, 
among others  For these, even if the national constitutions do not regulate participatory 
mechanisms, or regulate them in a very restricted way (such as Germany, Argentina, Brasil 
and the USA; Mexico recently broadened its legislation), the states, provinces, or districts 
can create their own legislation to include them 
In Germany, although the federal constitution does not permit the triggering of legis-
lative initiatives, most länder (states) and their municipalities have regulated them (Geissel, 
2017)  In Argentina a similar model is followed  There the municipal regulation even allows 
local government to modify their governing model (to change to a collegial government for 
example) if that were decided by referendum. A proposal of this type was first discussed in 
September 2018 in the municipality of Villa General Belgrano9  In some cases there is reg-
ulation for initiatives about specific issues. The Norwegian constitution does not establish 
formal provisions for initiatives and referenda of a consultative character. Neither does the 
national legislation at the municipal level specify when referenda should be held  However, 
the Education Act establishes that if a quarter of the electorate requests one, a local con-
sultative referendum must be held regarding the main language of an educational institu-
tion (from 1915 until it was reformed the result was binding) (Adamiak, 2011)  Prior to 1989 
the legislation concerning licences to sell alcohol also enabled initiatives on this question  
Finally, in 2003 regulation was introduced for agenda initiatives at a local and regional level 
4.2. Who: the initiating subject
In order to answer the question of who carries forward an initiative, we will focus on 
the subject empowered to do so, which can range from an inhabitant of a district or the 
citizen with voting rights, to associative bodies (Schneider and Welp, 2011) 
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In the case of initiatives culminating in a referendum, the subject with the power to 
trigger them is usually defined as the electorate registered in the territory voting would take 
place in. There are no significant disputes on this matter, although recently the importance 
of broadening participation to include other groups has been discussed, particularly 16-18 
year olds and, for district level initiatives, people who do not reside in a determined territory 
but who work, study or have other specific interests there.
In Norway there have been several changes in relation to who can vote in referenda 
(including those triggered by legislative initiatives) concerning the issues of school districts 
and language: the question was raised as to whether only the parents of school age children 
could participate, or all adults living in a district  Finally the last option was established 
(Adamiak, 2011) 
A large portion of juridical doctrine considers that an agenda initiative which does not 
lead to a vote but to the presentation of a proposal in the parliament or deliberating council 
should be more inclusive  In this vein, Aranda Álvarez asserts that “we have an instrument 
of political participation, but we do not have the right to vote, therefore the conditions es-
tablished to exercise one or the other right need not necessarily be identical” (2006: 200)  
In spite of this argument, by analysing Latin American regulation it can be observed that in 
most countries which regulate for this process, residents are not entitled to sign an initiative 
(only those with citizenship may do so), while it is only in Brasil that the age limit has been 
lowered to include anyone over the age of 16 (Suárez Antón, 2017) 
Colombia also permits the presentation of agenda initiatives to civic organisations, 
labour unions, indigenous or communal groups at a national, state, municipal, or local level, 
as well as to political parties and movements (Soto Barrientos, 2017) 
In Spain, legislation limits participation to Spanish citizens of a legal age who are 
registered on the census, thus excluding persons under 18 years of age and legally resident 
non-nationals (García Majado, 2017)  In contrast, according to the legislation of some auton-
omous communities, the participation of 16-18 year olds (Catalonia), non-nationals legally 
residing in Spain (Basque Country), or residents from the EU, Island, Lichtenstein, Norway, 
or Switzerland (Catalonia), is permitted (Pérez Alberdi, 2017) 
As a pioneering case, in Norway a project “E-Initiative” was launched, starting in 
2005, to facilitate an online agenda initiative in eleven municipalities in which there were 
no restrictions for participation for those under 18 years of age (Adamiak, 2011)  In general, 
the triggering of initiatives requires prior actions such as the registration of a sponsoring 
committee  This is the case for recall initiatives in Colombia, while in Peru the registration 
is carried out by the purchase of a kit (sold by the electoral commission) containing the 
signature gathering forms 
4.3. What: the object of the initiative
Can an initiative propose anything? In order to organise an answer to this question, 
we will differentiate between the initiatives that put forward proposals and those which are 
aimed at responding to governmental measures or elected posts, given that their objectives 
are clearly distinct 
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Proactive initiatives
At a national level, the restrictions on issues which can be addressed by initiatives can 
be grouped into three reasonably common categories: 1) issues which affect the constitution; 
2) issues related to the integrity of the state, questions of war and peace, of a supranational 
or international jurisdiction, international treaties; and 3) several limitations related to ordi-
nary legislation and other political decisions. Regarding the first category, in those cases in 
which a constitutional initiative is permitted, some issues may be excluded such as in the 
case of Slovakia where basic rights and liberties cannot be addressed 
In relation to the issues which can be the object of a legislative initiative, the basic 
requirement is that they be included within the permitted issues a territory or governmental 
body is entitled to address  Beyond this, with the exception of Switzerland and some states 
and municipalities of the USA, it is common to find numerous restrictions. In Africa for ex-
ample, many countries exclude from the instruments of direct democracy certain issues 
such as the Charter of Rights, fiscal, financial and budgetary policies, as well as decisions 
concerning the workforce and sensitive subjects such as the death penalty in South Africa 
(Kersting, 2009) 
Initiatives which culminate in a vote with binding results often exclude many issues, 
but something similar can be observed with agenda initiatives which lead to parliamentary 
debate  While there is an open discussion about the scope of initiatives seeking a referen-
dum, the limited scope of agenda initiatives is increasingly called into question  The most 
widespread argument is that said limitations make the mechanism irrelevant and incapable 
of channelling problems which sectors of the population are concerned about (if it can only 
be triggered to deal with issues of minor importance)  Hevia de la Jara states that “the inclu-
sion and exclusion of subject matter may be the key point which differentiates an applicable 
law from one which is merely a dead letter” (2010: 162) 
The Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CABA, see sheet 5) regulates agenda initiatives 
by establishing that they cannot aim to reform the city constitution, international treaties, 
taxes, and budgets. It is common to find “budget” as an excluded subject, leaving wide in-
terpretive margins which allow initiatives resisted by the authorities to be blocked, given 
that few significant initiatives do not involve the need for access to a budget.
In Switzerland there are no restrictions on the issues which can be submitted to a 
referendum, which can cause subsequent problems if eventually the decisions taken are 
unenforceable or undermine fundamental rights  At the federation level some of the recent 
consultations generated this problem but the perception that the judiciary has no direct 
legitimacy (for not being elected) and therefore should not impede the consultation, con-
tinues to prevail 
We can observe certain variability in the legislation of Swiss districts (Micotti and 
Bützer, 2003): in general terms the initiatives can range from petitioning for some type of 
measure for the municipality to the adoption, modification, or repeal of articles from the 
local charter  Some cities, such as Geneva, exclude areas such as construction, demolition, 
or acquisition of community assets from the initiative 
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We therefore find some countries with few restrictions on subjects which can be 
addressed, and others in which the list is very extensive or where arbitrariness reigns  From 
the cases which are less stringent, in New Zealand at a national level some 10% of voters 
can trigger a call for a consultative referendum about almost any subject except the result 
of some elections or related to questions which have already been put to a referendum 
(Qvortrup et al , 2018)  In Slovakia a legislative initiative can even request the dissolution of 
a municipality (Láštic, 2011) 
In order to illustrate stringency and ambiguity, in Bulgaria local referenda (including 
those sponsored by legislative initiative) must address matters of local importance in which 
the government has jurisdiction, excluding matters related to the municipal budget, local 
taxation, or local questions for which the law has established a special procedure  These 
extensive restrictions help explain the scarce implementation of this instrument and the 
relative lack of citizens’ interest in it (Taralezhkova, 2011) 
Another example of this type is the Czech Republic, where the 1992 legislation prohib-
its referenda about municipal budgets and taxes, as well as subjects which are not under the 
remit of the local government (which includes the administration of social benefits), while 
legislation introduced in 2004 stipulates that referenda cannot change or annul municipal 
ordinances (Smith, 2011)  The problem with excluding issues that affect municipal budgets 
lies in the fact that almost any proposal will imply the need for a budgetary allocation 
In Germany there are controls to ensure that a legislative initiative addresses a subject 
which can be submitted to a referendum  In an analysis of 16 German länder (Schiller, 2011b), 
it was observed that budget and taxes are excluded from legislative initiatives with the ex-
ception of Bavaria. In these cases, the initiative proposal must include a financial statement 
estimating costs and providing recommendations as to how to finance them. Also excluded 
are very important elements of municipal policy such as zoning, urban planning, and similar 
issues, which are permitted only in Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse and Saxony  
Other excluded subjects relate to municipal administrative organisation, the legal status of 
mayors and staff, tariffs, budgets for local businesses etc  The most frequent subjects of 
initiatives and local referenda are the infrastructure of education and social provision (17%), 
transport projects (17%), fusion of municipalities (14%), public service infrastructure (14%), 
business projects (14%), and projects related to waste and sewage (5%)  Many states require 
that a legislative initiative include plans to cover the costs of implementing the proposal 
(Geissel, 2017) 
In order to avoid being inundated with similar proposals, in some cases it is prohibit-
ed to process initiatives whose content is substantially similar to another presented during 
the same legislative period, such as in the case of initiative agendas in Spain  Although this 
avoids undesirable duplication, there is a risk that it can be used perniciously, by registering 
an initiative to address a particular question and failing to gather the requisite signatures, in 
order to stall a subsequent presentation (García Majado, 2017) 
With regard to the issues which can be addressed by initiatives, most agenda ini-
tiatives triggered in Norway focus on very specific and localised questions, such as roads, 
tunnels, buildings, and green spaces (Adamiak, 2011) 
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Reactive initiatives
Reactive mechanisms also display great diversity in their institutional design  For ex-
ample, in Switzerland at a national level it is possible to trigger an abrogative initiative in 
relation to a law which has just been passed  A time frame of 18 months is granted to collect 
signatures and promote the repeal  In Italy, by contrast, any existing law can be the object 
of an abrogative referendum 
The diversity mentioned above is reproduced in the analysis of mandate recall initia-
tives  In Bolivia, for example, all the popularly elected authorities – legislative, executive, and 
judicial, at all levels of government – may be submitted to recall once two years have elapsed 
since the beginning of their mandate, and up to a year before its conclusion  In Colombia only 
subnational executive authorities can be submitted to recall (mayors and governors) once the 
first year of their term is completed, and before the last. In California recall initiatives can 
be triggered from the first day of government (Welp, 2018). In Minnesota and North Dakota 
the recall initiative can be triggered at any time  The six Swiss cantons which regulate recall 
initiatives permit the removal of the government as a whole, and just one –Ticano– allows 
individual recall (Serdült, 2015) 
In some cases the figures liable to be the object of recall are wider. Hence in the 
city of Los Angeles all public positions are included, whether they were elected or assigned 
(which includes commissaries, director generals, and executive directors of various depart-
ments) (Sonenshein, 2006) 
The limits and interrelationships between territorial authorities are on occasion not 
entirely clear  Two examples from Slovenia illustrate this ambiguity  In Radovljica in 2004 
an initiative was undertaken to call an abrogative referendum against a planned motorway, 
which was blocked by the mayor  The initiators appealed to the courts which ruled in fa-
vour of the mayor’s decision, given that the route of the motorway had been decided by the 
state government  On the other hand, in the city of Postojna in 2000, an initiative triggered 
a consultative referendum which requested that the state government shut down a mili-
tary base  70% voted in favour of the proposal, with higher than 70% turnout  Although the 
base was not shut down, the Ministry for Defence began paying compensation to the local 
population for the inconvenience and limitations were put on certain activities at the base 
(Nežmah, 2011). This second case shows the potential that initiatives can have in terms of 
pressure and negotiation 
These different territorial levels can also act to override citizen’s demands  For ex-
ample, in Novi Khan, a small town in Bulgaria, a referendum triggered by gathering citizens’ 
signatures was held, and with a 65% turnout the citizenry voted in favour of closing a ra-
dioactive waste disposal site owned by the state  The state government took no action, in 
the knowledge that a national issue could not be resolved by means of a local referendum 
(Taralezhkova, 2011) 
4.4. How it is presented: formulation
With regards to the formulation, the proactive mechanisms can generate the elabo-
ration of a proposal, while the reactive may require justification (and evidence) in order to 
defend the rejection of the policy or office.
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With the hope that the mechanism would be accessible, arguing in favour of the 
agenda initiative, Kelsen (1920) stated that a general idea should be sufficient, without the 
need for the proposal to be elaborated in the form of a law  However, the negative aspect of 
very generic proposals is that they can lead to the idea which is eventually discussed being 
very different from the original one put forward by its sponsors  There is also the possibility 
of offering two options that the sponsors can choose between: agenda initiatives in Finland 
can be written in the format of a law or they can include a proposal that the government 
initiates a legislative process (Christensen et al , 2017) 
The initiatives which lead to a vote must be supported by draft legislation  This adds 
significant difficulties to triggering the process, as technical and legal knowledge are required 
to prepare it  In this sense key to the success of an initiative of this type (success meaning 
reaching the voting or discussion stage, regardless of the results) is that the sponsoring 
committee has technical support, or at least is given sufficient time to review and amend 
procedural questions after the initial presentation of the proposal  Otherwise, the mechanism 
could become inapplicable or eventually a resource only available to those with sufficient 
knowledge and/or the economic resources to secure advisors 
The recall initiatives can be differentiated, in relation to their formulation, between 
those regulated as a political right (“the public gives, the public takes away”), and those 
conceived of as penalisation for failing to fulfil a program (known as “programmatic vote”) 
or for corruption, which requires arguments and even the presentation of evidence  In Vene-
zuela, where national legislation also regulates recall initiatives for sublevels of government, 
failure to fulfil a program can be invoked, as well as dissatisfaction or popular discontent 
(Schneider and Welp, 2011) 
The ease with which an initiative can be triggered varies considerably if substantiation 
is required (as a formal requisite) or evidence (whose validity is assessed by an electoral 
body)  A programmatic vote means that during a campaign the candidates must present a 
work plan laying the foundations so that subsequently it is possible to judge whether the 
commitments made are being fulfilled or not and whether a recall petition is justified, if it 
can be registered 
The Ecuadorian case eloquently illustrates the impact of institutional design on both 
the amount and the quality and type of initiatives triggered: recall initiatives were introduced 
into the 1998 constitution, with the trigger motives being failure to fulfil a mandate and a 
guilty verdict of corruption  The former was evaluated by the electoral authority, while the 
latter was redundant since an authority with a guilty verdict of corruption is automatically 
removed from their post  In 2008 the new constitution relaxed the requirements for activa-
tion (number of signatures) and established that it was a political right (no need to produce 
evidence)  The number of recall initiatives rose considerably within a brief period until the 
legislation was once again reformed (after vigorous litigation by the Association of Munici-
palities) and currently adequate motives are very precisely defined, they must be presented 
with detailed evidence, and they are evaluated by the corresponding authorities (Welp, 2018) 
As we shall see, in some cases citizens initiate a proposal, including the drafting of 
the text to gather signatures or the question to be put to the vote, while in other cases it is 
the administration itself or a public figure who writes the text. For example in Los Angeles, 
it is the district attorney who, drawing on the draft proposal, provides the title and summary 
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of provisions which will circulate to gather signatures (Sonenshein, 2006)  In that city, in the 
case of a recall initiative, the petition includes a statement of the initiators’ motives and a 
reply from the authority affected 
In Poland, when a recall initiative is triggered at a local level its initiators must inform 
residents of their intention to recall the local government, explaining their reasons  However, 
the provincial electoral commissioner is not authorised to evaluate the justification for the 
recall initiative, and is limited to checking the legal and formal aspects of the petition 
As described in section 2 2, a central criticism of direct democracy relates to the 
knowledge level of citizens with respect to the decisions that are taken  In some cases the 
initiative processes are assisted by a figure (who could be from the government itself or an 
independent electoral body) responsible for providing detailed information about the issue 
under discussion, instead of that remaining in the hands of its sponsors and interested sec-
tors. These figures are especially important when the proposals are particularly complex, 
include many aspects or when several different issues are put to the vote simultaneously 
(for example in Arizona in 2006 when 19 different proposals about highly diverse subjects 
were voted on)  In California a legislative analyst provides a neutral summary explaining the 
proposals submitted to the vote (Beramendi et al , 2008)  In a pioneering example of the 
Citizens’ Initiative Review in Oregon, information is provided about the proposal by means 
of a deliberative process similar to citizens’ juries (see sheet 21) 
4.5. How initiatives are processed: procedure and signatures
The triggering procedure includes questions such as the number of signatures required 
and the time granted to collect them, the existence of specific forms and/or authorised 
collecting centres, as well as signature validation processes 
Signature thresholds
The question of the number of signatures is the most discussed one although, de-
pending on the object of the mechanism, the tendency is to request a reduction (agenda 
initiative) or increase (recall initiatives)  For agenda initiatives there is relative consensus that 
the number of signatures should be comparatively low (around 1%), since their impact is mi-
nor or indirect  However there are many cases were the threshold is set higher (in Colombia 
for example)  In general, a recall initiative requires more signatures than proposal initiatives  
For example, if in the case of Berlin (see sheet 11) 20,000 signatures are required to carry 
forward a proposal, 50,000 are required to solicit the recall of a public authority 
There are also proposals along the lines of suggesting that national legislation sets 
a cap but not a floor, so that a maximum threshold of signatures would be established but 
municipalities and regions would have the option to lower it (Hevia de la Jara, 2007)  At a 
regional level in Andalusia (see sheet 7) the autonomous law establishes a maximum for the 
municipalities that regulate initiatives: the signatures required cannot exceed 10% of the 
residents to be consulted (or 20,000 signatures) 
The signature thresholds can be expressed as a percentage of the electorate in re-
lation to the total number of votes cast in the previous elections, or as a fixed number. In 
some cases a certain geographical distribution of signatures is required  In Switzerland the 
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required number of signatures for a legislative initiative corresponds to three different sit-
uations (Micotti and Bützer, 2003): eight cantons determine the threshold as a percentage 
of the population ranging from 10% to 30%, five cantons do not have a regulation and leave 
the decision up to the districts, while in another seven cantons a minimum number of sig-
natures is indicated as a non-obligatory guideline for the districts, which ranges from 10% 
to 25% of the population  In general, the urban districts with a greater population density 
tend to set a number of signatures (representing a low percentage of the population), while 
the small districts establish higher percentages  In Germany the signatures required for a 
legislative initiative to be submitted to a vote are a percentage of the electorate and vary 
considerably between municipalities  In Hamburg it is 2-3%, in Berlin (see sheet 11) 7%, and 
in Brandenberg 10% 
At a regional level the Spanish autonomous communities tend to lean towards sub-
stantially reducing the threshold of signatures required for agenda initiatives in comparison 
with previous regulations (for example, thresholds reduced from 75,000 to 40,000 in An-
dalusia, 65,000 to 50,000 in Catalonia, and 30,000 to 10,000 in the Basque Country, among 
others) (Pérez Alberdi, 2017) 
Time frame for signature gathering
The time frames for the collection of signatures also have an impact on the feasibility 
of triggering an initiative and should strike a balance between the ability to channel demands 
(facilitating their expression) and the need to avoid undermining them (preventing them from 
multiplying in such a way that distorts legislative proceedings)  Until 2013 in Peru there were 
no time limits imposed (beyond the duration of the mandate in question) on signature col-
lection to trigger a recall initiative  This enabled the sponsors of the recall initiative targeted 
at the mayor Susana Villarán to take advantage of events that occurred during that period 
(for example floods) in order to reach the required number of signatures. Many cities in the 
USA impose no time limits on any type of initiative either 
In the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (see sheet 5) the sponsors are granted 12 
months from the date that the project is presented to obtain the required signatures  The 
Directorate General for Management and Citizen Participation is responsible for providing 
assistance to citizens, receiving proposals and checking that they do not address constitu-
tionally prohibited subjects  When projects achieve the endorsement of 4,000 signatures the 
initiative must be advertised by the city government on its radio channel as well as other 
print media and televisual broadcasts available to it 
In some cases the regulation leaves space for the authorities to exercise a boycott of 
sorts on the time frame set for the collection of signatures  In the case of abrogative initia-
tives in Oregon (USA), the period is 90 days from the end of the session which passed the 
law  However, the governor has 30 days in which to sign or veto the law, meaning that in the 
eventuality of clear attempts to organise an abrogative referendum, they can choose to delay 
for those 30 days, thus consuming a third of the time available for the collection of signatures 
(McGuire, 2008)  Whether or not these manoeuvres are employed, it is recommendable that 
the regulation does not facilitate them 
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Who, where, and how
Other important distinctions concern whether any voter can sign (as is usually the 
case), or only those who voted in the last elections, as well as whether the signatures can 
be gathered anywhere or only in specific locations (in Germany for example in certain mu-
nicipalities signatures for a legislative initiative can be gathered anywhere, or only in the 
town hall)  The latter option undoubtedly hinders the process as it entails added costs of 
transportation to the permitted locations  On the other extreme is the much more accessible 
option of electronic voting 
The potential for signatures to be collected electronically could considerably stream-
line the process  European and Finnish agenda initiatives provide this option  A study into 
electronic signature gathering (Serdült et al , 2016) analyses e-participation experiments that 
show the potential of these new technologies  In Sigtuna in 2007 ten online referenda with 
binding results were conducted with a participation of between 30% and 60% of citizens at 
some point in the process, incorporating sectors with diverse socioeconomic characteris-
tics  In Mälmo, in a much less stringent experience, all citizens are able to launch and sign 
proposals (the only restriction is that they should not be offensive or abusive) on an online 
platform which only requires a user to register and start a session  With no time limit, when 
100 signatures are collected a local administrative committee offers a formal public response  
In the first 16 months 210 initiatives have been launched and 55,000 signatures have been 
gathered 
For initiatives at a national level, in Europe only Latvia and Finland facilitate the col-
lection of signatures online, in the latter case through the government website10 or platforms 
developed independently by the sponsors of an initiative (Christensen et al , 2017)  Therefore, 
the difficulties associated with an initiative process depend on a variety of factors such as 
the number of signatures, the time frame allotted to collect them, the establishment of 
specific locations or not, or the possibility of electronic signatures. The combination of these 
elements is a measure of the level of stringency associated with a process 
Thus, for example in Los Angeles, a legislative initiative must gather at least as many 
signatures as represent 15% of the total votes at the last local elections, within 120 days  
In the case of an abrogative initiative it is 10%, but with a time limit of merely 30 days it is 
difficult to achieve (Sonenshein, 2006). In this way, after the 2005 elections for example, the 
threshold of signatures required for a legislative initiative was 0 05% with regards to the total 
number of registered voters  By contrast, in Minnesota the signatures of 25% of the voters 
in the previous elections are required 
At a national level for legislative initiatives in Switzerland, 100,000 signatures are re-
quired (2% of the electorate) within 18 months, while in Lithuania the number is 300,000 
(11 4%), also within 18 months  As for agenda initiatives, in Slovakia 100,000 signatures are 
required (2 3%) without time limit, while in Italy the number is 50,000 (0 1%) within 6 months 
(Seo, 2017) 
There are also cases for which the thresholds are divided into stages  In a national 
agenda initiative in Austria, the first step requires 8,000 signatures to launch an initiative and 
then 100,000 gathered in just 8 days in order for it to qualify to be discussed in parliament  
Most of the 38 initiatives launched from 1964 to 2016 met this objective: 34 were discussed 
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and 4 were rejected for matters related to form (Suárez Antón, 2017)  Therefore, it seems 
that this demanding procedure (due to time pressure) translates into few initiatives triggered, 
but with enough momentum to exceed the threshold 
In the case of a recall initiative at a regional level, in the states of the USA there is 
diversity in the signature requirements (Bowler, 2004)  In some states it is tied to percentage 
of the total number of votes cast in the last elections, ranging from 15% (in Oregon and Rhode 
Island) to 40% (Kansas)  In California the percentage is 12% but with an added requirement of 
1% from each of the 5 counties  In other states a percentage of the electorate is stipulated, 
with varying formulas: 20% of the electorate in Idaho, 25% in New Jersey, 15% and a fifth of 
each district in Georgia, 33% for more than 1000 voters and 40% for less in Louisiana, 10% 
for state offices and 15% for district offices in Montana.
Nigeria represents a very stringent case, where for a recall initiative aimed at mem-
bers of the senate or the house of representatives, more than 50% of the constituents of 
the corresponding district must sign (Beramendi et al , 2008)  In Colombia 40% is required 
(Welp, 2018)  In Slovakia the threshold of required signatures to trigger a recall initiative for 
the mayoral office is 30% and the voting turnout required is 50% regardless of the number 
of residents in the municipality  This translates into an obstacle in large municipalities, es-
pecially those with over 100,000 inhabitants (Láštic, 2011) 
Requirements as (dis)incentives
These varied combinations with which to trigger an initiative generate particular in-
centives to launch proposals  Okamoto and Serdült (2016) assert that in Japan recall initia-
tives are triggered more often than legislative initiatives, even when the central objective 
is related to a public policy and not to rejecting an authority, because the former require a 
lower number of signatures and are binding, while legislative initiatives are more difficult to 
trigger, require the approval of the council and their results are non-binding 
Quite intuitively, a study based on data from legislative initiatives in Bavaria shows 
that the likelihood of triggering processes in a municipality increases considerably and in a 
significant way when the threshold requirement for signatures is lowered (Arnold and Freier, 
2015) 
Although all these requirements for triggering an initiative are crucial to explain their 
use, they are not the only elements we need to take into account  For example, in Slovenia 
where the procedures are relatively simple, few local referenda take place  Among some of 
the reasons for this are the idiosyncrasies of local communities led by more pragmatic, less 
ideological programs, as well as the economic costs that referenda entail  Parties perceive 
them as a political defeat, both from the side of the government and from the opposition 
launching them, due to fear of losing and being accused of generating unnecessary costs 
(Nežmah, 2011).
Validation
On the other hand, the validation of signatures is a less studied aspect which often 
generates numerous problems for those sponsoring initiatives and those rejecting them  This 
occurs in very specific situations, demonstrating that in part this is due to a lack of experi-
ence (there are no debates of this kind in Switzerland)  The dilemma emerged in the Lima 
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case mentioned above, and also in the attempt to recall the mayor of Bogata, Gustavo Petro 
in 2014 (Welp and Rey, 2014) 
The validation system can range from checking a sample to verifying all the signatures 
(Lissidini et al , 2014)  In Uruguay, at a national level, faced with the impossibility of devel-
oping effective mechanisms of signature validation (the validation of a sample by calligraphy 
experts is not accepted, as it is in Colombia), a pre-referendum has been created, which is 
called on the basis of a number of signatures validated simply by checking that the name 
and identity document number match and that the person is alive (their actual consent is 
not confirmed). The inquiry carried out in the pre-referendum is therefore aimed at deciding 
whether or not a consultation should be held  The mechanism is useful for widening the 
debate and providing the process with guarantees, although it is very expensive 
Financing
Another important element related to the process of meeting the requirements con-
cerns the financing of the initiative. On many occasions the costs fall to the sponsors, while 
in others there is public funding either for the process of signature collection or for the cam-
paign in the eventuality of a referendum being called  In the case of supramunicipal legislative 
initiatives in Latin America, in most cases state support for the communication of proposals 
is included, while in some cases an economic contribution is provided which reimburses the 
costs: in Peru if the signature threshold is met, and in Paraguay if the initiative is eventually 
approved (Hevia de la Jara, 2007) 
In Switzerland the estimated cost per signature is two Swiss francs, taking into account 
printing costs, administration, publicity etc, not including paid signature collectors  There-
fore, triggering a referendum would cost at least 100,000 Swiss francs just for the collection 
of signatures, to which must be added the campaign costs for the referendum itself which 
normally the sponsors, whether they be organisations or parties, assume (Ruppen, 2004)  In 
some states in Germany reimbursements are provided to the sponsoring committee for the 
verified signatures. In Saxony that is approximately 0.05 euros per signature regardless of 
the success or failure of the signature gathering process  In other states the reimbursements 
depend on the voter turnout in the referendum, such as in Schleswig-Holstein where each 
positive vote translates into 0 28 euros (Beramendi et al , 2008)  In Barcelona (see sheet 8) 
the compensation is one euro per signature, once the threshold has been met 
The experience in Oregon is an interesting one in relation to financial assistance. A 
legislative initiative in 2002 had the objective of prohibiting economic compensation on the 
basis of the number of signatures collected, and 75% voted in favour  This initiative took place 
after many reports of fraud and abuse of the signature gathering process (McGuire, 2008) 
As regards the campaign if a referendum should be called, in order to prevent in-
equality between sectors in favour and against, some elements could be considered such 
as limiting expenses or regulation of access to the media (in some cases privately owned 
media are required to offer equal time to both sides of the debate, in others public funds 
are provided to subsidise access to the media) (Beramendi et al , 2008) 
In California, an exceptional case, private companies are authorised to collect signa-
tures. Occasionally the money invested can have an enormous influence on the success of 
the process, as occurred when Gray Davies was recalled in 2003 (Garret, 2004) 
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The vote
Lastly, with regards to the voting, in the case of Oregon a general election day is set 
every two years (in November on even numbered years) on which all legislative initiatives 
are voted on  Signatures can be presented up until 120 days prior to this (McGuire, 2008)  
This type of model may prevent an excessive number of voting days, concentrating as it does 
various calls for votes (which can come from various different types of initiatives and other 
top-down mechanisms) on the same day 
4.6. Why: consequences
With regards to consequences, it is helpful to differentiate between the possible out-
comes of the process, in other words whether the proposal is debated by the authorities or 
if there is a referendum  And when there is a possibility of triggering a consultation, if it de-
pends on whether the formalities are fulfilled, or on a subsequent decision by the authorities. 
Another crucial aspect is whether the results are binding or consultative and, when the anal-
ysis focuses on a local level, it is also worth observing who organises the electoral process  
In any case, we will analyse all these questions categorised by the type of call, culminating 
in a specific consultation (legislative or abrogative) or in an agenda or recall initiative.
Consultative initiatives
In German cities, in general, the council decides if a proposal to register an initiative 
is accepted, but studies suggest that if the formalities are complied with, the proposals are 
accepted (Geissel, 2017)  When a legislative initiative exceeds the signature collection re-
quirements the next step consists of ensuring that the results of the referendum are valid  
For example, in the Czech Republic in 2004 the turnout threshold was raised from 25% of 
the electorate to 50%, while in Bulgaria in 2009 it went from being 50% to having to equal 
the turnout at the last local elections (Schiller, 2011a) 
As Schiller (2011) points out, although the result of a referendum may be valid, its 
mandate may be consultative or binding  In Italy the municipal statutes only facilitate con-
sultative referenda triggered by citizens  In other countries the binding character depends on 
turnout, such as in Bulgaria or Poland (60% of the turnout of the last corresponding election)  
In Germany local referenda are binding if they reach the required quorum of participation 
which can vary considerably between municipalities 
When an initiative leads to a binding referendum only in some cases is a simple ma-
jority accepted; it is often the case that additional requirements are incorporated such as a 
determined electoral turnout, double majorities or a minimum percentage of positive votes  
To provide a few examples, there are minimal requirements to validate the referendum results 
of a constitutional initiative in Switzerland (a simple majority and majority in 26 cantons), 
while they are high for an abrogative referendum in Italy (50% turnout) or a legislative ini-
tiative in Lithuania (50% turnout and 33% approval of the proposal as a proportion of total 
votes) (Beramendi et al , 2008) 
In New Zealand, where two out of the three questions submitted to vote via a refer-
endum initiative at a national level until 2008 received enormous public support but had no 
parliamentary impact, their non-binding character has been heavily criticised  In fact, one 
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of the initiatives addressed precisely this question (Beramendi et al , 2008)  The non-bind-
ing character, added to the stringent requirements (12 months within which to collect the 
signatures of 10% of the electorate), have generated little enthusiasm for this mechanism, 
which has meant few proposals being put forward 
Which are more successful: the consultations driven from above, or those from be-
low? Regarding the German case during the period 1956-2009, Schiller (2011b) compares the 
results of referenda triggered by a legislative initiative (2,055 cases) with those spearheaded 
by a local administration (410)  Among the referenda called “from above”, 67% received a 
favourable valid vote, 23% a negative vote, and 5% obtained a favourable vote but did not 
surpass the required turnout percentage in order to be valid (in the remaining cases the 
result was uncertain)  By contrast, among the referenda driven “from below” by legislative 
initiative, 48% received a valid favourable vote, 35% a negative vote, and 15% received a fa-
vourable vote but the voter turnout was insufficient to achieve validity. On the one hand we 
can observe that the favourable valid votes are considerably higher for referenda called by an 
administration (67%) than those triggered by citizens (48%)  On the other hand we can see 
that legislative initiatives encounter more of a struggle to exceed the turnout requirement 
threshold (15% of cases as opposed to 5% of the referenda called by public administrations)  
If we put to one side the turnout requirement threshold, the referenda with a favourable vote 
would represent 72% of those called by an administration, and 63% of those triggered by 
initiatives: a less emphatic gap  Legislative initiatives can also be conceived of as a mecha-
nism of lobbying and negotiation  Considered thus, their design could include the possibility 
of being withdrawn by their sponsors in the eventuality of the proposal being accepted by 
other means (Büchi, 2011)  In some experiences in Germany the authorities anticipated and 
decided to reconsider certain disputed projects before the signature collecting process was 
completed (Schiller, 2011b) 
When, faced with a legislative initiative surpassing the signature threshold, the au-
thorities can offer an alternative proposal to be voted on (as happens in several places), 
the political process can be enriched with a more complex deliberation and greater public 
involvement in the choice of issues to debate  There is a risk that widening the alternatives 
can complicate the actual vote, but as we have seen in section 4 4, mechanisms to facilitate 
providing information to the voting public can be established 
In Uruguay we find an atypical regulation concerning voting in a referendum called 
by a legislative initiative to amend the constitution  The citizenry may only vote “yes”, while 
those in opposition must abstain  To succeed, a turnout of 35% of the electorate is required  
This model benefits the status quo given that any abstention is assumed to be a negative 
vote (Linares Lejarraga, 2017) 
On the other hand, legislative initiatives can serve as a democratic mechanism with 
which to resolve social conflicts. The examples studied by Hincapié (2017) of the movements 
in various Latin American countries against the practice of extractivism for the appropriation 
of natural resources are useful to illustrate this idea  The local communities affected used 
unconventional forms of direct democracy such as prior consultation (based on the rights 
of indigenous communities), and local popular consultations (general called “from above”)  
In Peru, for example, the social mobilization in Tambogrande (Piura) against a mining project 
led to a call for a Neighbourhood Consultation with backing from the mayor in 2002, had a 
73% turnout and returned a 98% rejection of the project  Although the central government 
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underestimated the consultation, the Canadian mining company’s license was eventually 
withdrawn  This precedent was repeated with similar results in other places such as Ayabaca 
and Huancabamba, with process bringing together local governments, indigenous and peas-
ant communities, environmentalists and human rights activists  In a similar way, by means 
of agreements with local government, neighbourhood assemblies, social and rural workers’ 
organisations launched consultations in Argentina (2003 and 2012), Guatemala (2005 y 2012), 
Colombia (2013 y 2017) and Ecuador (2011) 
These cases show that having recourse to initiatives can be a useful conflict resolution 
mechanism, to open channels of expression for citizen movements in contexts of intense 
social conflict. In fact, if the requirements for the initiatives are very stringent or not widely 
known, demands can be channelled towards taking more informal paths, including signature 
gathering  For example, in Córdoba (see sheet 9) and Krakow (see sheet 20) we can see how 
political actors and associations initiated signature collecting campaigns to disseminate their 
political proposals (protecting street names or stopping the hosting of the Winter Olympic 
Games)  In both cases these actors could have used a proposal initiative to take their de-
mands to the city hall, even though they opted to follow more informal channels 
Agenda initiatives
The comparative study of agenda initiatives suggests that various aspects are import-
ant to prevent them from becoming “worthless scraps of paper”  Suárez Antón (2017) has 
observed that at a national level in most countries in Europe and Latin America which register 
initiatives, they are not utilised or are included as a mere parliamentary formality without 
generating debate  In Italy, for example, the procedure concerning agenda initiatives is not 
regulated, so the parliament is under no obligation to discuss them (Seo, 2017) 
When the criteria is established that a representative should endorse the initiative 
(as in the case of Brasil) or opportunities are created for the sponsors to attend a session 
and defend their proposals in parliament, the chances that such proposals have an impact 
on the debate increase (Suárez Antón, 2017)  In Finland, some months prior to introducing 
agenda initiatives at a national level, parliamentary proceedings were modified so that they 
would be dealt with like any other law proposal and their sponsors would have the right to 
be heard in the relevant committees (Christensen et al , 2017) 
While in some countries the initiatives have had a lesser impact (such as Eastern 
European countries), in Switzerland the initiatives have had a significant influence on the 
political agenda and the political system as a whole  Recently the extreme right populist 
movement has been able to mobilise popular support through initiatives addressing contro-
versial issues such as banning immigration, which has sparked a debate about parliamentary 
oversight of the content of initiatives (Seo, 2017) 
The example of Hämeenkyrö (Finland) demonstrates the problem of subordinating 
initiatives to a representative logic  In this municipality in 2006 an agenda initiative was trig-
gered against the construction of an incinerator, signed by 800 people (10% of the elector-
ate) and requesting that a consultation be held and that the result be respected  The local 
government decided to hold a consultation, in which 46 3% voted in favour of the incinerator 
and 49 3% voted against with a 55 1% turnout, despite which the local administration decided 
to approve the construction of the plant (Büchi, 2011)  While advancing an initiative requires 
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much time and effort, taking or overturning a decision in a municipal plenum can be very 
quick  This type of experience can have very negative repercussions on public opinion 
However, there is also the possibility of combining agenda initiatives with another 
mechanism such as a legislative initiative or a referendum initiative  This is the case in Peru 
at a national level, where if an agenda or constitutional initiative that exceeds the signa-
ture threshold is rejected or substantially modified, a call for a referendum can be solicited 
by collecting signatures equivalent to between 0 3% and 10% of the population (Welp and 
Suárez, 2017) 
Recall initiatives
In the case of a recall initiative, the expected outcome can incentivise strategies 
which were not originally desired  Thus, some cases establish that if the recall is passed, 
the authority will be replaced by substitutes, while in other elections are triggered  In Peru 
it has been observed that this generates pernicious incentives in the system, encouraging 
politicians (in a highly fragmented and weakly institutionalised party system) to be the main 
sponsors using the mechanism as an extension of the electoral battle (the losers unite 
against the electoral victor). The law was modified in 2013, and in the following term there 
was a marked decrease of the number of initiatives  California stands out again as one of the 
few cases in which voting for a recall becomes an election, in which while voting to recall 
an authority it is also possible to vote for their replacement  This was the process by which 
Arnold Schwarzenegger became governor, after successfully recalling Gray Davies in 2003 
In the case of replacing an elected official through a recall initiative, we encounter 
different options, as the state of California and the city of Los Angeles illustrate  In the 
former, the replacement would be the candidate with most votes in the recall referendum, 
while in Los Angeles it is necessary to achieve a majority vote or otherwise new elections 
are called between the top two candidates  In the Californian model, in a recall with many 
strong candidates, it is possible that the candidate eventually elected could obtain less votes 
than those who opposed the recall (Sonenshein, 2006) 
The recall referenda also have varied criteria in order to be considered valid, as some 
national examples show (Beramendi et al , 2008)  In Kiribati a majority of registered voters 
must vote. In Belarus more than half of voters must support the referendum. In Nigeria and 
the Republic of Palau a simple majority is sufficient. In Micronesia a simple majority of votes 
in sufficient in Chuuk, Kosrae and Yap, while in Pohnpei an affirmative vote of 60% of regis-
tered voters is required for the government, or 51% for the legislature  In Venezuela a number 
of voters equal to the vote that the official garnered in their election is required, as well as 
it being necessary that 25% of the total number of registered voters cast a favourable vote  
In Poland, a 2005 reform established that the turnout threshold required (which has been 
30% at a municipal level) was changed to 60% of the number of votes cast in the elections 
which selected the affected body (Piasecki, 2011) 
Lastly, we also find mixed recall processes in which the citizenry is called to vote in a 
referendum but the initiative falls to an accredited body (in other words, with a “top down” 
dynamic, as in Austria, Iceland, Palau, and Romania), or in which citizens launch a recall 
petition that can be processed and approved (or not) by an accredited body (which can be 
categorised as a non-binding recall initiative)  Some countries, such as Palau, have mixed 
recalls for representatives at the highest executive levels and complete recall initiatives for 
the members of legislative bodies (Beramendi et al , 2008) 
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5. Reference sheets: Examples of initiatives
On the following pages we provide the details of initiative experiences in different 
parts of the world  It does not constitute an exhaustive list of local initiative practices; how-
ever, we have tried to cover a broad variety of cases  The selection of experiences responds 
to several criteria that we consider relevant 
Firstly, almost all the initiatives are from local or municipal level  There are two ex-
ceptions: sheet 7, which features a Spanish region, is included because of the diversity of 
initiatives encompassed; and, secondly, sheet 21, which refers to a US state, is included due 
to the innovative way in which it combines the initiative with a process of deliberation 
Our definition of “local” is generous in its scope: we include cases of initiatives de-
veloped in a municipality, but also experiences implemented in a capital territory, federal 
district or large metropolitan area  We have tried to present the majority of the initiatives 
from large cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants 
Secondly, and despite being a large case study, we have selected the different sorts 
of initiatives covered in this report: legislative, agenda, referendum, abrogative (of regula-
tions or public decisions) and recall initiatives  In some cases, experiences resembling these 
typologies have been incorporated, even when formally they have not been given this name 
by their promoters or the authorities 
Thirdly, they represent a wide variety of initiatives from the point of view of successes 
and failures  We understand that they can be judged from different perspectives (see section 
2 of this report): an initiative can be unsuccessful from an institutional point of view (being 
rejected by the representative chamber), but it can, for example, be successful in terms of 
boosting and mobilising the associative network  Therefore we include initiatives associated 
with different outcomes and political achievements 
Lastly, we have tried to cover a broad territorial map, although it was not an easy 
task, given that some territories are better documented online or in academic literature  The 
initiatives in our list are located in Europe, North America, South America, Asia and Oceania. 
We have not found local cases in Africa  This is, undoubtably, a task that future studies must 
address 
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Sheet 1. Duisburg (Germany):  
recall initiative after a catastrophe
Summary
The German Federal Republic is one of the few democratic countries that do not regulate 
direct democracy mechanisms nationwide  At a state (länder) level, in 1990 a wave of legal 
modifications was promoted to introduce a variety of mechanisms: activated by the authori-
ties, compulsory and by signature collection  At present, all states and local councils regulate 
them  The mandate revocation is present in 11 out of the 16 German states, although only in 
four can be started by signature collection: Brandenburg, Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein and 
North-Rhine-Westphalia. Even if the activation requirements are considered high, its prac-
tice is not rare  Still, it is more frequently registered in local councils with less than 20,000 
inhabitants and specially if they are activated by council towns themselves (indirect recall)  
But now it has begun to expand to bigger cities like Potsdam (in 19998, 160,000 inhabitants), 
Cottbus (2006, 100,000 inhabitants) and the case analysed below, Duisburg (in 2012, 500,000 
inhabitants) 
Regulation
All the German states include direct democracy mechanisms, which are also regulated at a 
council level  The regulation varies depending on the state, while procedures are also differ-
ent  The table below shows the states in which the recall initiative is regulated (also known 
as direct or bottom up, started by signature collection, contrary to the indirect or top down 
one, activated by the council or parliament), the year of introduction and modification of 
the law (when it applies), the number of signatures required and the number of registered 
referendums for each regulatory framework 






North-Rhine-Westphalia 1999-2011 2012 15-20
3 
4
Saxony 1994 33’33 11
Schleswig-Holstein 1997 20 5
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Geissel and Jung (2018)
Formal characteristics
The city of Duisburg is located in the state of North-Rhine-Westphalia. The recall initiative 
was introduced there in 1999 as an indirect mechanism (activated by the City Council)  The 
law was modified in 2011 to introduce the recall initiative with a relatively low percentage of 
signatures, which has boosted activations  The legislative change pursued offering an answer 
to the citizen’s demand following outrage when the people tried to revoke the mayor but the 
council (where a majority backed the mayor) blocked it 
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Prevalence
The mandate recall becomes effective if a majority votes in favour and turnout reaches 25% 
of the electorate 
Practical development
In 2010, a Love Parade, a techno music party organised in the city of Duisburg, ended in a 
tragedy where 21 people died and 500 were injured in a stampede. The party had first taken 
part in Dublin in 1989 and since then had been attended by a growing number of people  In 
2010 it was decided to relocate the party to Duisburg in an area surrounded by rail tracks 
accessible only through tunnels  When thousands of participants crowded together tried to 
leave unsuccessfully, panic spread and catastrophe broke  The authorities and the police 
blamed each other while the population put together claiming for Christian Democratic Union 
of Germany (CDU) mayor Adolf Sauerland’s recall for having permitted the festival to take 
place in an unsuitable area, hardly accessible and with too many participants  However, in 
the state of North-Rhine-Westphalia the recall had been introduced in 1999 as an indirect 
mechanism  Once the proposal was presented, a majority in the Council voted against acti-
vating the referendum  Shortly after, the state Parliament changed the law to allow the recall 
initiative by signature collection. Once a legal basis was stablished, a committee called “New 
Start for Duisburg” started to collect signatures to hold a recall referendum  They needed 
signatures from 15% of the electorate, approximately 55,000 people, which were quickly col-
lected (more than 67,000 were validated)  On February 12, 2012, 85,5% of the electors backed 
mayor Sauerland’s recall, with a 41,6% turnout (above the 25% requirement) 
Strengths
Some studies show the support of the Germans for the introduction of direct democracy 
mechanisms  Thus, in a 2012 poll, it was observed that 87% of the population would back 
the introduction nationwide referendums (Emnid, 2013)  Other polls on a local level show 
that Germans want to be more involved in the decision-making (Stiftung and Baden-Würt-
temberg, 2014) 
After the Duisburg tragic events, the mechanism would have allowed to restore the trust 
in the capacity to renew the system (change the law to allow the referendum) and improve 
accountability 
Weaknesses
Recall initiatives tend to be specially polarized  In the above case, there is neither any study 
that shows it nor other associated weaknesses 
Documentation
Stiftung, 2011 / Stiftung and Baden-Württemberg, 2014 / Emnid, 2013 / Geissel and Jung, 
2018 / Serdült and Welp, 2017 / Schwarz, 2012
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Sheet 2. Nagoya (Japan):  
The mayor promoting a recall initiative
Summary
After World War Two and during Japan’s American occupation, the political reform of the 
country was discussed, with a special emphasis on decentralization  As part of the reforms 
to be implemented, direct democracy mechanisms were introduced  Recall initiatives are 
regulated since then (1947), including the formats: the recall of the local assembly as a whole, 
the recall of individual members of the assembly and the recall of mayors if one third or more 
of the electorate requests it  Between 1947 and 2014, around 1,500 processes by signature 
collection were registered, of which hundreds resulted in binding votes  Here we analyse 
the experience of Nagoya in 2011, when the same mayor decided to promote the recall of 
the council (contrary to his policies) in order to force a new election where he triumphed 
increasing his majority in the deliberative body 
Regulation
In Japan the law allows to collect signatures in order to vote on the dissolution of the local 
assembly (art  76 3 Local Autonomy Law, LAL), the recall of individual members of the as-
sembly (art  80 3 LAL) and the recall of mayors and governors (art  81 2 LAL) 
Other mechanisms of direct intervention regulated by the Local Autonomy Law are the re-
quest to remove public office like vice governors, vice mayors or members of school com-
mittees  Finally, they also include requirements on public policies 
Formal characteristics
The percentage of signatures required is the same for the three recall procedures regulated 
in Japan and varies depending on the amount of population  The time given to collect the 
signatures is one month in small cities and two months in big cities (more than 500,000 in-
habitants)  The current regulation was passed in 2002  An authority who has been removed 
can run again in the next election, the activation can only take place one year after the 
government has started and the same procedure cannot be activated twice during a term 
With the signatures of one fifth of the electorate an evaluation of the public services man-
agement can also be requested. Finally, a specific ordinance (art. 74 of the Local Autonomy 
Law) needs to be created in the first place in order to hold a referendum on policies. 1,5% of 
the signatures are required to inititate the request, but the decision remains in the hands of 
the local assembly  If the assembly rejects it, the referendum cannot be called  Surprisingly, 
contrary to the recall, which is regulated for all Japanese municipalities, referendums on 
policies are only permitted in 56 municipalities  Still, the results are not binding 
Prevalence
Term recalls have been pretty frequently in Japan  Between 1947 and 2014, Okamoto and 
Serdült (2016) registered around 1,500, which would place the country in third position after 
Peru (with more than 5,000 authorities subjected to referendum between 1997 and 2013) 
and the United States (where Cronin, 1989, identifies around 4,000 during most of the 20th 
century) 
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The attempt to dismiss executive authorities by a vote of confidence is the most frequent, 
with 709 cases, followed by 158 attempts to recall the entire local assembly, the rest pointing 
out at assembly members  The recall success rate is 72% for assemblies, 88% for assembly 
members and 26% for governors and mayors (Okamoto and Serdült, 2016) 
However, records show that the majority of proposals or referendums initiatives are rejected, 
a relatively steady pattern over time  Some of the denied cases (which are not discussed) 
had been backed by a high number of signatures  For instance, more than 600,000 residents 
from Nagasaki prefecture backed the petition of keeping a hospital, whereas more than a 
million residents from Hokkaido asked for the creation of a local referendum ordinance that 
would allow holding a referendum on a nuclear power plant, with none of these signatures 
having had any reply 
These examples have brought Okamoto and Serdült to question whether the use of a recall 
initiative is an example of “institutional imbalance”  According to this argument, many recalls 
would have been avoided had other mechanisms aimed at intervening over public issues 
been available  If a great deal of activations follow this pattern, it would be an expensive and 
inefficient mechanism when it comes to promote accountability.
Practical development
The term recall experience in Nagoya (a city of 1.8 million inhabitants) is peculiar insofar it is 
activated with the purpose of solving a conflict within the institution. The newly appointed 
mayor Takashi Kawamura wanted to implement his campaign promise to lower taxes, but he 
had to face the local council objection, with an adverse majority  Then the mayor threatened 
to promote a recall to dismiss the council  In order to do so, 366,000 signatures were col-
lected in a month. The number of signatures required was not achieved in the first instance, 
because they were not enough and many of them were invalidated  But the mayor insisted 
and he gathered them in a second attempt  The voting took place on February 6, 2011  The 
council was dissolved and a new election was called where the mayor obtained a majority 
favourable to his reform agenda 
Strengths
The mechanism could be useful to channel the disenchantment and in specific situations it 
would allow the authorities to overcome institutional blockages, like the Nagoya case in 2011.
Weaknesses
However, if the frequent use of recalls is motivated by the rejection of specific policies, it 
could turn out to be an expensive and not very efficient resource to solve the matter. The 
studies of Okamoto and Serdült (2014 and 2016) and of Takanobu (2000) encourage to see 
participation mechanisms as a framework of related resources  In this case, designing better 
mechanisms to manage policies could be more efficient.
Documentation
Igarashi, 2006 / Jain, 1991 / Okamoto et al , 2014 / Okamoto and Serdült, 2016 / Serdült and 
Welp, 2017 / Takanobu, 2000
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Sheet 3. Warsaw (Poland):  
A reinforced mayor after overcoming a recall initiative
Summary
In Poland recall initiatives were introduced through a national law in 1991, although they can 
only be activated at a subnational level  Since then, the mechanism has been frequently used, 
while the regulation has also been replaced twice (2000 and 2005) and other minor reforms 
have been made, usually towards making it more precise and increasing the requirements 
to activate it  The Polish experience with recall initiatives follows a pattern similar to that of 
some Latin-American countries such as Peru, where after many activations in small towns 
(less than 20,000 inhabitants) the mechanism was applied in big cities, promoted basically 
by political parties  In Warsaw, the recall initiative on October 13, 2013 was focused against 
the first woman ever to become mayor of the town, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, leader of the 
new political organisation Plataforma Cívica (Civic Platform), who had come to power in 2006 
and been re-elected in 2010  The referendum request was started by a small district party 
that rejected the increase of the public transport fares, the high cost of garbage collection 
and the delays in the expansion of an underground line  When the main opposition party, 
Ley y Justicia (Law and Justice), joined the initiative, the signatures needed for launching 
the referendum were quickly reached (134,000) 
Regulation
The term recall was introduced for the first time with a 1991 law (the recall was focused on 
the whole government and not on individual authorities), replaced in 2000 (since then it is 
possible to recall only the mayor) and in 2005 and reformed in other occasions  It has been 
noted that a high number of recalls were practically ignored outside the country because they 
took place mainly in small cities (Piasecki, 2011)  In 2013, the referendum took both locals 
and foreigners by surprise, as the former were not expecting to reach the signing threshold 
while the latter ignored the significance the mechanism had gained over the country.
The Referendum Law from 1991 did not specify the rules for carrying out campaigns or im-
pose any restrictions on the number of recalls that could be activated on each period  The 
promoters had 60 days to collect at least 10% of support signatures from electors in a pro-
cess that was started by registering the request before the provincial election commissioner  
In order to proceed, a majority of at least 30% of the total amount of electors had to back 
the motion  Was the recall approved, a new election should be called to replace the recalled 
authorities  The local referendum laws from 1996 and 1998 stablished additional require-
ments, like the obligation that it could only take place after at least one year from the start 
of the authority term and not less than six months before its completion 
In 2000, territorial reforms were passed, which led to revise the Local Referendum Law. New 
requirements were introduced to create the recall promoting committees, which should 
be composed of at least five citizens at a town level and 16 for the district or province. In 
addition, political parties and organisations were authorised to begin the collection  The 
thresholds of 10% of signatures amongst eligible voters (5% at a district level) and the 30% 
turnout requirement did not change. The campaign, the finances, the promoters and the 
results proclaim were specifically regulated (Piasecki, 2011: 129).
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As activations proliferated, pressure from local councils led to modify the law in order to 
raise the activation requirements and the success of the recalls  Thus, in 2005, a 60% turn-
out threshold of the electors who voted when the authority was elected was introduced 
so the referendum could be binding  Therefore, the law turnout recorded in many recalls 
would make success rate more difficult. In 2013, a new threshold requesting a turnout of at 
least the same amount of voters as when the authority was elected was introduced so the 
referendum could be valid  
Formal characteristics
Registration of a promoter committee  Signature collection  Majority of over 30% of the elec-
toral register and over 60% of turnout (100% since 2013) of those who voted for the authority 
so the consultation is valid 
Prevalence
The result is binding if the threshold turnout is reached  The authority is recalled if this op-
tion obtains a majority  Studies and reports show more than 100 recall initiatives per term, 
with a peak of 195 in the period 1998-2002 (Piasecki, 2011)  After 2002, mayors became the 
main focus of recall initiatives (Bednarz, 2013; Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2014) 
Practical development
The Law and Justice Party had promoted recall initiatives against mayors of the Civic Plat-
form in small cities before trying it in Warsaw (Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2014)  
This aspect of the fight between political parties might have defined the initiative against the 
mayor in Warsaw, according to Czesnik (2005). Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz was the first woman 
reaching the executive in the city. The idea of launching a referendum was first announced 
by a small left-leaning party against the rise of public transport fares, but other forces and 
arguments joined quickly  The recall initiative was announced mainly due to the following:
a) the rise of transport public fares in the city;
b) cuts in education, including making many full-time school workers redundant and cutting 
janitors’ wages;
c) high garbage collection taxes;
d) dissatisfaction with the rise of public administration jobs concerning 1,000 people;
e) inadequate control of investments: failure to complete the extension of the second un-
derground line, the costs of the construction of the National Stadium and others.
Despite a strong campaign against her, the mayor avoided the recall and she could even 
manage to be re-elected in the following election  Turnout reached 25 7% and a majority 
backed the recall, but the recall did not make any further progress because it was invalidated 
due to the low turnout 
Strengths
Democratic potential of different recall forms 
It does not always have to have a contrary effect against rulers  In Warsaw, the recall seems 
to have strengthened the mayor, although this has been a specific consequence within 
a particular case 
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Weaknesses
Ideally, the recall initiative should lead to solving extreme conflicts via institutional channels. 
However, in some cases it seems to have become an instrument in the hands of the parties  
In the case of Poland, the high turnout threshold encourages the authorities submitted to 
recall to promote abstention in order to invalidate the voting 
Few previous experiences would have caused results that would strengthen the local gov-
ernment (Dianne Fein in the United States)  The main risk of the mechanism has its origins 
in the incentive it offers to political supporters and opponents, specially within a context of 
populism rise and spread of fake news  The Warsaw case displays several similarities with 
that of the mayor of Lima, Susana Villarán, who also avoided the recall but ended up with 
an extremely weak government that distanced the party from growth in further elections 
(Welp and Rey, 2014) 
Documentation
Bednarz, 2013 / Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2014 / Piasecki, 2011 / Serdült and Welp, 
2017 / Welp and Julieta, 2014
Sheet 4. Nago (Japan):  
An abrogative initiative against government measures
Summary
The local initiative in Japan dates back more than half a century  Its use has considerably 
increased since the 1980s  However, experts reveal that the initiative has important limita-
tions: it depends on the local assembly’s final decision and popular initiative referendums are 
not binding  The local initiative has had some political relevance as a tool of the associative 
groups in front of government decisions in “NIMBY”11 conflicts like the building of military 
bases, nuclear power plants or waste processing facilities 
Regulation
Local Autonomy Law from 1947 (article 74) 
Formal characteristics
The Local Autonomy Law from 1947 included the possibility of recalling local governments, 
requesting audits on the local government and requesting measures, changes or suppression 
of regulations at a local level  Therefore, the legal framework has allowed the agenda initi-
ative for decades, as well as the recall and the referendum ones, which are two variations 
of the same procedure  In order for a petition to reach the local council, the signatures of 
2% of voters are required  In the chamber, the representatives will make a decision on this 
measure (accepting it or rejecting it) by simple majority  If the measure is rejected, a further 
referendum cannot be requested 
When it comes to request a referendum, the procedure is similar: a petition including the 
measure and the referendum request must be issued  After that, 2% of signatures from 
voters backing the proposal should be collected  Finally, the local representative chamber 
makes a decision on whether the referendum should take place or not  That is, it decides 
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if the initiative request proceeds and culminates or goes no further  In addition, in case the 
referendum does take place, it will not be binding: it has only an advisory capacity 
The issues on which a petition or referendum can be held are not determined, but some 
exceptions are pointed: on the local taxes and fees that cannot be modified by means of a 
popular initiative (art  74) 
Prevalence
According to Numata (2006), this kind of initiatives has a limited use in Japan, although it 
significantly increased between the 19080s and the 2000s. From 1947 to 2012, 1,742 mu-
nicipal requests were counted in the country (Okamoto et al , 2014)  The growing demand 
for initiatives has brought several towns (42 in 2010) to pass their own initiative ordinances 
following Takahama City’s (Aichi) model from 2000 (Numata, 2006; Okamoto et al., 2014). 
Sometimes, these ordinances improve the state legislation empowering citizens: for instance, 
in the previous case, if the promoters of the initiative collect the signatures of a third of the 
local electors, the referendum on the measure will be held without any interference from 
the authorities 
It has also been highlighted that local agenda and referendum initiatives have a special 
impact on the rejection of measures from the central government (abrogative ones)  For in-
stance, the referendum initiative has been frequently used as a tool in a “NIMBY”-type con-
flict to reject government decisions to build nuclear power plants, rubbish dumps, polluting 
factories or military bases in certain towns  In this kind of situations, neighbours teamed up 
to react to the central government’s decisions using, among others, the initiative resources 
available at a local level 
Practical development
 In1996, the central government reaches a series of agreements to expand a military base 
in Nago City (Okinawa). More specifically, a heliport for the American air force was to be in-
stalled  This raised a wave of protests including the activation of the initiative 
On the one hand, the Japanese government backed the construction of the heliport and the 
land transfer appealing to the “compensation policies” argument: it would entail a new pro-
gram of economic development for the region  The main supporters were the local chamber 
of commerce and the industrialists  However, in 1996, opponents to the expansion of the 
base increased in numbers and organised an opposition platform formed by antimilitarists 
and unions Yasuhiro, 2007)  A referendum initiative petition was organised under the motto 
“Important decisions must be made by the community” 
The signature collection took hold and the local government agrees to hold a referendum 
with the following question: “Do you agree with the construction of the heliport because it 
can benefit the community with the promise of economic development and pollution de-
crease?” In February 1998 the referendum was held and the option backing the construction 
of the heliport lost  82% of voters participated and 51% of them rejected the military base 
Shortly after, a new conservative candidate wins the mayor’s office in Nago despite having 
backed the construction of the heliport  Thus, the possibilities for the neighbours’ protests 
to have a decisive impact could not move forward  Since the referendum was not binding, 
its only effect was revealing the unfavourable public opinion of part of the population  But 
neither the local government nor the state government cancelled the heliport construction 
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project  Afterwards, in 2000, community groups sued the City Council claiming the referen-
dum result had not been considered, but the regional court dismissed the claim because 
the referendum results were advisory and not binding 
Strengths
The initiative, in this case, sets a moderate percentage of signatures that makes its use vi-
able at a local level 
Although the local government is not obliged to call the referendum, sometimes the strength 
of the signatures leads to the call, despite the preferences of the local authorities 
Weaknesses
On the other hand, as in other cases, the initiative is not binding, that is, it depends on the 
final decision of the local representative chamber. It would then be subjected to the deci-
sion of the public representatives, concerning not only the proposals’ passing but also the 
effective holding of the referendum 
In light of this fact, in a troubled context, associative groups may prefer alternatives of col-
lective action or reaction against the government’s decisions, which may result less costly 
and more efficient. For instance, sometimes judicial action may be a less expensive alterna-
tive than the proposal or referendum initiatives 
Documentation
Local Autonomy Law (1947)12 / Numata, 2006 / Okamoto et al., 2014 / Yasuhiro, 2007 / Eldridge, 
1997 / Mulgan, 2000
Sheet 5. Buenos Aires (Argentina):  
An agenda initiative influential in urban development
Summary
The agenda initiative was regulated in the City of Buenos Aires in 1998  In the following dec-
ade, nearly 20 initiatives were presented with his promoters being pretty unsuccessful  In 
this case we analyse the experience of a neighbourhood group from the district of La Boca 
that used the initiative to obtain a wide green area in their district  Although they did fail 
to collect all the necessary signatures, the more than 17,000 they obtained forced the local 
political representatives to reconsider their position 
Regulation
In the City of Buenos Aires, direct democracy mechanisms are considered in articles 64 
(popular initiative), 65 (referendum), 66 (popular consultation) and 67 (term recall) of its 
Constitution  They are also included in the popular initiative procedure law, June 25, 1998 
Formal characteristics
The majority of Argentinian provinces have direct democracy tools or measures since the 
1980s. They also have an enormous significance at a municipal level. Buenos Aires is an 
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autonomous city with its own by-law (constitution) including a variety of direct democra-
cy measures (Arques, 2017)  Its constitution includes the possibility of holding binding and 
non-binding referendums, as well as legislative initiatives (called “right to petition” and 
“popular initiative”) 
The main characteristics of the legislative initiative in the City of Buenos Aires are the fol-
lowing: the electors are the “promoters” of the initiative, and they must elect a spokesperson 
who represents them  The political representatives cannot be promoters  The local law-mak-
ing assembly sets a managing body  This body assists the promoters in the presentation, 
verifying that the initiative deals with a power concerning the city and ensuring it abides by 
all the legal requirements 
We can point out a series of steps in the initiative  Firstly, the promoters present the initiative 
to the managing body  Once the application is validated by this body –following the estab-
lished legal requirements– they can start collecting signatures  The have a 12-month deadline 
and must collect signatures from 1 5% of the electoral register in order for the initiative to 
reach the council assembly and be voted by the representatives (accepting or rejecting the 
project) (art  64 Constitution of Buenos Aires) 
Secondly, the initiative that collects at least 4,000 signatures gets “promoted”  This means 
it can be publicly announced on the local radio station, on public posters, in newspapers, 
and so on, in order to amplify the signature collection campaign 
Thirdly, all the signatures collected are taken to the managing body  After three business 
days, they are sent to the local electoral court  The electoral court will check the signatures 
are correct and valid following the sampling technique (at least 3% of the signatures will be 
validated)  It has 30 days to check the signatures  If more than 10% have any defects, the 
initiative is rejected 
Fourthly, the court delivers the validated initiative to the President of the municipal assembly 
and to his board to be discussed by the public representatives 
Finally, once in the assembly, the promoters have the right to be heard in the commission 
where the popular initiative will be discussed  The term has 12 months to either sanction or 
dismiss the project  If the initiative contains the signature of more than 15% of the electoral 
register, and the 12-month deadline passes without the assembly having discussed the pro-
ject, the mayor must call a binding referendum 
Which issues can be discussed on an initiative? The competencies of the Buenos Aires legal 
assembly, as an autonomous city, with the exception of projects referred to the Constitution 
reform, international treaties, taxes and city budget 
Prevalence
It consists of a process with clear effects, reinforced by the steps set for its processing in 
the city assembly  If the assembly exceeds the 12-month deadline to process it and the ini-
tiative exceeds 15% of signatures from the electorate, a referendum is called automatically  
Practical development
In the first 10 years since the regulation, few initiatives were passed (Paonessa, 2007). For 
instance, Paonessa counted 18 initiatives in 5 years of which only two managed to pass all 
the procedures and verifications, being finally passed by the usual legislative route (public 
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representatives approved them)  One was “A public park of native species” to create a green 
area in the old Roca station, in the La Boca neighbourhood of Buenos Aires 
Prior to this initiative, in 1999 the Comisión de Vecinos de la Calle Iralia (Neighbourhood 
Commission of Iralia Street) (and surroundings) was created  The new railway legislation 
changed the usage of the Roca station, remaining as a huge disused space, in front of which 
the neighbours consider using the waste ground as a green area connecting it with other 
close neighbourhoods (previously separated by rail tracks)  The initiative was brought up by 
the neighbourhood’s committee with the support of several groups of architects  Initially, in 
2000, the Iralia residents sent the town council a project to convert the old station into a 
green area, including 200 signatures  However, the neighbourhood group is informed about 
various construction groups interested in the land and so the members begin to worry  Thus, 
a community group was activated to carry out other potentially effective participation strat-
egies like the agenda initiative 
The neighbours’ association contacted other groups to defend its project  For instance, the 
Asamblea permanente por los espacios verdes urbanos (Apevu, Permanent assembly for ur-
ban green spaces) and other 50 associations  They set a “Encuentro Vecinal en Defensa de 
las Tierras Públicas” (Neighbourhood Meeting for Public Land) and the initiative project was 
developed with the support of the Ombudsman  After registering the initiative, they collected 
14,271 signatures, which were not enough to process it as an agenda initiative  The key of 
the proposal was that, despite it did not reach the necessary amount of signatures, it was 
widely spread and attracted the attention of the political representatives  Some of them even 
decided to echo the proposal and took it to the municipal assembly 
In the representatives’ assembly, the project finally obtained 28 votes in favour (it needed 
to obtain to reach a simple majority) and was rejected in 2003  Due to the neighbours’ per-
sistence, new negotiations were again established and an agreement with the authorities 
was reached  In 2004, the project was negotiated again with the local government and was 
unanimously approved by the assembly in April. In 2005, the Native Species Park was prac-
tically completed 
Strengths
The agenda initiative is perceived as a useful way to channel a demand when other less 
institutionalised methods do not work. It is an influential tool in local politics when all the 
requirements have not been completed (for instance, the complete number of signatures) 
The initiative sets a reduced number of signatures to enter the “public promotion” phase, 
where authorities are obliged to promote the collection of signatures in the local media 
The obligation to call a binding referendum if no answer is provided within 12 months (as 
long as signatures from 15% of the electorate were achieved) makes it impossible for the 
authorities to ignore initiatives with a great support 
Finally, the initiative can be a successful strategy to influence both institutional represent-
atives (“institutional agenda”) and the public opinion (“social agenda”) as well as to create a 
social fabric and interconnectivity between associative organisations (social capital) 
Weaknesses
The collection of signatures seems an expensive process for small associative organisations  
Back then district initiatives did not exist 
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The initiative forces the local assembly to provide an answer  But only if the initiative reaches 
15% of the signatures from the electoral census (and has been submitted a year ago) a ref-
erendum is automatically called (the ones that do not reach this threshold may be ignored) 
Documentation
Arques, 2017 / Hevia de la Jara, 2010 / Paonessa, 2007 / Schneider and Welp, 2015 / Parque 
de la Flora Nativa Casa Amarilla13 / Popular Initiative Regulation14 / Parque Público en La Boca 
Project15 / Popular Initiative Bill16 / La Boca: avanza un proyecto de iniciativa popular17
Sheet 6. Madrid (Spain):  
A new kind of online initiative to submit proposals
Summary
Since late 2015, Madrid City Council has an online platform to register and discuss citizens’ 
proposals  When they reach a certain support threshold, the proposals are submitted to 
popular consultation  However it does not exactly consist of a legislative initiative procedure, 
as it is stated on the Spanish regulation. We could define it as an agenda initiative. 
Regulation
Agreement of September 15, 2016, of the Government Body of the City of Madrid by which 
the guidelines for the application of the right of proposal are modified (BOAM nº 7746).
Agreement of the Government Body of September 14, 2015, passing the application of the 
regulatory guidelines for the exercise of the right of proposal through the Open Government 
website 
Formal characteristics
In September 2015, the local government expanded the right of proposal regulation that was 
already included in the citizen participatory regulation from 2004  As this right is developed, 
the local government broadens the proposal capacity, provides it with mechanisms to carry 
it out and sets a series of guidelines to make it online  Subsequently, in 2016, the guidelines 
are modified to improve the functioning of the proposal channel. Thus, although it is not 
called “citizens’ initiative”, we can state it is an original means for online initiatives 
The main steps of the tool are the following. The first step covers individual proposal and 
collecting online supports  Any citizen may submit proposals in person or online  These are 
subjected to an open process looking for backing (online or in-person votes) amongst natu-
ral persons aged over 16 registered in the city. There are a range of filters, in the sense that 
the General Management of Citizen Participation excludes the proposals that oppose human 
rights or human dignity (see guideline 2 3 )  Each month, the General Management publishes 
an online report about the five most backed proposals.
The second phase would be the debate  The proposals are discussed during a period rang-
ing from 90 to 150 calendar days on the online forum Decide Madrid18 (Madrid Decides)  
The proposals reaching a support equivalent to 1% (of registered voters over 16 years old) 
will automatically turn into a public consultation  In the case of Madrid, that means 27,662 
supports (in June 2018)  Alternatively, the government area may decide straightaway to sub-
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mit the proposal to consultation, even if it has not reached the threshold  The third phase 
consists of a technical assessment  The proposals are discussed by the City Council, which 
will produce, within the following 30 days, a report on its legality, viability, jurisdiction and 
economic cost  Any proposals discussing issues on which the city has no jurisdiction, con-
trary to the applicable legislation, technically impracticable or too expensive would produce 
a negative report, although alternative proposals might be considered 
The fourth phase is a public consultation (see article 6 of the guidelines for the application 
of the right of proposal)  Here the mayor brings the consultation to the plenary session and 
follows the procedure set by the Local Regime Bases Law (7/1985)  The consultation must 
be passed by an absolute majority of the plenary  This kind of non-binding consultation re-
quires the authorisation of the Spanish government  However, Madrid City Council takes on 
the commitment to implement the resulting measures 
If the proposal is passed, the DGPC will send it alongside the favourable technical assess-
ment to the corresponding executive body (body, district or local organisation)  Within 30 
days this body has to communicate which specific measures it will adopt to abide by the 
proposal  The interventions that cannot be carried out will be published online with the 
corresponding explanation 
Prevalence
The connection with the public decision-making takes place when a proposal reaches 1% of 
the supports and is submitted to a popular consultation after being passed in the council 
plenary 
The new procedure has had an impact on both the media and international organisations  
The online platform won a UN award19
Practical development
More than 17,000 proposals have been made so far, although only 38 of them have reached 
5,000 supports  Two of them have reached the 1% threshold (more than 27,000 supports) in 
order to be submitted to public consultation, and so they were in February 2017 in the so 
called “participation week” 
The first proposal was the “single ticket for the public transport”, which was registered in 
September 2015 with the following explanation: “it is essential that intermodal transport is 
promoted, that is, changing means of public transport without extra cost within a wide period 
of at least 90 minutes”. In November 2015, the Ahora Madrid government team submitted a 
similar measure to the Transport Committee, the regional department where the decision 
is made  After collecting more than 200,000 favourable votes in the consultation, the City 
Council, in his September 2017 plenary session, approved by a majority (with the only oppo-
sition of just one party) the creation of this ticket and urged the Comunidad de Madrid (as 
part of the Committee) to rethink their approach 
The proposal “Madrid 100% sustainable” is very different, it is not as specific as the first one, 
which offers an interesting comparison  It was boosted by Alianza por el Clima (Alliance for 
Climate), a platform with more than 400 organisations  It included a list of 14 actions (such 
as raising awareness campaigns and hire a 100% renewable municipal electric power)  As 
pointed out by the Informe de Competencia20 (Competition Report) many measures could be 
tackled by the local administration while others were not  The Informe Técnico21 (Technical 
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Report) details the actions the City Council has committed to develop within its jurisdiction  
One of the most interesting points of this proposal is its broad political character and its 
translation into specific political measures within some City Council areas.
Strengths
This kind of online initiative is easily accessible through the platform, which receives hun-
dreds of proposals every year  Apart from welcoming the proposal, there is also an online 
debate and discussion area where comments can be posted and displayed in a chain (for 
instance, the transport ticket produced more than 800 comments)  The barriers to access 
the right of proposal and the right to information decrease significantly.
Another strength is the transparent monitoring of the several phases that the proposal is 
submitted to, which can be made online, where the jurisdiction and technical reports are 
uploaded 
Weaknesses
The procedure might be slow and complex 
The administrative development and the consultation expenses can be perceived as exces-
sive by society 
The Spanish legislation has some barriers that prevent this kind of tool from being agile: 
the call for the municipal consultation requires the acceptance of both the local and state 
governments, apart from the fact that the consultations are not binding  Although the Madrid 
government announced it would comply with the consultation results, this is not guaran-
teed and is dependent on the political will of the government team and on its majority in 
the plenary  Moreover, the proposals beyond strictly local jurisdiction might remain unsolved 
should other government departments oppose 
Documentation
Guidelines for exercising the right to propose22/ Acuerdo de 15 de septiembre de 2016 de la 
Junta de Gobierno de la Ciudad de Madrid por el que se modifican las directrices para el 
ejercicio del derecho de propuesta23/ Citizen participatory processes developed in the city 
of Madrid  June 2015-July 201724/ Ninguna iniciativa ciudadana registrada en los últimos 20 
meses moviliza al 1% del censo25/ El billete único intermodal: una reivindicación ciudadana26/ 
El Pleno de Madrid aprueba la propuesta ciudadana de poner en marcha el billete único27
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Sheet 7. Andalusia (Spain):  
The multipurpose character of the initiative
Summary
The new participation law in Andalusia (Spain) passed in 2017 sets the basic criteria to im-
pulse citizens’ initiatives to promote not only deliberative processes but also popular con-
sultations and participatory processes concerning the proposal and development of public 
policies  It consists of a general legal framework that each municipality should specify in its 
municipal regulations 
Regulation
Law 7/2017 on Andalusia Citizen Participation, from December 27 
Previously, there was the agenda initiative at a regional level (operated by the Law 5/1988 on 
Popular and City Councils Legislative Initiative, from October 17)  Local popular consultations, 
including the referendum initiative, also existed in Andalusia 
Formal characteristics
In the new Law on Andalusia Citizen Participation (2017) the local citizens’ initiative reaches 
an exceptional significance, going beyond the regional level. Thus, the initiative is connected 
to a wide range of participatory processes at a local level  The law has been recently passed 
and still requires its further regulation and development 
Firstly, in the purpose section, the initiative is set as a core aspect: “Facilitating the exer-
cise of the initiative by the people and citizen participatory entities”  It is also included in 
the explanation of the right to participation: “The initiative to promote the implementation 
of citizen participatory processes under the assumptions and the terms stated by this law” 
(article 8)  The processes that can be promoted via initiatives are the following:
Processes of participatory deliberation (article 20) that promote a discussion of arguments 
in a public debate  At a regional level, a minimum of 20,000 valid signatures will be required  
At a local level, the exercise of the initiative will require the number of valid signatures set 
by the corresponding municipality regulations for citizen participation  The initiative can be 
started by either people or organisations  The application will include a basic description of 
the issue and it will be processed by the administration within 3 months  The appropriate 
administration will reach a “basic agreement” with the characteristics of the deliberation 
process and it will make it public  The deliberation process will last a maximum of 4 months  
After the process, the administration will release a public report 
Initiation of popular and participatory consultations: a group of neighbours may request to 
hold a “participatory consultation” (art  48)  Its purpose includes issues concerning Andalu-
sian local organisations and it has an advisory character  Generally, people with the right to 
vote in this local or regional participatory consultations will be those aged over 16 who belong 
to the sector or group of population concerned by the issue that is being discussed and that 
qualify according to article 6 1  This age limit may be omitted in issues directly concerning 
children  Tranches of signatures are set depending on the population (art  48 3):
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Number of inhabitants of the municipality Number of valid signatures required
5,000 or less registered inhabitants 10%
5,001 to 50,000 registered inhabitants 500 + 7% (exceeding 5,000 inhabitants)
50,001 to 100,000 registered inhabitants 3,650 + 5% (exceeding 50,00 inhabitants)
>100,000 registered inhabitants 6,150 + 3 % (exceeding 100,000 inhabitants, with a limit of 30,000 signatures)
The law also allows the consultation to be held in a delimited territorial area (for instance, 
a district), in which the initiative and the number of valid signatures would be set by the 
municipal participatory regulation, although the number of necessary signatures could not 
be more than 10% of the neighbours being consulted 
Once the mayor has validated the initiative, it moves on to the council plenary, which must 
reach an agreement by an absolute majority in order to pass or reject it (article 9, 2011 Law, 
and article 49 1, 2017 Law)  Once it is passed, there is one formal requirement left: the con-
sultation must be authorised by the state government (article 10 “Processing the authorisa-
tion”), which has rejected the great majority of requests to hold local popular consultations 
that had been submitted 
Processes of citizen participation in the proposal and development of public policies  The ini-
tiative is similar to the initiation of deliberation processes: “The citizens’ initiative to propose 
a public policy at a regional level will require the support of at least 20,000 signatures (…)  At 
a local level, the exercise of citizens’ initiative will require the number of valid signatures set 
by the corresponding citizen participation regulations, not exceeding 20,000 signatures  The 
requirements and characteristics will be regulated by further local regulations  In addition, 
other proposals can be issued to make ordinance drafts at a local level (art  30)  Thus, the 
competent body within the local administration decides which initiatives are moved forward  
That is to say, as in previous processes the law remains open on its details (it is developed 
in the local regulations) and the development of the initiative is subjected to the mayor’s or 
plenary’s decision 
In all cases, the Law establishes that the suitable telematic means to carry out the initia-
tive will be offered  However, these resources remain unknown because the law still needs 
regulatory development 
Prevalence
The Participation Law 2017 has been recently passed, so we still do not know its practical 
functioning and lack elements to judge its development  The work is being done at the Gen-
eral Management of Citizen Participation of the Andalusian Government to introduce the 
Andalusian councils the challenges the future Framework Regulation for Citizen Participation 
in Andalusia will have to face 
Concerning the initiative for popular consultations, there is no aggregated data about its 
use, but this participation tool has been scarcely used so far, maybe due to its complexity 
and the procedure requirements (collection of signatures, plenary approval, government 
authorisation)  Some anecdotal initiatives take place every year in Andalusia  For instance, 
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in 2018, Porcuna City Council (Jaén), following a citizens’ initiative signed by more than 1,000 
residents, requested authorisation to hold a consultation on the continuity of its municipal 
government, which will hardly develop because it challenges the legal framework 
Strengths
The initiative acquires a central role and legal coverage to initiate participation processes 
not only in the development of deliberative forums but also in the making of public policies 
as well as the promotion of consultations at a municipal level  The initiative acquires, in this 
sense, a “multipurpose” character 
The regional regulation sets a maximum number of signatures, allowing the municipalities 
to specify the number while ensuring a certain degree of viability 
Weaknesses
The lack of incentives to use the initiative could be an issue because in all cases it is sub-
jected to the representative logic  Thus, the celebration of participation processes started 
by citizens are subjected to their approval by the municipal plenary, and might even require 
an authorisation by the central Government (for popular consultations), so the members of 
the organisations consider that the initiative is too expensive and offers few guarantee of 
success 
Further municipality regulations will set the specific details in the assessment of the initi-
atives  We ignore how the basic agreement will be reached and which criteria the admin-
istration will follow to decide  Therefore, this aspect also concedes a relevant voice to the 
representative and/or administrative logic 
The 2017 Law includes the “participation in the budget” but it does not specify the initiative 
to promote it 
Documentation
Law 7/2017, December 27th, of Citizen Participation in Andalusia28 / Law 2/2001, May 3rd, 
Regulating the local popular consultations in Andalusia29 / Foro Andaluz de Gobiernos Locales 
y Procesos Participativos  Hoja de ruta30 / Local strategy of open government and participa-
tory processes31
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Sheet 8. Barcelona (Spain):  
A multipurpose tool on probationary period.
Summary
In 2017, Barcelona City Council passes a new, widely supported Participation Regulation, 
including an innovative citizens’ initiative formula  Different kinds of initiatives are estab-
lished in order to promote participatory processes and consultations, to create participation 
bodies and to propose debates and regulations in the Municipal Plenary  The regulation was 
first applied in early 2018 with two initiative proposals whose signatures had been collected 
online (on the Decidim Barcelona32 website, We Decide Barcelona)  Although both initiatives 
collected enough signatures, they were rejected in April by the Municipal Plenary  That will 
reopen the debate about the relationship between the citizens’ initiative, the consultation 
to the people and the representative logics in the municipal policy 
Regulation
The initiative is regulated in the Citizen Participation Regulation passed in October 2017 
Formal characteristics
Initiatives about municipal jurisdiction may be submitted as long as they do not violate 
Human Rights, modify the organic regulation or concern public prices, taxes or changes in 
approved municipal budget 
All Barcelona residents over 16 years old are welcome to participate, as well as the organi-
sations whose activity takes place within the city (art  11)  The promoters will create a Pro-
moting Commission formed by at least 3 people. A list of attesting officials who will collect 
the signatures must also be submitted 
The initiative has to be duly submitted to the General Register of the City Council alongside 
the on-site and online signature collection forms  The corresponding municipal body checks 
whether the initiative adjusts to the regulation  When it comes to consultation initiatives, the 
City Council will produce a report on the economic impact of the measure and, if it exceeds 
the 3% of the municipal budget, it can reject the proposal (see article 15 for details on this 
limit)  The administrative body in charge has to provide an answer within a month to the 
application submitted by the promoters who will collect the signatures 





Number of signatures 
(districts or inferior) Result
Debate points in the municipal plenary 3,750 400-1,300 * Agreement proposal on the inclusion of the issue in the agenda
Citizens’ Consultation 15,000 2,000-6,500 * Proposal to plenary, plenary decision (legal system review)
General provision 15,000 2,000-6,500 * Proposal to plenary (processing) in 3 months
Start of participation process 9,000 1,200-3,900 *
Should start in 3 months
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Creation of participation body 9,000 1,200-3,900 * Proposal to the plenary and decision by it within 30 days
Public audience 7,000 800-2,600 * Should be called within 30 days
Neighbourhood Council 1%, 25 minimum and 450 maximum** Call, 30 days maximum (see limits)
Neighbourhood consultation 10%, 250 minimum**
Participation process or creation of body 2%, 50 minimum and 900 maximum**
Source: Own elaboration based on the Barcelona Participation Regulation 
*Between the biggest and the smallest district, depending on the population  
**Neighbourhood residents over 16.
Following the Andalusia (see sheet 7) and Córdoba (see sheet 9) cases, this is a multipur-
pose initiative, although it serves even more purposes: a) debate agenda, to incorporate 
issues in the municipal plenary or in the Districts; b) to promote a participation process;  
c) to hold a public hearing; d) to create a participation body; e) to pass a general provision; 
f) to carry out a consultation; d) to call a neighbourhood board 
Once the signatures have been collected, they have to be validated before a notary, a Justice 
Administration attorney or the City Council chief of staff  The corresponding body validates 
the forms within a month  The column of the table displaying the “results” shows the various 
effects the citizens’ initiative might have 
The City Council is obliged to provide technical and financial support to the initiative with 
one euro per signature (up to the number of signatures required) prior to an expenses ac-
counting  This assistance is aimed at the initiatives that have been developed reaching the 
necessary number of signatures (art  7) 
The promoters must collect the signatures within two months, either on-site or online 
Prevalence
This tool has been recently implemented so there is still little evidence about its functioning  
Anyway, two cases have already risen a particular interest on the tool 
Practical development
Two consultation initiatives met the established requirements  A proposal on the remunici-
palisation of water utilities and another one on the renaming of a square  Both had reached 
the threshold of signatures (15,000) to request a public consultation  We will focus on the 
development of the first one.
The initiative “Remunicipalise Barcelona” had been promoted by the “Catalan Association of 
Engineering Without Borders” in December 2017 with regard to the multi-consultation that 
the City Council had planned to hold in 2018  The proposal had two parts: on the one hand, 
the backing of a public and municipal water management (“weave a citizens’ network in Bar-
celona so the water is managed in a public and democratic way with citizen participation”); 
on the other hand, holding a consultation to encourage the debate within the population  It 
included the following question: “Do you want water management in Barcelona to be public 
and with citizen participation?”
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Once the signature collection was completed (and with the support of the local government, 
backing the proposal), the initiative was brought to the Plenary in April 2018, but only BEC 
and ERC groups voted in favour of the citizens’ consultation, which resulted in only 16 votes 
and losing the voting (25 votes against it, out of 41) 
Most groups rejected the proposal, reflecting the political atmosphere in which the local 
government was increasingly isolated  As a consequence, not only the water utilities con-
sultation was rejected, but also the celebration of the citizens’ 2018 multi-consultation was 
questioned - although for different reasons 
In addition, over the previous months the company in charge of the water management 
(Agbar) as well as other organisations representing private companies (Chamber of Dealers 
and Companies Linked to the Public Sector) had sued the City Council over the terms of 
the hypothetical consultation, even over the criteria established by the Citizen Participation 
Regulation passed in 2017  In the summer of 2018, the municipal government was still con-
sidering alternatives to the citizen multi-consultation 
Strengths
One of the advantages of this initiative tool is its multipurpose character, which allows in an 
innovative way to promote a wide range of participation and consultation processes, as well 
as debates of interest to the citizens  In addition, the signature requirements are, in general, 
lighter than in most initiative regulations  Finally, the collection is facilitated by online means 
Weaknesses
Like in other cases, the state regulation eventually sets that the initiative is subjected to the 
usual legal procedures, that is, the Municipal Plenary  The Barcelona case shows that, despite 
the popular backing of an initiative, if a majority of political groups object to it, the initiative 
can be blocked  The case also shows how the initiative interacts with the current political 
climate and with the relations between the local parties to the point of strongly depending 
on party alliances or deadlocks even with the support of the government 
Documentation
Citizen Participatory Regulations, Barcelona Council (2017)33/ Public information regarding the 
initiative34/ Information regarding the initiative (Decidim Barcelona)35/ Remunicipalicemos 
Barcelona (initiative)36/ Two initiatives in Barcelona (article)37/ Recta final hacia la remunicipal-
ización del agua en Barcelona38/ Ni tranvía ni multiconsulta en Barcelona: la oposición tumba 
dos iniciativas clave de Colau a un año de las elecciones39/ La CUP y el agua de Barcelona40/ 
Un día negro para Colau41
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Sheet 9. Cordoba (Spain):  
A municipality innovative in its participation, an underused tool
Summary
Participatory regulation in the city of Cordoba includes several types of initiative by the citi-
zens, broadening national regulation on the subject  However, the initiative is a scarcely used 
participatory tool, with scant presence in the media  We wonder which factors could explain 
its low influence in a city which stands out for its participatory practices.
Regulation
The national law setting the main guidelines for local government (1985), reformed in 2004 
Citizen Participation Regulations of the Cordoba city council (1997) 
Formal characteristics
The citizens’ initiative is included within the regulations of citizen participation as one of the 
rights of participation  It can be used for promoting several types of participatory processes  
As in the case of the Andalusian Participatory Law (see sheet 7) and Barcelona (see sheet 8), 
the initiative is also multipurpose, but with different characteristics and degrees to which 
it is binding 
The initiative is supported by national law which sets out the main guidelines for local gov-
ernment (1985), modified in 2004: “Citizens that have the right to vote in local elections can 
exercise the popular initiative, presenting proposals of agreements or proceedings or regula-
tion projects about matters within the local jurisdiction”  These initiatives must be subscribed 
to by the following percentage of residents: a) Up to 5 000 inhabitants, 20%; b) from 5,001 
to 20,000 inhabitants, 15%; c) from 20,001 inhabitants, 10% (Art  70bis)  The initiative that 
gathers these signatures goes to the Plenary Session, where it is voted on  It can include the 
request for a popular vote 
Cordoba’s regulations for participation echo this type of popular initiative, but they are wid-
ened to include other typologies less legally binding  According to Cordoba’s participatory 
regulations, the citizens’ initiative has three main areas:
Firstly, the initiative can be used to promote projects for bylaws which cover local jurisdic-
tion, excluding taxes and public prices  It is included in the article 139 of the Local Organic 
Regulations (ROM) and in article 7 of the Participatory Regulations  The city council provides 
a popular initiative form that citizens can fill out.
Secondly, there are the proposals for debate in the plenary sessions (agenda initiative)  This 
initiative consists of presenting proposals to include certain debates in the Plenary Session’s 
agenda  For this, the support of at least 5% of the local registered associations is required  A 
declaration of conformity must be agreed by their executive committees or plenaries  Also, 
any registered resident can put forward a proposal with the support of 30% of the signatures 
specified in article 70bis (The law which sets out the main guidelines for local government). 
The mayor is responsible for accepting the initiative and making way for the Plenary session, 
within a period of 15 days from the time the validated initiative was registered 
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Thirdly, there is the right to request that the city council develops activities of public inter-
est  Any group of citizens can propose this through a document sent to the executive body, 
clearly stating what is requested  It must include the personal information of those propos-
ing it and only their signature is required  The relevant local body must reply within a period 
of 30 days. This type of citizens’ initiative could be classified as a version of the classical 
non-binding individual petition 
Practical development
We have not been able to find any citizens’ initiative in the city in previous years. Signature 
collection tends to be a tool for collective action which is promoted by political groups or 
organisations with the objective of pressurising the government  This is the case of the re-
cent “#Nometoqueslascalles” campaign promoted by the Popular Party in 2018 with the aim 
of putting pressure on the local government (PSOE-IU) to keep the names of high-ranking 
Franco era officials in 5 streets, through the call of a popular referendum against the names 
being changed  Although the initiative was never formalised, it shows how a collection of 
signatures often acts as a strategy to pressurise and rouse collective action, rather than a 
participatory institutional channel  The collection of signatures had an impact in the media  
On February 7th, the PP had already collected 1,000 signatures amongst the citizens, and 
2,766 in Change org 
In this case, we can observe that a collection of signatures is a quite a common collective 
action and protest strategy (as opposed to initiative)  It allows for an increase in the social 
diffusion of a project and its visibility in the media without needing to fulfil the formal re-
quirements of the legislative initiative  Signature collection would be proof of “social support” 
towards a proposal 
In the local context of Cordoba and other Spanish cities, the citizens’ initiative is a rarely used 
tool, probably because other existing collective action strategies cause greater influence, 
with fewer organisational and economic costs 
Prevalence
Despite the regulatory development of a citizens’ initiative as a multipurpose tool of partic-
ipation, the fact is that in the case of Cordoba, as well as in other Spanish cities, it is not 
tool which is often used 
In the version included in the law where the main guidelines for local government are estab-
lished, no recent initiatives have been recorded in the city  Regarding the less binding types, 
the petition and agenda initiatives, no data is available concerning their use. Neither has the 
media given much coverage to this kind of initiative in the city, which suggests a scant usage 
and/or visibility of the proposals 
Thus, we find an underuse of the most powerful type of initiative and certain degree of 
invisibility over other kinds of agenda or petition initiatives  It could be a sign of a lack of 
popularity of these initiatives in comparison to other participatory tools which are developed 
in the city (from Participatory Budgeting to advisory councils)  It is possible that signature 
requirements are too demanding (10% for proposing bylaw initiatives)  It is also possible that 
other participatory tools and informal channels of influence are less costly for the associa-
tions and citizens that want to propose policies in the city 
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Strengths
The multipurpose initiative, as regulated by the Cordoba Participatory Regulations, offers 
several modalities, with various degrees of being binding and different costs for promoters  
Therefore, one of the strengths is the range of channels of initiative 
Weaknesses
The initiative could turn out to be too costly in its general form (The law which sets the 
main guidelines for local government, 1985)  Compared to other more accessible channels 
of participation, this tool could be perceived as an unattractive political opportunity for as-
sociations and citizens 
Therefore, it is not surprising that informal signature collections rarely culminate in citizens’ 
initiative processes 
Documentation
Citizen Participation Regulation42/ The PP collects signatures requesting a referendum for 
the removal of Franco era streets in Cordoba43/ The PP of Cordoba promotes a referendum 
in order to save five Franco era streets 44/ The PP of Cordoba promotes a campaign against 
the removal of Franco era names in the Cordoba street map 45
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Sheet 10. Los Angeles (USA):  
$15 per Hour Minimum Wage, a failed initiative, a successful proposal
Summary
The $15 per Hour Minimum Wage Initiative proposed the enactment of a bylaw regarding the 
minimum wage in the city of Los Angeles  It was proposed by a coalition of social organi-
sations and did not manage to complete the referendum process  However, the proposal 
achieved visibility and was approved by the city council  
Regulation
The legislative initiative is included in the Los Angeles City Charter, in other words, within the 
local constitution  It is also included in the election code, where initiatives and referendums 
are regulated 
Formal characteristics
The Los Angeles initiative is an agenda and referendum initiative at the same time  It must 
be proposed by registered voters that will become the promoters  The City Clerk is respon-
sible for revising and validating the initiative and the included signatures  The “spreaders” or 
distributors are adults over the age of 18 who collect the signatures 
The promoters establish a committee of five voters. They submit their request to the City 
Clerk, including a motivation letter  They also submit a request to the city attorney to prepare 
the title, the question and the official summary of the initiative. The secretary gives accred-
itation that the initiative meets the legal requirements. No initiative can be distributed until 
it is validated by the secretary (Section 706) 
Once it is circulated, the following number of signatures are required: 15% of voters reg-
istered in the last local elections  The signatures are collected in 120 days  The secretary 
will check that all the requirements are fulfilled, they will validate the signatures and the 
signature collectors’ sworn statements  There is a period of 30 days given for examining the 
submission. In case of the requirements being fulfilled, the promoters will receive a certif-
icate  In order to validate the signatures, in some cases a random sample may be selected 
to check that the signatures are correct  Once the initiative is validated, promoters and the 
city council are informed 
The local government must choose one of these three options within a term of 20 days: a) to 
adopt the proposal; b) to put it to a special popular referendum between 110 and 140 days; 
c) to put it to a vote in the next local or state election 
Following a similar procedure, abrogative initiatives can be promoted against a city ordinance  
In other words, the petition requests calling a referendum regarding a concrete measure, 
with the intention of revoking it  It can be requested 30 days from the time the city ordi-
nance was approved  
Prevalence
The initiative, fulfilling the requirements, has a strong capacity to make an impact: it drives 
the approval of a proposal or the call of a referendum  It has direct effects and it is not 
merely dependent on the will of local representatives 
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In previous years, the following initiatives took place in Los Angeles County:
Year Approved measures Rejected measures Total of initiatives
2010 23 15 38
2011 35 9 44
2012 41 16 57
2013 22 11 33
2014 26 17 43
2015 19 7 26
2016 63 12 75
2017 16 9 25
Total 245 96 341
Source: Own elaboration based on data registered in Ballotpedia
Practical development
As we can see, the use of initiatives for specific policies is a habitual practice in the Los An-
geles county, with many tens of proposals each year  One of the cases with a higher media 
and social repercussion is the Voting on $15 Minimum Wage initiative in 2014  The initiative 
did not achieve the 61,486 signatures required for reaching the city council, but it was ap-
proved in the end 
The aim of the proposal was to increase the minimum wage in the city to $15 per hour, except 
for small companies with up to 10 workers or non-profit companies. For them, the measures 
would be implemented in 2017 to allow time for adaptation  According to the media, the 
measure could affect more than 50% of city workers considered to be “low wage workers”, 
with wages below $15  The measure had already been approved in other US cities  The initi-
ative was promoted by Los Angeles Workers Assembly, a coalition of unions like Unite Here 
Local 11, County Federation of Labor, small progressive and communal groups, churches and 
pro-social justice groups  Local businesses and the State opposed the initiative, warning 
about a risk of businesses leaving the area 
In September 2014, the City Secretary gave the collection of signatures the green-light to be 
initiated, but the requested number was not achieved  Despite this, the initiative had huge 
repercussions  It was part of a broader campaign with protests, rallies, assemblies and a 
strike  Given the visibility of the collection of signatures, the local government considered 
the measure  Several months later, in May 2015, a progressive increase in the minimum wage 
was approved, to $15 in 2020  Soon afterwards, similar signature collections were initiated 
in other cities in California and the USA  In other words, the citizens’ initiative, even failing 
in the signature collection, encouraged social mobilisation and allowed it to spread to other 
cities. This led to the city council considering the proposal and approving a modified version. 
Los Angeles thus became the largest US city with the highest minimum wage 
Strengths
The initiative allows local authorities to receive proposals that achieve wide support  It gives 
visibility to proposals which come from grass-roots organisations  Besides this, it favours 
measures that may be seen as troubled or controversial (for example, facing the main local 
economic groups) to receive wide-spread social support and allows them to be considered 
by the local government 
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Even when the initiative does not fulfil all the requirements, it might be useful for activating 
the associative network around a specific measure. 
Weaknesses
Signature collection can be very costly and a failure to gather the required signatures and 
keep to the deadlines could be a source of frustration for participants. Nevertheless, in this 
case the frustration probably did not emerge as the proposal was considered without having 
fulfilled the requirements.
Documentation
City Charter, Rules, and Codes46 / Chapter VII, Initiative, referendum and recall petitions  
Los Angeles  Election Code47 / City of Los Angeles $15 per Hour Minimum Wage Initiative48 
/ Minimum Wage, Initiative Ordinance49 / Los Angeles Lifts Its Minimum Wage to $15 Per 
Hour50 / $15-an-Hour Minimum Wage in California? Plan Has Some Worried51 / Ballot initiative 
regarding minimum wage begins collecting signatures52 / Los Angeles Rising53 / The Fight for 
$15 37 an Hour54
Sheet 11. Berlin (Germany):  
A case returning the management of the electricity grid to the municipality
Summary
This initiative took place in Berlin in 2013 and was promoted by a coalition of progressives 
and ecologist groups  The aim of the initiative was return the local electricity grid to the 
municipality, in order to moderate the rates and introduce new environmental sustainability 
criteria  The initiative prospered, and in a few months the required signatures were gathered  
However, the required quorum was not accomplished in the referendum and in the end the 
measure was not approved 
Regulation
The regulation of the initiative at city-state level was developed in 1995 through the article 
62-63 of the Constitution of Berlin (1995)  It is known as “Volksbegehren” 
Formal characteristics55
The Berliner citizens’ initiative can be used for requesting the end of a term (calling for new 
elections), for reforming the city constitution or for introducing specific measures in the 
legislative assembly (art  62 and 63) 
For requesting the end of a term (recall initiative), a collection of 50,000 voter signatures is 
required. If the signature of one out of every five voters (20%) is achieved, a referendum is 
called mandatorily  To win the referendum, a simple majority is required, as well as a turnout 
of at least 50% of voters 
In order to amend the local constitution (constitutional initiative), 50,000 signatures of voters 
are again required  The referendum becomes mandatory when the signature of one out of 
every five voters (20%) is achieved within six months. The amendment then wins if there is 
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the support of a majority of two thirds in the referendum, with at least a 50% turnout 
Agenda and legislative initiatives can amend, repeal or introduce new regulations  Petitions 
can be made regarding the whole jurisdiction of the city, except for budgetary and personnel 
provisions, public workers’ wages and pensions, and taxes  The initiative must gather at least 
20,000 signatures of residents over 16, when the proposal goes to the representative body 
(agenda initiative)  Calling a referendum is mandatory when the signatures of at least 7% of 
the voters are collected within 6 months 
The corresponding office (Internal Affairs Area) receives the initiative proposal and prepares 
a report regarding the costs of the measure  This report must be included in the signature 
collection. Also, official signature forms are provided. Once gathered, the petition must be 
registered in the administrative office by the organisations and the people signing. This office 
validates the signatures 
The citizens’ initiative also exists at district level (according to the jurisdiction of the district 
representative assembly)  It is called “residents’ petition” and the district assembly takes it 
into account and approves or rejects it in a Plenary session 
Prevalence
The initiative mandatorily leads to the call of a referendum if at least 7% of voters sign the 
petition  If the signatures do not reach this percentage and gather only 20,000, it would be-
come an agenda initiative. Therefore, the degree of influence depends on the support.
Practical development
One of the most visible cases in the last years was the initiative for the control of energy to 
be returned to the municipality (2013)  The promoters collected enough signatures to call a 
local referendum, but they did not then manage to produce enough voter turnout 
The “New Energy for Berlin” initiative was promoted in 2013 by a coalition of progressives and 
ecologist associations  More than 50 associations joined the project  They also obtained the 
support of The Greens, the Pirate Party, The Left and the Social Democrats  Several renew-
able energy companies supported the initiative as well  The idea was to create a consumer 
cooperative endorsed by local institutions in order to improve, cheapen and make the elec-
tricity grid more sustainable 
In mid-2013, the organisers spent 4 months gathering signatures  172,000 signatures (7% of 
voters) were required but in the end they achieved 228,000 signatures  Thus, they ensured 
that the initiative would lead to a referendum being called in September 2013, coinciding 
with the state elections. However, the local government changed the date to November 2013, 
so the referendum would not be tainted by federal elections 
More than 600,000 Berliners (more than 80%) voted in favour of the initiative, but the turnout 
only reached the 24 1% of the total voters (when 25% was required) 
Although the measure was not approved, its visibility contributed to the adoption of similar 
measures by the Assembly of Berlin  Also, it contributed to the increase in visibility for de-
bates regarding energy production and distribution at local level (Blanchet, 2014)  
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Strengths
When the legislative initiative enjoys wide support, it may influence local policies, even when 
it is not approved in the respective referendum  It also gives visibility to certain policies that 
provoke intense debate and public support 
Weaknesses
It is highly costly for promoters, in terms of resources, mobilisation and work to gather the 
signatures, while the approval in the subsequent referendum is also not necessarily guaran-
teed  The referendum furthermore requires an arduous amount of work for its mobilisation 
(to reach the required percentage of turnout) 
Documentation
Arnold and Freier, 2015 / Blanchet, 2014 / Royo et al , 2011 / Solar, 2016 / The Constitution of 
Berlin56 / The navigator of Direct Democracy (City level)57 / The navigator of Direct Democracy 
(District Citizens’ Initiative)58
Sheet 12. Bogota (Colombia):  
A broad legislation but limited practice
Summary
The 1991 Colombian Constitution and the 1994 Citizen Participatory Law already provides 
for the legislative initiative at local level  In 2015, the city of Bogota developed regulations in 
order to promote this type of participatory tool. Nevertheless, according to the authorities 
themselves, the initiative was scarcely used  Other online participatory tools were therefore 
introduced in 2017 due to the lack of efficacy of the former. The case of Bogota allows us to 
consider a participatory tool which is promoted by authorities but scarcely used in practice 
Regulation
1991 Political Constitution, Article 10, Republic of Colombia / 134 Law of 1994 issuing the rules 
regarding Citizen Participatory Mechanisms / 1757 Statutory Law of 2015, with respect to the 
promotion and protection of the right to democratic participation / 209 Agreement Project 
of 2015, which develops article 66 of the agreement 348 of 2008 relating to the presentation 
of agreement of projects by citizens and social organisations in the council of Bogota, capital 
district and issuing other provisions 
Formal characteristics
According to the Colombian general legislation, various types of initiatives can be found  For 
the recall, the support of a number of citizens registered in the census is required; 30% of 
the votes obtained by the elected person in public office.
The initiative of agreement projects or city ordinances (legislative initiative) has appeared 
in the Colombian legislation since the 90s  In order to present and validate an initiative, the 
signatures of at least 10% of the citizens registered in the local electoral census are required  
The initiative then goes to the local council  If the proposed policy is not approved, the coun-
cil can decide to call a referendum or, if 20% of the signatures are gathered, the referendum 
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must be mandatorily called  The initiative representative must always be convened by the 
city council and be heard during the whole initiative process (signature validation, council 
proceedings, conversion to an agreement project, etc )  According to Ramírez (2017), most 
of these types of initiatives are unsuccessful 
The regulations also include provisions regarding the electoral campaign funding. The Na-
tional Electoral Council therefore establishes annually the maximum amount of money that 
can be designated to gathering support, as well as the maximum amount of money that each 
citizen can provide  This measure tries to avoid economic powers controlling these types of 
mechanisms 
Agreement projects can be presented regarding issues which are within the jurisdiction of 
local councils. Nevertheless, some important limits exist:
a) Those which are the sole initiative of the Mayor
b) Budgetary, fiscal or tax issues
c) International relations
d) Amnesty or reprieve grants
e)Public order preservation and restoration
Prevalence
In the years 2014-2015, the Council of Bogota received no legislative initiative regarding city 
ordinances or local agreement projects59 (see data in Agreement Project 145 of 2017)  Be-
tween 1994 and 2012, 18 years after the Participatory Law, a study by the Electoral Obser-
vatory Mission recorded only 4 citizens’ initiatives of local agreement projects throughout 
Colombia (and just one of them was approved)  Although available data is limited, it seems 
that the tool was not used widely in the country  One of the reasons explaining the scarce 
use of the initiative is that the regulation is too demanding for Bogota: 520,400 signatures 
within 6 months are required  The authorities of Bogota admit that the procedure is too 
costly  Also, according to Altman (2010) there is a lack of tradition in the use of these types 
of bottom-up tools 
The long history of war and violence in Colombia has also severely affected political con-
fidence and the participation and functioning of participatory mechanisms which restrict 
collective action (Breuer, 2008b) 
Practical development
In 2017, the city council of Bogota approved an agreement project over the implementation 
of new technologies in the participation  Its aim was to further the administration-society 
relationship through ITCs, as an answer to the scarce use of the legislative initiative and 
the necessity to adopt direct proposal channels on the Internet  Therefore, in 2017 the city 
council decided to implement a series of online forums where citizens were able to present 
policy suggestions and proposals directly to the representative bodies, through an online 
platform (“Be part of the city”). However, these online forums do not have the legal efficacy 
nor the binding character of the legislative or referendum initiatives  A mandatory evaluation 
of the suggestions by the authorities has not been considered. Neither is it stated if the 
proposals can be presented individually or as a group, or if they must have social support  




The Colombian case and, more specifically in the case of Bogota, show the regulatory devel-
opment regarding the initiative at different levels of the administration  The city has devel-
oped a protocol for facilitating the initiative with an apparently simple procedure in terms 
of phases and organisation 
Weaknesses
The legislative initiative is costly for promoters in terms of signature requirements and the 
necessary economic resources for fulfilling such tasks. We do not have in-depth studies 
available, but it would be interesting to analyse the political determinants which explain the 
underuse of the initiative, while considering the Colombian local context 
Contrary to what was established in the 2015 regulations of Bogota, the city council was not 
provided with additional administrative resources in order to encourage this type of partici-
patory tool  In other words, the regulations established a protocol but the hiring of adminis-
tration personnel to encourage, assist or manage this type of tool was specifically rejected.
The initiative procedure is not provided with telematic tools  In fact, as consequence of the 
lack of efficacy of the initiative, the council of Bogota developed alternative telematic chan-
nels, but without formally linking them 
Just like in other cases, the initiative is dependent on representative logic: it must be sup-
ported by 20% of the signatures of the local electoral register  If it is supported by 10% of 
the citizens with the right to vote, it is passed only on to the representative council, where 
its fate is decided (approved, rejected or holding a referendum) 
Documentation
Altman, 2010 / Breuer, 2008b / Breuer, 2007 / Ramírez Nárdiz, 2018/ Referendums that come 
to nothing60/ 134 Law, of May 31st, 1994, regarding citizen participatory mechanisms61/ 1757 
Statutory Law of 2015/ 209 Agreement Project of 2015, Council of Bogotá D C 62
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Sheet 13. Canberra and the Capital Territory (Australia):  
An unsuccessful story of the extension of the initiative at local level
Summary
In the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), where the city of Canberra is located, a legislative 
initiative was submitted for debate in 1995, 1996 and 2002 as a measure aimed at favouring 
participation at local level  The proposal was not approved by the legislative chamber of the 
federal district, but it generated an important debate  Local initiative tools have not been 
extended in Australia, despite there being some isolated cases of this 
Regulation
Community Referendum Act Law Project of 1995 and, latterly, of 2002, presented to the leg-
islative assembly of the Australian Capital Territory 
Formal characteristics
The projects for the Laws of 1995 and 2002 are practically the same  Both develop legis-
lative initiative in the ACT territory, which includes the capital, Canberra, and other small 
municipalities  It was proposed by the Australian Liberal Party, the country’s centre-right 
conservative party  One of the promoters argued that it was a suitable area for launching 
the proposal, given that it is one of the richest territories in the country, with the highest 
number of civil servants and the highest level of education  Therefore, social participation in 
legislative activity should be encouraged (Macintyre et al , 2003) 
The legislative initiative was included in the bills. The following steps were taken: first, pro-
moters had to form a committee and draw up a proposal (a brief one of 100 words)  This 
would be presented to the local Electoral Commission in order to guarantee the fulfilment of 
all formal requirements  The initiative proposal needs to be previously signed by at least 1,000 
voters. Once the signatures are gathered, the Electoral Commission verifies them (through 
a random selection of 200) and checks that the proposal is correct 
Secondly, once this first barrier has been crossed, the official collection of signatures would 
begin. The petition must collect the signatures of 5% of voters, (figures from the previous 
election in the territory), within the 6 months following approval of the initiative  The signa-
tures are validated by the Electoral Commission 
Thirdly, promoters would draw up the bill with the help of the Attorney General, who would 
finally authorise the proposal as suitable for presenting to the legislative assembly of the 
territory  A spokesperson is then designated to present the project to the assembly  This 
presentation must be given within 6 months and the assembly will decide if the measure is 
approved or rejected  In case of rejection, a popular referendum will be mandatorily called  
One remarkable issue appears in this phase  After the debate in the legislative assembly, 
promoters can modify the original project in order to reach an agreement with the assem-
bly members to approve the regulation without a referendum  There is, therefore, room for 
negotiation 
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Lastly, if the proposal is not approved by the assembly, a call for a referendum would take 
place  According to the bill, the compulsory nature of voting in Australia would be upheld  
The initiative would succeed by a majority of votes  What would happen next? The approved 
initiative comes back to the legislative assembly where it is approved or rejected as a law  
As the referendum result is not binding, the previous phase begins again to some extent 
Prevalence
Many referendums have been called at federal level in Australia, but those procedures have 
been promoted by the government (Qvortrup et al , 2018: 246-251)  Local initiative has not 
become widespread, except for some isolated cases like in the city of Burnie, were the leg-
islative initiative regulations were successfully approved (Williams and Chin, 2000: 36)  Sev-
eral projects have been presented in different territories but most of them did not prosper 
(Gregorczuk, 1998) 
The aforementioned bills were not approved by the legislative assembly in the Capital Ter-
ritory and therefore never implemented 
Practical development
Why has local initiative had such limited success in Australia? On one hand, there is some 
circumstantial evidence which points to Australian local politics and particularly in this case, 
to partisan relations within the Capital Territory  The legislative initiative proposal was sup-
ported by the Liberal Party (centre-right) while the Labour Party and the ACT Greens were 
reluctant to introduce the measure (Williams and Chin, 2000)  The initiative policies did not 
achieve a unanimous and joint endorsement from any of the big parties and the initiative 
proposals tended to generate conflict within the parties.
On the other hand, as Williams and Chin (2000) point out, no solid consensus exists over 
which model of initiative should be implemented at state and local level  In other words, the 
formulated proposals, not just in the Capital Territory but also in Tasmania or Queensland, 
included very diverse procedures  It is also possible that in some cases, like in the projects 
presented in the ACT, the procedures were not simple and convincing: thus, in this case, 
two rounds of petitions supporting the initiative were incorporated, followed by approval in 
the territorial assembly, the call for a referendum in case of rejection when, once again, the 
territorial assembly would make the final decision.
Finally, as in other cases, other community participatory institutions exist in Australia that are 
useful for putting forward proposals and asking for the opinions of the local population  For 
example, the advisory councils in some cities are useful for debating projects with members 
of associations and active and interested members of the communities concerned  The leg-
islative initiative proposals are also advisory, competing, in a certain way, with other simple 
consultation institutions which have already been extensively tested 
Strengths
The legislative initiative bills demand a low number of signatures in the initial phase (1,000) 
and a relatively low percentage of signatures for the validation of the initiative (5% of votes 
in the previous elections) 
The expected negotiation procedure between promotors and the assembly could generate 
an interesting space for negotiation, such as the one which often takes place in practice 
in the Swiss case 
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Weaknesses
The procedures are complex, with several rounds in each phase: two rounds of signature col-
lection, and twice through the representative body  Despite the complexity of the procedure, 
any initiative approved in a referendum would not be mandatory for the legislators  There-
fore, as a last resort, the initiative is advisory (halfway between the legislative and agenda 
initiatives) and the public representatives would make the final decision. The procedure is 
too costly with regards to the impact that can be achieved (that is, the territorial assembly 
ultimately considering a measure) 
Documentation
Hill, 2003 / Macintyre et al , 2003 / Gregorczuk, 1998 / Qvortrup et al , 2018 / Williams and 
Chin, 2000 /Community Referendum Bill 199563/ Community Referendum Bill 200264
Sheet 14. Quezon City (the Philippines):  
A pioneering initiative in the country
Summary
Quezon City (QC), with almost 3 million inhabitants, is the municipality with the largest pop-
ulation in Greater Manila, one of the wealthiest areas of the country  Despite the existence 
of initiative regulations since 1989, the first measure coming from a popular initiative was 
approved by a local referendum in 2011 
Regulation
Republic Act N. 6735. An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appro-
priating Funds Therefore (1989)
Formal characteristics
The legislative initiative exists at city (metropolitan area), municipal and district (barangay) 
levels  At local level, only one initiative can be presented per year65 and it must address is-
sues that already exist within the corresponding jurisdiction 
There is an initial presentation phase to the legislative body  The promoters need 1,000 sig-
natures at metropolitan area level; 100 at municipal level and just 50 at district level  The 
initial proposal allows for a debate to be requested in the local legislative chamber, as well 
as the approval, rejection, amendment or rejection of any law, ordinance or resolution  The 
municipal secretary can assist with the formulation of the proposal  Once the proposal has 
been presented by the promoters, the legislative chamber can announce its decision within 
30 days  If no favourable response occurs, then a process of signature collection begins in 
order to request a measure or referendum with guarantees 
In this case, the promoters initiate the signature collection, within 90 days for the metropolitan 
area, 60 for the municipality and 30 for the districts  They must collect the signatures of 10% 
of registered voters in the metropolitan area or the municipality (with at least 3% of signatures 
from each constituency or district, in order to guarantee that all territories are represented) 
and the signatures of 10% of registered voters in the case of just one district being involved 
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The signatures are gathered in agreed locations where authorities are present to guarantee 
the integrity of the petitions. The stands are placed in public areas like official buildings. 
Finally, the signatures are delivered to the local electoral commission, which reviews them 
If the established requirements are fulfilled, the local electoral commission must call for a 
referendum regarding the proposal within 60 days for metropolitan initiatives, 45 days for 
municipal ones and 30 days for district initiatives  The local electoral commission sets a date 
for the referendum 
If the initiative is supported by simple majority, the local electoral commission passes it on 
to the representative chamber in order to formalise the measure  The local government is 
not allowed to adopt opposing policies within 6 months and the new regulations can only 
be amended by ¾ of the representatives of the local chamber 
Prevalence
State legislation regarding the initiative was introduced in the Philippines in 1989, enabling 
the initiative in different territorial levels  It was then developed in 1991 through local gov-
ernment legislations. No information has been found regarding the diffusion and frequency 
of local initiatives in the country, but the media and local authorities have reported a few 
recent initiatives at municipal or district level. The first case to reach the number of required 
signatures, leading to the subsequent referendum, took place in 2011 in Milagrosa, a City of 
Quezon district  It is therefore an indication of how few initiatives successfully overcome all 
the established procedures 
Practical development
The initiative originated in the Milagrosa district, in the south of the city, with close to 5,000 
inhabitants  The ordinance consisted of a set of measures related to a perceived lack of 
security in the district: squatting and the establishment of illegal housing, drug trafficking, 
beggars and the homeless  Two initiatives were proposed, to be voted on simultaneously: 
the implementation of an ordinance to control the proliferation of squatters and beggars, 
and an initiative regarding the control of drug trafficking and the opening of non-licensed 
establishments 
The initiative gathered all the required signatures (more than 300 within a month)  The ref-
erendum was then called in May, where the proposals were approved. Nevertheless, the low 
turnout in the referendum (only 856 of more than 3,600 registered voters) is a negative sign 
(a 24 4% turnout)  The measure was successful with 465 votes in favour and 384 against 
Strengths
The initiative includes two phases: the first one allows a proposal to be submitted to the 
authorities, which is achieved using a low number of signatures (50 in the district level and 
100 in the city level)  The second phase consists of the actual gathering of signatures, pro-
moting an initiative that can be either approved by the local chamber or must be mandatorily 
put to a vote in a referendum 
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Weaknesses
In the second phase, the signature requirements are stricter (10% of the registered voters), 
especially at local and metropolitan area levels (where other territorial requirements are 
included like the participation of 3% of voters in each district) 
Only one local initiative is accepted per year, limiting its potential 
Another difficulty is found in the signature gathering process, taking place in official locations 
and with the public emissaries’ supervision: this does provide a guarantee for the signature 
collection process, although it implies higher costs, greater inflexibility and a slow process 
of gathering  This may help explain the scarce use of this tool 
Documentation
Republic Act No. 673566/ QC barangay holds 1st successful initiative vs  squatters and drugs67/ 
QC barangay holds first successful referendum68 / People’s initiative vote held in Quezon 
City69/ Taking civic initiative: Where every citizen is a lawmaker70
Sheet 15. Geneva (Switzerland):  
A traditional and broadly used participatory tool
Summary
The citizens’ initiative is a traditional institution in Switzerland at federal, cantonal and mu-
nicipal levels  In Geneva, the initiative exists in both the cantons (regions) and municipalities  
It is a well-known and frequently used participatory tool: each year a popular referendum 
is carried out in one of the municipalities of the area for measures which have been put 
forward through citizens’ initiatives  The initiative serves to carry out legislative proposals, 
to abrogate regulations approved by local government or to put specific measures to a vote 
in a referendum  The initiative in Geneva covers wide areas of local government jurisdiction 
(including the budget), but it is relatively costly in terms of economic resources and the effort 
required to mobilise a collection of signatures and the subsequent referendum 
Regulation
Constitution of the canton of Geneva, Chapter II, Communal Referendum, Art  71-77 
Formal characteristics
In the case of Geneva (this sheet is limited to a local case) there are two types of initiative: 
the agenda and legislative initiatives  They are known as “Kommunale Volksinitiative” and 
“Gemeindereferendum” 
The popular initiative (agenda initiative) allows measures to be put up for debate in the local 
council. Before the signature collection process, at least five voters must register their pro-
posal with the Elections and Voting Service. This service verifies the legality of the initiative 
and ensures the promoters are registered voters  The control is only focused on the “form” 
of initiative. After this verification, an official notice is published, and the signature collection 
commences 
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According to the 36th article of the cantonal constitution, the potential issues to be ad-
dressed are the following: community housing, thoroughfares, public construction works, 
urban planning, public and private foundations of common interest, leisure, cultural, social 
or sports activities practised in community facilities 
Promoters must collect all the signatures within 4 months  In the case of Geneva, the sig-
natures of 4% of voters must be gathered and in numerical terms, a minimum of 2,400 and 
a maximum of 3,200 signatures  In 2018, the requirement is 3,200 signatures 
The local council must take a decision regarding the initiative, within 12 months, drafting a 
regulation if it is approved  If it is not approved, the council must propose a counter-initia-
tive (art  73), in other words, it must propose an alternative  The initiative is therefore always 
constructive: it leads to the council taking measures on the issue 
The legislative initiative permits the proposal of a referendum about a certain issue  The 
signatures must be gathered within 40 days of the council having debated the issue  The pro-
moter committee then registers a proposal for a referendum and signature collection in the 
Elections and Voting Service  This service ensures that the “form” is correct  The promoters 
must also inform the local council of their intention to gather signatures 
As in the agenda initiative, the signatures of 4% of voters must be gathered, up to a max-
imum of 3,200, which is the required number of signatures in 2018 (from a total of 122,715 
voters)  Once the signatures are collected, they are submitted to the Elections and Voting 
Service for their verification. If the required number of signatures is reached, a referendum 
is called, and the measure will be approved if it has the support of an absolute majority of 
voters (more than half the total amount of valid ballots) 
Prevalence
At state level, the popular initiative was introduced in Switzerland in 1891  The proposal 
and referendum initiative is a traditional institution that previously existed in some cantons 
and that reaches hundreds of municipalities (Ruppen, 2004)  The legislative and agenda in-
itiatives are frequently used in the municipalities of the canton of Geneva  In almost every 
federal, cantonal or municipal elections, local measures proposed by citizens’ initiative are 
simultaneously voted on 
According to Serdült and Welp (2012), around 30% of popular referendums in Switzerland are 
proposed by associations or social collectives  Referendums show a highly variable turnout, 
but general studies point out that the average level of voter turnout is around 50% and that 
after several years of growing abstention, it has made a recovery  (Ruppen, 2004)  Turnout 
tends to be higher in referendums at local level (Buetzer, 2011) 
The popular initiative is a costly participatory tool  Therefore, it tends to be put forward by 
pre-existing associations, parties or other groups, thus reflecting the resources and power 
relationships within society  The economic costs of the signature collection are therefore 
high: for example, it is estimated that gathering one signature and mobilising one voter for 
an initiative, costs 2 Swiss francs (1 Swiss franc = 0’88 euros) (Ruppen, 2004)  
Practical development
In the case of the city of Geneva, the last referendum put forward by popular initiative serves 
as an illustration  It took place in June 2016 as a reaction to budgetary cuts that were going 
to be carried out in the city 
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In December 2015, a series of decisions were made regarding the city budget, implicating 
an adjustment in the goods, services and procurements sectors, as well as in the public 
subsidies sector  As a result, the new local budget endorsed by the centre-right parties sug-
gested a reduction in public investment: particularly in the cultural and social associations 
subsidies  As a reaction against this agreement, a legislative initiative was promoted in order 
to reject the budgetary cuts 
Leftist parties, unions (Syndicat interprofessionnel de travailleuses et travailleurs, SIT) and 
numerous cultural and social associations positioned themselves against the budgetary cut-
backs  According to the members of the government, it was necessary for “putting the local 
economy back on a sound footing” 
The result of the referendum was a rejection of the cuts in the aforementioned budgetary 
areas. Thus, the first measure that was put to the vote (against cuts to the goods, services 
and procurements sectors) received 60% support  The second measure (against cuts in cul-
tural and social subsidies) received the support of more than 61% of voters  In both cases, 
voter turnout was 43 6% 
The reactionary vote to “reject the deliberation” of the Council (that is how it is formally 
called) had successfully passed through all its phases  In this case, we may note that the 
initiative is of a “veto-player” nature (Buetzer, 2011), in other words, a part of the society 
gets together to veto a decision made by the governing majority (what we can also identify 
as an abrogative initiative) 
Strengths
The tradition in the use of the initiative tools allows visibility, and the ability for it to be un-
derstood by the public 
Legislative and agenda initiatives can be proposed for local budgetary issues that are vetoed 
in many other cases of initiative 
In the agenda initiative, the fact that the proposal rejection leads to the presentation of a 
counter-proposal by the government promotes a two-way relationship with its citizens 
Weaknesses
The analyses of the Swiss initiative highlight the economic costs involved in the development 
of the campaign, the required signature collection and, in this case, the mobilisation required 
for the subsequent referendum 
Documentation
Buetzer, 2011 / Kaufman and Waters, 2004 / Ruppen, 2004 / Serdült and Welp, 2012 / Initiative 
ou référendum communal71/ Submission procedure of the initiative72/ Submission procedure 
of the referendum initiative73/ Nombre de signatures pour une initiative populaire ou un 
référendum pour l’année 2018 74/ Les coupes dans le budget 2016 mobilisent la gauche75/ 
Le peuple refuse à nouveau les coupes dans le budget de la Ville de Genève76
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Sheet 16. Richmond (USA):  
An affordable housing initiative
Summary
This initiative was proposed by a coalition of progressive representatives and associations 
with the goal of regulating the rental market in Richmond, California (USA)  The initiative 
was supported by the required number of signatures and afterwards a referendum was suc-
cessfully held 
Regulation
The citizens’ initiative is regulated by the Californian State Constitution, that operates as a 
general rule  The initiative and referendum are jointly regulated in article II, section 11, and 
also in the Californian electoral code, which contains provisions for the development of in-
itiatives and local referendums in cities which do not have their own constitution 
Formal characteristics
The legal framework can be summarised as follows:
The legislative initiatives for proposing ordinances must be submitted to the electoral au-
thority of the city  The promoters must inform the electoral authority before the signature 
collection begins  This communication must include an explanation of the measures and 
a justification, in a maximum of 500 words. The request must be endorsed by up to three 
promoters  The promoters must pay a fee of 200 dollars maximum (the prices are settled by 
the legislator) that will be returned within a year, once the authority verifies the “sufficiency” 
of the petition  The attorney general prepares the question; an impartial title and a 500-word 
summary, within 15 days  Any citizen can suggest amendments to the proposal if they can 
justify that it is misrepresented 
Once the initiative is ready, it must be published in the local or county newspapers and can 
also be published in public places. The certificate regarding the publication of the signa-
ture collection must be submitted to the electoral authority within 10 days and the process 
commences 
The signature collection lasts 180 days  The minimum number of petitions is at least 10% of 
the registered voters in the previous local election  In the state of California, in cities with 
less than 1,000 registered voters, 25% of signatures (or at least 100 petitions) is required 
The electoral authority registers the request with the local representative chamber  The 
chamber must establish a hearing with promoters and will request different types of reports 
(economic, legal, financial impact, etc.). These procedures must be carried out in a maximum 
of 30 days from the day the request was submitted by the electoral authority 
Once the initiative and the petitions are validated by the electoral authority, the legislative 
chamber can adopt the ordinance, reject it and put it to a vote in a referendum  Any approved 
ordinance coming from a citizens’ initiative or a popular referendum can only be rejected by 
popular referendum (section 9217)  An ordinance regarding the same issue cannot be voted 
on within 12 months 
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A special call for a referendum regarding an ordinance must be announced within 88 days 
A similar regulation77 also exists for territorial districts where an initiative or referendum can 
also be proposed 
Prevalence
To fulfil the legal requirements, the initiative must be approved by the local chamber or put 
to a vote in a referendum  It must be mandatorily considered by the local legislative cham-
ber  Its binding character is reinforced by the prohibition of approving an ordinance of the 
same issue within 12 months, or by the popular vote clause (an ordinance approved through 
a popular vote must be rejected or amended through a popular vote)  If the referendum of 
two opposed ordinances coincides on the same day, the one with the highest level of sup-
port will be approved 
Practical development
The initiative in the state of California is over 100 years old  In this case, we highlight the 
recent experience in the city of Richmond because it addresses a critical local policy: rental 
prices and the housing market  Facing the recent increases in rent, a coalition of several par-
tisan and associative groups in Richmond presented an initiative regarding the public control 
of rental prices in the city  This initiative was registered on 23 February 2016 
The initiative was signed by Gayle McLaughlin, political representative and a member of the 
Green Party of California  It was also presented by the Tenants Together association, Right 
to the City, Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment (ACCE), Richmond Pro-
gressive Alliance, Association of Nurses and other associations, neighbourhood and union 
groups. The legislative initiative was supported by a large coalition of NGOs, research groups, 
neighbourhood groups and social justice organisations, who all agreed that housing was one 
of the main problems  Previously, a similar initiative had been approved by the representative 
chamber, but the Californian Apartment Associations (the homeowners league) managed to 
block it via legal channels 
According to its promoters, around half of Richmond inhabitants are tenants  The main goal 
of the measure was therefore to control price rises and to promote housing stability as a 
way of reinforcing personal and community safety. The specific measures consist of creating 
a committee of local experts that propose a maximum rental price in those houses which 
are subject to regulation, public complaint procedures for tenants and the prohibition of 
free and unjustified evictions.
That year the measure needed at least 4,189 signatures  More than 5,000 petitions were 
submitted to the electoral authority and a referendum was held on the issue in November 
2016  Finally, the Local Rent Control initiative was approved by 21,380 votes to 11,378 
The legislative measure came into force without delay in December 2016. Nevertheless, the 
homeowner association (California Apartment Association, CAA), contested the ordinance for 
being contrary to the Constitution and other state regulations  The challenge was rejected 
by the county judge and the CAA withdrew the claim in May 2017 
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Strengths
As well as in other cases in the US, the simple, detailed and binding character of the initiative 
is one of its strengths  The initiative must be approved by the representative chamber or 
put to a popular vote, which is an important incentive so that the costly signature collection 
process can be carried out 
The transparency of the procedure is also a strength, clearly stipulated in the regulations (for 
example, the role of the public prosecutor, the representative chamber or the promoters) 
Weaknesses
Economic inequality represents an important obstacle. Nevertheless, it can be overcome, as 
this case shows  Regarding the Local Rent Control initiative for example, some local media 
explained that the coalition which favoured rent control raised 80,000 dollars for the cam-
paign, whereas the houseowners association (CAA) already had 500,000 dollars available  The 
inequality of resources in this case was not an impediment for the victory of the pro-tenants 
coalition, despite having fewer economic resources  
Documentation
Rent control measure ballot in Richmond78/ Rent Control Advocates Claim to Have Enough 
Signatures for November Ballot Measure79/ Housing Policy and Belonging in Richmond80/ The 
struggle for renter protections in Richmond moves forward81
Sheet 17. San Antonio (USA):  
An initiative proposed by the “Workers Defense Project”
Summary
In Texas, more than 300 municipalities permit legislative initiative for the proposal of concrete 
measures or policies  They are called “ballot measures”82  In this instance, the State of Texas 
has approved a law so that Texan cities may include citizens’ initiatives in their regulations 
for regulatory or constitutional reforms and the proposal of concrete policies 
Regulation
The regulation for the initiative in San Antonio can be found in the San Antonio City Charter83, 
Art  IV, Sec  34-44 
Formal Characteristics
The key characteristics of the initiative are:
Legislative initiatives centre around municipal jurisdictions, except for those prohibited by 
law (private appropriation of money, enforcement of duties and taxes, recognition of the 
voting rights of collectives or persons, public prices, zoning or re-zoning of properties)  For 
an initiative to be valid, 10% of voter signatures are required, from those registered to vote 
in previous municipal elections 
The petitions are registered in the office of the City Clerk. The Clerk certifies or accredits the 
signatures gathered and the validated delivery of them to the Municipal Chamber of Repre-
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sentatives  If any anomalies are found in the signatures, a request to settle the matter must 
be submitted within 20 days 
The local Chamber of Representatives can either approve the measure or call a referendum  
When the Chamber receives a petition, it is mandatorily considered and a public meeting with 
the promoters is made available  Whatever the Chamber’s assessment may be, they must 
take a decision within 60 days maximum  60 days is therefore what is available to call for 
the vote on the petition, whether it is an independent election or whether it is in conjunction 
with other types of elections  Once the decision is made, they have between 30 and 90 days 
to carry out the referendum 
If the initiative is approved by a majority of voters in the referendum, it is then considered an 
ordinance of the city  The ordinance cannot be amended until 6 months after its approval 
Prevalence
The initiative must be considered mandatory by the local Chamber if all the established 
norms are followed  If it is approved by the majority in the referendum, it comes into effect 
as an additional ordinance of the city. It cannot be modified or revoked until 6 months from 
the date of its approval 
The initiative therefore, in spite of the high cost of collecting signatures, can be highly effec-
tive in being approved by the local Chamber and by passing it to a popular vote 
Practical Development
One of the most significant cases in Texas is the “Working Texans for Paid Sick Time” ordi-
nance in San Antonio city  This ordinance initiative details the introduction of paid sick leave 
for workers in San Antonio businesses  According to its promoters, more than 40% of San 
Antonio’s workers do not have the right to claim paid sick leave  In this way, if the ordinance 
came into effect, the workers would benefit from a system of paid sick leave, for the work-
er or their family members  The number of days they could claim would vary according to 
the size of the company, but the worker could enjoy 6 to 8 days of paid leave (calculated 
according to the number of hours worked in the company) These days can be accumulated 
from one year to the next  The measure will affect around 130,000 workers 
The period of collecting signatures for support terminated at the end of May 2018 when 
144,000 signatures had been recorded and handed to the City Clerk  It is estimated that 
some 60,000 to 70,000 signatures were needed according to the law, so the collection can 
be considered a great success  Part of the signatures were collected online 
The most notable point is that the process of collection, that lasted two months, was pro-
moted by a group of trade unions and grassroots organisations: the AFL-CIO (American Labor 
Federation) and other organisations such as San Antonio Central Labor Council, UNITE HERE, 
United Food and Commercial Workers and youth organisations such as Young Active Labor 
Leaders (YALL), MOVE, etc  Apart from the mobilisation, the initiative received support from 
the Democratic Senator and businessman Beto O’Rourke, which according to the local media 
increased the popularity of the measure 
In July the Clerk certified the legitimacy of the signatures and handed in the proposal to 
the City Council. There was a fierce political battle over it, since business lobbies, various 
organisations of lawyers and republican groups showed their opposition to a similar initia-
tive approved in the city of Austin. However, in August, the local council finally approved the 
measure  It was predicted that there would be a new legal battle in the following months 
regarding the new local ordinance 
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Strengths
The principal strength of this tool is its binding nature, which is an incentive for promoter 
organisations facing the costly job of collecting such a high number of signatures (10%), more 
than 100,000 in the case of San Antonio 
The procedure is simple and transparent, similar to California (see sheets 10 and 16) it has 
a high level of appraisal and development in the regulations  Also, the materials which are 
not included are clearly set out in the regulations  The distribution of its jurisdiction in the 
local arena allows this type of economic and redistributive content  In other jurisdictions 
it would be more complicated  One of the advantages of this case and of the other cases 
from the US, is the breadth of subjects and the political, social and economic impact of the 
proposals presented 
Weaknesses
As in the Richmond case, the collection of signatures and the possible subsequent referen-
dum are subject to the availability of resources and to the social inequalities  As stated by 
one of the spokespersons for this initiative, ‘the lobbies against the initiative (business and 
Republican Party) will have put together a large amount of resources a priori to publicise 
and promote their opposition to the measures”  On the other hand, the coalition of social 
organisations that promote the initiative have a smaller selection of resources to put together 
a priori in order to develop their campaign in favour of paid leave  This is a problem that is 
exacerbated if we consider that the principal people affected (and their potential support) 
are workers with few resources  Despite this, the initiative has already been approved in 
other cities such as Austin and finally in San Antonio.
Documentation
Laws governing local ballot measures in Texas84/ Working Texans for Paid Sick Time (Working 
Texans)85/ Coalition Launches Paid Sick Leave Campaigns in San Antonio, Dallas86/ Organizers 
Exceed the Number of Signatures Needed for Paid Sick Time Referendum87/ Activists Take 
Paid Sick Leave Fight to San Antonio with 144,000 Signatures88/ San Antonio Council Approves 
Paid Sick Leave Ordinance89
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Sheet 18. Portland (USA):  
A traditional and consolidated participatory tool
Summary
The legislative initiative is a traditional participatory tool both in the state of Oregon and in 
the city of Portland  Oregon has been innovative with initiative material, through the Citizens’ 
Initiative Review, which integrates deliberative forums into the process  In the city of Port-
land, this method has not yet been incorporated, but detailed guidelines for the initiative 
can be found, as well as a wide array of information regarding its procedures and numerous 
recent experiences, both successful and unsuccessful  Even statute or local constitutional 
reforms follow a similar procedure in terms of proposing legislative measures 
Regulation
The initiative is regulated by the Portland City Code Section 2 04 040 
Formal characteristics
The legislative initiative, as occurs with others, permits the proposal of specific regulations 
and the request of a referendum regarding an issue  Accessible and detailed information is 
available on the city website90 
Firstly, voters can place a request for an initiative from the City Auditor’s Office, either in 
person or by email  It is signed by a maximum of 3 promoters  These promotors can seek 
assistance from the Office for filling out their request and outlining their initiative proposal. 
The request must include a proposal for the date of the referendum, in the case of one being 
requested (the initiatives can only be put to a vote on the same days as the representative 
elections). The proposals can address local statute or constitutional amendments. The office 
must issue a resolution regarding the initiative’s validity and legality, within 5 days 
All this must be delivered to the city attorney in order to prepare the question  The city at-
torney must write the question within 5 days. Regulations also include a deadline for filing 
a claim, both by promoters and the general public, if the question is considered unsuitable 
according to law. The question will be published in the city attorney’s office website.
Secondly, there is the signature collection. Before it begins, the city attorney’s office must 
validate the petition forms, the information sheets and the Committee of Promoters  The ver-
ification of these documents is very important for guaranteeing that the signature collection 
fulfils all legal requirements. After that, the chief petitioners can start gathering signatures. 
Chief petitioners or authorised agents who gather signatures must also follow protocol (there 
are fines for noncompliance).
The signatures of at least 9% of the voters in the previous local elections are required  Ac-
cording to official data, from May 2018 until 2020, the requested number of signatures totals 
37,638  Petitions must be submitted at least 4 months before the scheduled vote, in case 
a referendum is requested 
Thirdly, the submission of petitions to the local elections’ official (a section of the city attor-
ney’s office). The signatures must be validated within 30 days. Statistical sampling methods 
may be used for verification. The office may verify the initiative or not (it can request addi-
tional signatures from the promoters if the validated petitions are not sufficient).
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Finally, the legislative initiative is submitted to the local representative chamber  The chamber 
can approve it, henceforth becoming law, or reject it  In this case it would pass straight to 
the referendum phase  The representative chamber can present a counter-proposal to vote 
on  This would happen on the same date 
Prevalence
The legislative initiative is a relatively frequent practice in the city  For example, in the decade 
from 2000 to 2010, a citizens’ initiative which aimed to amend the city statute, succeeded 
in gathering the required number of signatures to be put to a referendum vote  In 2002, 
the so-called “Good Government” initiative, which dealt with the the modification of local 
government make-up, lost in the referendum. Nevertheless, as we will see, the demand has 
remained present in some collective neighbourhood groups 
Most of the direct democracy measures developed in the city are top-down  For example, 
consultations promoted by the government  These take place more frequently than the in-
itiative 
The local initiative is part of an innovative state practice in terms of citizens’ initiative  In fact, 
Oregon has developed an initiative system called Citizens’ Initiative Review, which combines 
the initiative process with the realisation of deliberative forums where information is dis-
tributed, and citizens can discuss the initiative measures which will be put to a referendum 
vote  (see sheet 21) 
Practical development
The initiative in Portland and the state of Oregon is an institution with a long trajectory 
In 2015, a new initiative was approved by the local Auditor’s office, once again picking up, in 
part, the 2002 local statute amendment proposal  Its aim, as in the aforementioned initiative, 
was to change the local government model: the mayor would hold the executive authority 
and the representative chamber would in essence be a chamber of territorial representation 
(elected by the 7 districts)  Along with this, the promoters, neighbours of peripheral city dis-
tricts, aimed for the members of the representative chamber to be elected by districts and 
not at the city level, in order to link representation to the territorial communities 
The proposal was called “The Portland Community Equality Act” and received validation to 
collect signatures in September 2015  The required signatures (31,345) had to be gathered 
by July 2016, four months before the elections 
The problem of this initiative was that, according to the local media, the voters of Portland 
had already rejected the measure at least seven times in local consultations, the previous 
two being in 2002 and 2007  In other words, the citizens’ initiative had already been present-
ed on numerous occasions without ever having achieved the majority support of local voters 
However, in some city districts the feeling of political exclusion persisted, facilitating greater 
persistence for the proposal  In this case, the proposal was pushed forward by a group of 
neighbours from the east of the city who condemned the concentration of political rep-
resentation and resources in the city centre  They also demanded a greater decentralisation 
of urban management 
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The initiative, after 8 months of gathering signatures, did not reach the 10% of signatures 
required to be validated  It did not therefore reach the local chamber of representatives and 
a referendum was not able to be called  It is possible that the recurrence of the initiative and 
its defeat in previous consultations may have discouraged participation and social support 
Strengths
The initiative in Portland has a considerable institutional tradition, both in the city and at 
state level  This participatory tool has a long history, which permits a wide understanding 
and familiarity of it by its citizens 
Weaknesses
Historical demands –like the territorial representative model of the aforementioned initia-
tive– may require alternative participatory channels once rejected in a referendum  In other 
words, once a measure passes through one or more initiative processes and is defeated in 
the signature gathering process or in the referendum, it is possible that it will be discredited, 
or give the impression that most of society does not approve of it 
Documentation
Portland City Code Section 2 04 040  Guide for the citizens’ initiative91/ Plan to change Port-
land’s government to 9-member City Council with district representation passes hurdle92/East 
Portlanders seek equality, dramatic government93/ District Elections and Good Government94
Sheet 19. Helsinki (Finland):  
A simple online procedure 
Summary
Citizens’ initiatives at a local level acquired much greater ease of access in 2013 when an 
online platform for the presentation of initiatives was launched  This platform streamlined 
the dissemination, the validation of signatures and even updated information concerning 
the progress of the initiative  A huge variety of proposals have been delivered to the Helsinki 
City Hall from then on: ranging from the construction of a new bicycle lane to a referendum 
about the construction of a large mosque in the city  This ease of launching proposals is 
combined with a final oversight by the chamber of representatives. 
Regulation
The initiative is regulated by the Local Government Act 1995/365 
Formal characteristics
Agenda initiatives to raise policies for discussion are permitted to address issues which are 
under the remit of the city  This is principally carried out through an online service dedicated 
to that service (Kuntalaisaloite fi), run by the Ministry of Justice for cities 
An initiative must be sponsored by residents with voting rights  To trigger an initiative, they 
must collect signatures representing 2% of the residents with voting rights in the city  Once 
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this has been achieved it becomes a subject of “interest” for the local chamber of repre-
sentatives  A time frame of 6 months is granted to debate the issue 
The collection of signatures must take place online, through the abovementioned platform, or 
in person – in which case the signatures should be handed in to the Municipal Registry Office.
A referendum initiative can also be triggered to request a policy consultation  In this case 
the signatures required are 5% of residents with voting rights  Finally, the local assembly 
decided whether the referendum should be held or not 
In both cases the sponsors must be informed of the decisions taken regarding their initiatives  
Impact
The right to launch initiatives has been included in local Finnish legislation since the end of 
the 1970s  The implementation of online media was carried out in 2013  Through the internet 
residents can make proposals, gather support (signatures from residents with voting rights) 
and follow the results of the debate in the local chamber (whether the measure has been 
approved or not) 
In Helsinki the implementation of this online system triggered an increase of proposals  
While in 2012, 9 local initiatives were registered, in 2013 30 were proposed  This mechanism 
was also established by the Ministry of Justice in other cities  According to local media the 
online procedure has facilitated signature collection in comparison with the effort of col-
lecting them in person  Additionally, the signatures are validated quickly due to the platform 
containing online identification tools (“e-signature”), supported by the Ministry of Justice 
(Susha and Grönlund, 2014) 
Practical development
On the state website the progress of different local initiatives can be monitored in relation 
to signature collection and their status  Therefore, it is possible to see what initiatives have 
been triggered in Helsinki, which have been successful and have been sent to the local cham-
ber  The most voted-on initiatives from 2014 on were a proposal for the maintenance of the 
city airport (Malmi Airport), and another for the construction of a bicycle lane (both garnering 
more than 10,000 supporters)  One of the proposals that inspired intense public debate was 
the initiative to hold a referendum about the construction of the Helsinki Grand Mosque 
The proposal to construct the mosque arose in 2015. The project would be financed by a 
foundation attached to the Royal House of Bahrain (Islam and Society Forum)  The large 
mosque would occupy an old industrial site in the city, close to the neighbourhoods with 
sizeable Muslim communities  However, to proceed with the construction it is necessary to 
obtain permission from the City Council due to the fact that the foundation requested the 
use of public space for their not-for-profit project.
Public debate about the project resurfaced at the beginning of 2017 in relation to the dis-
cussion that would be held in the City Hall chamber of representatives that spring  In fact, 
the issue arose in the debates leading up to the municipal elections that year  In this context 
the candidates for the National-Coalition and the Finns’ Party were opposed to the project. 
In contrast, the candidate for the Green League cameo ut in favor “in principle” of the con-
struction of the mosque  Thus, a classic scenario of “culture war” developed between left 
and right-wing positions around the proposed mosque construction 
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Following the elections in April a new centre-right government took power in the city  With a 
view to the municipal decision about the project and the site, at the beginning of November 
a citizens’ initiative was launched to reject the project for the great mosque and to request 
a referendum on the issue  One of the sponsors was a well-known artist and another was 
a member of the Finns Party (Pia Kopra)  The initiative gathered more than 1,200 supporting 
signatures, a small quantity in relation to more successful initiatives (12,000 signatures)  It 
did not pass the minimum threshold required to reach the municipal chamber  In spite of 
that it was utilised as a tool to spread the anti-mosque campaign and as a show of support 
for partisan positions against the project 
The initiative put forward two main arguments: firstly, financing for the mosque would prin-
cipally come from the Bahrain monarchy, identified with radical Islam. Secondly, the mosque 
would offer leisure, sport and free time services, and the signatories opposed infrastructure 
segregated according to religion 
In December 2017 the project was debated in the city’s Urban Development Committee be-
fore being raised in the City Hall plenum  The committee unanimously rejected the sale of a 
public site to the mosque  Therefore the sponsors withdrew the initiative temporarily with 
the intention of reformulating it 
In this case the referendum initiative played a marginal role, since the centre of the political 
debate took place in the municipality and between party political representatives  However, 
the initiative proved useful for social and party political actors who were committed to re-
jecting the mosque: a) mobilising their followers; b) spreading the campaign and information 
which criticised the project; c) a tool for collective action and protest  
Strengths
The online platform set up by the Ministry of Justice facilitates the presentation of initiatives, 
communication and the collection of signatures, as well as the validation (e-signature) of 
individual signatories 
The low requirements in terms of number of signatures encourage the presentation of initia-
tives, although they only succeed in some cases in reaching the chamber of representatives 
that, in the last instance, will take a decision about the concrete measure or referendum  
Weaknesses
Ultimately initiatives are subordinated to decisions taken by municipal representatives, for 
both agenda and referendum initiatives  As Büchi (2011) points out, initiatives have a strongly 
consultative component  
Documentation
Büchi, 2011 / Susha and Grönlund, 2014 / Christensen et al , 2017 / Information about the 
Local Government Act 1995/36595/ Initiative Service Website96/ Website eases progress of 
citizens’ municipal initiatives / Bahrain royals contributing to Helsinki mosque plan97/ Finns 
Party Helsinki chair: Grand mosque is welcome98/ Helsinki’s grand mosque project still has a 
long way to go, reminds project manager99/ Finnish minister says new ‘grand mosque’ plans 
could pose ‘security risk’100/ Mirage: Why Helsinki’s ‘Grand Mosque’ Disappeared101
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Sheet 20. Krakow (Poland):  
Reaction against a big sporting event
Summary
In Poland a citizens’ referendum exists at local level  In 2014, a referendum in Krakow gained 
attention at international level: a social movement platform gathered thousands of signa-
tures online and the local government was politically obliged to call for a referendum over 
their participation in the Olympic Games as a host candidate for 2022  In the referendum 
a significant segment of the population rejected involvement in the sporting event.
Regulation
Local Government Act, March 8th, 1990 referendum 
Local Referendum Act 2001 and municipal statuses  
Formal characteristics
In Poland, the citizens’ referendum initiative was included in the Local Government Act (1990) 
and subsequently in the Local Referendum Act of 1991 and 2000 (Piasecki, 2011)  The initiative 
is put forward by 5 registered voters on the electoral register and also by registered organi-
sations or parties with communal activities  The initiators will have 60 days to collect all valid 
signatures  The request for a referendum requires the support of 10% of voters’ signatures 
The citizens’ initiative is sent to the Provincial Electoral Commission  This institution reviews 
the legal and formal criteria both as an insight and in subsequent signature validation  Once 
validated, the initiative goes to the second phase: the go ahead for the referendum  The Pro-
vincial Electoral Commission and the City Council facilitate the whole process (for example, 
setting up polling stations) 
For the result of the referendum to be valid, it requires participation of at least 30% of the 
voters of the total census (60% of participation in the case of revoking the local government)  
In order to be approved, the measure must reach a simple majority  In referendums regarding 
municipal taxes, a qualified majority is required.
According to Piasecki (2011), the state legislation does not facilitate the citizens’ initiative in 
proposing legislation, policies or agenda issues, but neither does it prohibit it  Thus, some 
local statutes incorporate this type of initiative (Sidor, 2012); but it is a type of direct de-
mocracy scarcely used (Piasecki, 2011)  For example, in Wroclaw, the municipal statute es-
tablishes the citizens’ initiative for local ordinances through a petition signed by 300 voters 
(out of a total population of more than 600,000 inhabitants)  This type of initiative refers to 
local matters (for example, the increase of licenses for the sale of alcohol) or to social issues 
(for example, asking the mayor to negotiate inheritance taxes with the state)  In Warsaw in 
2008 the popular initiative was also launched: 3,000 voters can initiate the proposition of a 
regulation, taking it on to the local chamber for its evaluation 
Prevalence
According to recent studies, the referendum citizens’ initiative is not the most frequently 
used type of direct democracy in Poland, other tools such as the recall referendum initiative 
prevail over it (see sheet 3)  Recall referendums sometimes begin with a citizens’ initiative 
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Regarding the citizens’ legislative initiative or the initiative for the proposal of policies, we are 
not aware of specific studies in Poland, apart from the few existing studies which highlight 
their underdevelopment 
The derogatory referendum mentioned above did not begin -strictly speaking- from an ini-
tiative; it was a campaign to collect signatures promoted by a social movements’ platform, 
which motivated the local government to decide to hold the referendum 
Practical development
In 2012, Krakow was presented as one of the candidate cities to host the Winter Olympic 
Games of 2022  There were other candidates, such as Oslo and Stockholm  However, two 
years later, Krakow was dropped from the list of candidates following a local referendum, 
where part of the population rejected its involvement in the macro sporting event 
In 2012, the City Council of Krakow and the Polish Olympic Committee decided to apply for 
the Winter Olympic Games. The initial enthusiasm was reflected in local and national media, 
but soon they began to give voice to other critical actors who showed their doubts over the 
benefits of the event.
Against the municipal candidacy, an urban social movements’ platform called “Krakow 
Against Games” was created (Vargas-Tetmajer, 2016)  As well as performances, rallies and 
demonstrations, the platform collected more than 7,900 online signatures in support of the 
campaign  It was a central protest strategy that made the platform and its anti-Games dis-
course definitively visible in the national media. It was not a formalised citizens’ initiative, 
but a collective action strategy reacting against a municipal agreement to participate in the 
event (derogatory dimension)  The main arguments of the campaign were economic: exces-
sive public investment, the candidacy would increase the municipal debt, some green areas 
would be destroyed and too many infrastructures would be built just for the event, which, 
according to the part of the population, would then be of little use  (Pasquinelli, 2015) 
Despite the candidacy of 2012, the municipal government decided to revise its decision and 
to hold a referendum over participation in the Olympic Games  The government publicly 
defended its favourable position towards the event  Finally, the referendum was held in May 
2014 together with the European elections  Around 35% of voters turned out and more than 
69% of the voters were against the Olympic candidacy 
Strengths
Although it was not a citizens’ initiative, but rather a strategy of collective action, the collec-
tion of signatures served as a reaction against an unpopular municipal policy  In this sense, 
the collection of signatures can be useful as a defence strategy against unpopular policies, 
as a measure of control over municipal governments, and also as a source of information for 
public decision-makers  Facilitating citizens’ initiative channels and promoting their visibility 
can be a way to establish more formal ways of relating to public administrations through 
more transparent rules 
Weaknesses
In this case, the formalisation of the citizens’ initiative did not take place, thus the decision 
to call for a referendum was primarily the will of the municipal government  The organis-
ers of the platform did not need to formalise the collected signatures to influence public 
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decision-makers  However, in other cases, this formalisation is necessary to gain effective-
ness: only if there is a formalised procedure to request a referendum can the result will be 
achieved 
The social movements’ network collected the signatures via telematic means, through an 
online platform  If citizens’ initiatives do not have this possibility, they can be perceived as 
too costly, and they will then opt for other forms of protest and collective action 
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Sheet 21. Oregon (USA): Citizens’ Initiative Review,  
an initiative supplemented with deliberative forums
Summary
In 2010, the Oregon government launched a new practice linked to the citizens’ initiative: 
a series of deliberative forums would be held before referendums  They would prepare a 
dossier of information for the electorate, as a measure prior to referendums  The measure 
came to be known as the “Citizens’ Initiative Review” (CIR)  Several groups of voters would 
be selected, forming a representative sample of the population, to deliberate for several 
days and to collect their arguments for and against, in a dossier called a “Citizens’ Letter”  
This model of deliberative forum has been incorporated in other states such as California, 
Colorado and Washington 
Regulation
House Bill 2895: 2895 (ch  632), 2009, Session of the Oregon State Legislature 
Formal characteristics
The regulation was aimed at revitalising the citizens’ initiative by promoting a more informed 
public debate  For this purpose, deliberative forums would be held to discuss citizens’ in-
itiatives on state regulations  These forums are formed by randomly chosen electors who 
will receive information from various perspectives and discuss the measures over several 
sessions  After that, they would draft a “Citizens’ Dossier” which includes information about 
the initiative to be submitted to a referendum  This dossier is sent to the electors’ houses 
The regulation establishes some additional details about these deliberative forums: they 
would be composed by a sample of 18-24 registered voters, there would be 5 meetings over 
5 consecutive days, it would be facilitated by an NGO with experience in the material and 
in the organisational work. They would write a final letter with four sections of arguments 
and counterarguments (Citizens’ Letter). The letter also includes a final evaluation of the 
majority of panellists 
The measure was initially a pilot programme, but was implemented permanently in 2011, with 
the support of the major state-wide parties 
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Prevalence
In 2010, two forums were launched to discuss two citizens’ initiatives: one was dedicated 
to discussing the increase of prison sentences for serious crimes and for repeated driving 
under the influence of alcohol; and the second forum was about the medical use of mari-
juana  The panellists, in both cases, wrote the respective “Citizen Letters” with arguments 
and counterarguments that they thought the voters should know about  The experience was 
consolidated in Oregon and has also been extended to other states (Gastil, Richards and 
Knobloch, 2014) 
This new device was the answer to a concern that voters may not have enough information 
or indeed the correct information about the measures submitted to referendums (see Gastil, 
Richards and Knobloch, 2014, on the effects of the CIR)  The “Citizens’ Letter” was intended 
to supplement the citizens’ initiative with additional information prepared by other electors, 
covering potential gaps in information 
One of the main effects was an increase in the information about the “Citizens’ Initiative 
Review” itself  In a survey carried out in 2010, around a 25% of the interviewees knew about 
the new deliberative forums before the state sent the Citizens’ Letter  After the distribution 
of this information, around 42% knew about the deliberative forums 
Regarding the formation of opinions, in the case of the initiative regarding penalties asso-
ciated with serious crimes, the information prepared by the forums helped 30% of the re-
spondents to form their own opinions on the matter  Regarding the initiative over the medical 
use of marijuana, a smaller number of respondents felt influenced by the new information 
offered by the forums (only 18% said they had been influenced).
Practical development
From the point of view of the deliberation that took place in the forums, Knobloch et al  
(2013) give a positive assessment  These authors wrote a series of reports about the deliber-
ative experience of the participants and the practical development of the forums  Regarding 
this evaluation, we can highlight some elements:
First, after analysing the participants’ experience and the observations of the researchers, the 
forums were useful for weighing up the pros and cons of the measure  Learning about new 
arguments or identifying the underlying values of the initiatives emerged as a less relevant 
effect: participants probably already knew these about values and arguments  Secondly, the 
following areas were considered excellent during the development of the forums: equality in 
participation (for example, in intervention); the consideration of the different arguments and 
mutual respect among participants and elements related to the careful facilitation of session  
Finally, and very prominently, the development of a non-coercive process of exchange and 
decision-making (in a reasoned manner) was applauded by the participants 
According to Knobloch et al  (2013), successful deliberation standards were the product of a 
previous session of deliberative training and skills (how to discuss the issues); the mixture 
of discussion formats in small groups and in a plenary; and the inclusion of question and 
answer sessions with stakeholders and observers of the process 
Strengths
One of the critiques about the use of the initiative and the referendum refers to problems 
in the distribution of adequate and diverse information  This type of deliberative forum can 
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serve to complement the information provided through other means such as state insti-
tutions, the media, political parties, the promoters themselves and the detractors of the 
initiatives 
The deliberative forums generate a summary document (Citizens’ Letter) including the argu-
ments for and against a specific proposal. The forums listen, debate and include the various 
points of view  They can therefore act as a balance to the stakeholders’ arguments and/or 
to the actors who have a higher capacity to shape public opinion on the matter (for exam-
ple, through privileged access to the media or through promoting campaigns with greater 
economic resources) 
Weaknesses
In some cases, the information offered by the forums (the Citizens’ Letter) does not con-
stitute significant additional material; it is neither different nor more influential than the 
information available through other means  They may represent a waste of time, effort and 
money, without a clear contribution in terms of additional information  Perhaps it would be 
appropriate to reserve this tool for those initiatives that foresee a greater need to comple-
ment the available information 
Bibliography
Gastil y Knobloch, 2010 / Gastil et al , 2014 / Knobloch et al , 2013 / House Bill 2895102
105
6. Conclusions
The citizens’ initiative represents a complex and unequal participatory tool  It is com-
plex, given the very different models and processes that exist, and unequal, because its 
presence, development and results vary enormously between regions and countries  In this 
study we have tried to improve our understanding of the reality of the local citizens’ initia-
tive, the debates concerning its potential and risks, its geographical dispersion and its most 
relevant characteristics  We have set out a general view of the topic, analysing 21 experiences 
and the contributions of 20 experts in this field.
This study has tackled numerous debates, illustrated by more or less successful cas-
es  From this revision we are setting out a series of ideas on elements which we consider 
relevant, to guarantee that the administration’s efforts in opening up participatory channels, 
and of citizens in putting them into practice, will be fruitful and generate positive results  
In the face of the crisis of political institutions, the citizens’ initiative is seen as one option, 
amongst many others, to strengthen the link between citizens and representative institu-
tions  If badly designed, it could well have the opposite effect 
Before considering specific questions, it is important to highlight that there are no 
magic formulas that can guarantee the success of a particular model of citizens’ initiative  
That which works in one area, could fail in another, or visa-versa  The context is, in this way 
fundamental, both at a social level (the community which wants to be heard) as it is at a 
political level (the institutional political framework within which the initiative is to be placed)  
Without losing sight of the relevance of each idiosyncrasy, we are confined to pointing out 
some issues that should be carefully considered in good regulation and good practices 
The purpose of initiatives
The first point to consider is the objectives which the initiative can aim at. Apart from 
objectives that are intrinsic to each kind of initiative (to propose legislation, debates, refer-
endums, to recall laws and revoke posts) the possible topics to be included can be limited 
or extensive  This is less relevant in the case of recall, although it can be under the control of 
the Mayor, the entire government, individual members, or even designated public offices. In 
the remaining initiatives, it becomes a central aspect  Opening a participatory process, which 
can deal with any topic, is not the same as establishing important restrictions  The most 
restrictive, and relatively common of these, is that which has to do with money, preventing 
the municipal budget from being affected  On the one hand, this leaves out elements which 
are crucial to citizen interests. On the other hand, depending on how the topic is defined, 
it can contribute to positioning vis-à-vis the final vote. Also, depending how the topic is set 
out, it could lead to ambiguity given that almost any proposition could have a budgetary 
effect if it were to be approved 
As far as the intrinsic scope of each type is concerned, the agenda initiative is the 
least assured, given that its link with decision-making is limited to promoting a debate in 
the representative chamber, which could perfectly well be ignored or rejected  In this case, 
limiting the topics to be included in the proposition makes less sense  An agenda initiative 
with few guarantees is not so different from many other less formal mechanisms  Citizens 
everywhere can collect signatures and deliver them to the authorities for them to consid-
er  The difference could stem from the establishment of a clear public debating procedure 
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and response mechanisms, just as from the possibility that the promoters participate in a 
deliberative process, with no vote, but with a voice  Moreover, if the debate is opened up to 
all citizens, this tool could be seen as more useful than other ways of expressing demands 
Matching requirements and objectives
The remaining initiatives, which should be deemed successful if they impact directly 
on the decision-making process, are intrinsically more attractive as a channel of collective 
action  This decision-making relevance of each type of initiative should, without doubt, be 
bound to the requirements which are defined by its implementation. In cost-benefit terms, 
the more benefit an initiative can generate, the greater the costs its potential drivers will be 
prepared to assume, and vice versa 
For an initiative to demonstrate an outstanding support, these requirements make 
reference to the number of signatures required; where they can be collected and the time 
needed to assemble them and, in case of its leading to a referendum, to the conditions that 
ensure a binding result  At the same time, these elements should relate to one another  On 
the one hand, the combination of the requisite number of signatures (be it a percentage, 
or an absolute majority) with the time needed to obtain them  In the short term there is no 
sense to a high quorum  On the other hand, the requirements of the signatures and those 
of the referendum  Very relaxed requirements, to guarantee the outcome of the referendum 
(in an extreme case, a simple majority without a minimum participation threshold) could be 
sustainable if the requirements for delivering signatures are very strict and act as a filter for 
the majority of proposals  The number of referendums to be carried out, would, in principle, 
be limited with this option, by the cost of achieving them, but its highly binding nature could 
be sufficient to promote the use of the tool. With the reverse combination, relaxed require-
ments for the signatures (few and over a long period of time) could lead to a less demanding 
referendum (with a participatory quorum and votes in favour of the proposition) 
Information and expectations
In many cases the question is often raised as to why tools, such as the citizens’ initia-
tive, that are already the disposal of citizens are not used  Of course, it is necessary for citi-
zens to be aware from the start, of the existence of these instruments and their potential and 
basic requirements  Besides this, the answer to the question probably results, in part, from 
a negative evaluation of the balance, between the costs implied in activating the initiative 
and the effects it can have  This balance, between the degree of binding to public decisions 
and the requirements to ensure it prospers, is important to encourage public demands be 
driven forward and for use of the process to make sense (instead of opting for other ways to 
express demands) whilst at the same time, avoiding an overuse of this participatory channel 
from saturating the political process or giving excessive influence to a small minority, with 
the costs and the waste that this would mean 
Correction of inequalities
When considering participatory costs, a tool to channel citizens’ demands, should 
take into account the existing inequalities in society  For a group of people or a small as-
sociation to initiate a process of signature collection the same effort is not required as for 
an organisation with large economic resources and access to the media  In this sense, it is 
opportune for the design of the initiatives to include elements that can compensate for these 
inequalities, such as technical assistance and with dissemination 
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In the event of a referendum, these inequalities could lead to the possibilities of 
campaigns in favour or against the proposition, so, it is advisable to incorporate measures 
to increase the power of, and give visibility to, the campaign, as well as perhaps limiting the 
economic resources invested in it by each party 
Online platforms
New technology is a final aspect to highlight in relation to the costs of participation. 
The possibility of online platforms makes collecting signatures easier and more open  In 
some cases it has been proven that they have also led to social groups that are traditionally 
excluded from institutional participation (such as young people) being involved  Likewise, 
through the web, signature collecting campaigns can be complemented by forums that allow 
debate and flow of information, although these inevitably only reach certain sectors of the 
population 
Transparent procedures
Guaranteeing transparency throughout the process is a fundamental issue if citizens’ 
initiatives are to contribute to reducing the mistrust towards political institutions  This means 
establishing clear and detailed rules from the beginning to the end of the proposition’s jour-
ney, such as a system that can guarantee accountability  Incorporating independent actors to 
influence different stages of the process could be relevant in this sense. This is especially in 
order to allow promoters of an initiative who disagree with some decisions made by public 
authorities to respond (such as, for example, in the case of refusal of a signature collection 
proposal alleging that the subject does not comply with the stipulated requirements in the 
regulations) 
Electoral convergence
One of the concerns in relation to direct democracy refers to the danger of overload-
ing citizens with too many electoral events  In order to avoid this, several experiments show 
the relevance of making several questions converge in one electoral event, grouping citizens’ 
propositions with calls for representative elections  In this way representative dynamics and 
direct democracy converge, and avoid a saturation of elections and participatory spaces 
Initiatives and debate
Lastly, we need to refer to the quality of debate  The participation and the empowerment 
that can be achieved through direct democracy, often conflict with slow and well organised 
deliberation and debate, that can give rise to less dichotomous solutions, than the result of 
a referendum  In an attempt to reduce this dichotomy, phases which permit a richer rela-
tionship between the instigators of the proposition and the administration to take place, are 
designed into some initiatives. One example is that of a legislative initiative with a first round 
of signature collection to register the proposal, which is discussed with public representa-
tives to facilitate agreement, before initiating the second phase of signature collection, which 
culminates in a referendum  In turn, when faced with a citizens’ proposal, the government 
can occasionally include a counter proposal in the referendum, enabling several options for 
citizens to decide upon. In terms of the final stage of voting, it is important to enable chan-
nels for the flow of information between citizens and the different sectors involved.
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Combination with other tools
This mixture of participation and deliberation can be made more powerful by combin-
ing the citizens’ initiative with other tools  The Citizens’ Initiative Review (see sheet 21) is an 
example of the combination of a legislative initiative, including its instigators and detractors, 
with citizens’ juries who hear out interested parties, and then debate and develop a report 
that is intended to inform the vote  The involvement of the initiators throughout the whole 
process (from the start of a petition until voting) and even when it is developed into specific 
policies, can strengthen the relationship between citizens and public institutions
In short, a citizens’ initiative cannot be considered in isolation  It must be conceived 
of and designed in relation to the combined participatory tools, including amongst these the 
varying initiative models that exist in that community  Take the example of a municipality 
that has limited itself to implementing the recall initiative, or where the rest of the initiatives 
are designed in such a way as to make them too costly and/or weakly binding  In these sce-
narios, when faced with municipal legislation which is rejected by citizens, popular discord 
could lead to a direct attempt to remove the government, instead of initiating a process to 
repeal the particular policy or propose alternatives  Therefore, the citizens’ initiative should 
be conceived as part of a broader architecture of related instruments (Okamoto and Serdult, 
2016; Takanobu, 2000) 
The Initiative as a school of Democracy
Neither is it appropriate to evaluate the citizens’ initiative in isolation, but rather it 
should be understood as part of a process, which implies learning and evolution  The paths 
taken by different experiences of direct democracy are important: as time passes under-
standing of the tool improves and becomes used more appropriately  In those places where 
direct democratic experiences are more established and are designed on the bases of an 
appropriate combination of validation requirements and effects upon the political process, 
they generally work well and receive positive evaluations from citizens  Where there is less 
experience (or experience does not exist) the citizens’ initiative can initiate a route whereby 
the citizenry and public administration lean towards greater interaction  This can plunge both 
into a learning process of active participation, as well as increased responsiveness 
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Annex: List of consulted experts
Table A 1. List of consulted experts and their institutions
Name Institution
Alejandro Montbrun Consultant
Alicia Lissidini Universidad Nacional de San Martín
Brigitte Geissel Goethe University Frankfurt
Bruno Kaufmann Swiss Democracy Foundation
Caroline Morris Queen Mary, University of London
Céline Colombo University of Zurich
Francisco Soto Barrientos Universidad de Chile
Henrik Serup Christensen Åbo Akademi University, Turku
Jo Saglie Institute for Social Research, Oslo
Jan Erling Klausen Universitetet i Oslo
John Gastil Pennsylvania State University
Maija Setälä University of Turku
Mike Davies SMART Harare
Ming Zhuang Participation Center, China
Neliana Rodean University of Verona
Nenad Stojanovic Université de Genève
Orestes Suárez Antón European Parliament
Sandra Hincapié Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, México
Víctor Cuesta Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria
Yan Guzman Hernández Universidad de La Habana
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